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Security Conference Continues in Vienna

Slow Progress Noted

LD0105220191 Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT 1 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna May 2 TASS—The need to augment the important results, achieved at the talks on confidence-building measures and security in Europe, was stressed at a regular plenary meeting of this forum, which was held in the Austrian capital on Wednesday.

Its participants stated that delegations from 34 states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe put forth several interesting ideas and proposals, which should be studied.

The Soviet delegation also spelled out its specific proposals on the limitation of military activities by all CSCE countries.

Meeting participants noted that the work on a seminar on military doctines is progressing. There is an impression that the sides are close to a decision on this issue, except the dating of the seminar.

However, the rate of examining some other issues leaves much to be desired. Partners has not begun to discuss many of them, including the mandate of future talks, which will begin after Helsinki-2—the forthcoming CSCE summit in 1992.

The experience of work on the mandate at the Madrid and then the Vienna CSCE summits shows that much effort and some time will be needed for this purpose. However, participants in the talks have not even had a preliminary exchange of opinions on this issue.

Arms Experts Comment

LD0205191191 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 2 May 91

[Excerpts] Soviet-American talks on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments continue in Geneva. Here is the Radio Moscow military expert Colonel Vadim Solovyev, with the details:

[Solovyev, in Russian fading into English translation] The American side has attempted to (?revive) the important general understandings on the reduction of individual types of strategic armaments, including those confirmed by the heads of the foreign policy agencies of the Soviet Union and the United States in Washington on 12 December last year. [passage omitted]

Then there was a long interval in the Geneva talks. A few days ago, work on the text of the treaty was resumed, said Col. Solovyev.

And now here's the opinion of the Soviet representative Lieutenant-Gerneral Petr Ladygin:

[Ladygin, in Russian fading into English translation] The Soviet side had used this working intermission to prepare for active work at the talks with American partners. We hope that the United States also used the technical intermission for finding final solutions to the unresolved, mostly technical questions.

I am a participant in the talks myself, with ample experience in solving similar questions at an international level, and I can definitely say that if the sides demonstrate willingness, the strategic arms limitation treaty could be completed within a limited period of time. That was clear at the beginning of the year, but if the United States is reluctant to complete this work in the near future, we are ready to work with Americans as much as they wish. We realize that an agreement on considerable cuts in strategic offensive weapons is necessary for the international community as a whole, not just the Soviet Union or the United States.

Moscow Conference Urges End to Naval Arms Race

PM0105115791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 91 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "For Peace in the Ocean; Soviet Public Appeal"]

[Text] Representatives of public organizations, scientists, jurists, and seafarers who gathered for a conference in Moscow on 30 April voiced profound concern at the continuing naval arms race.

Despite the liquidation of the "cold war," the changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe, and the reaching of an accord on a significant reduction in conventional arms, it was stated at the conference, the question of reducing naval confrontation and strengthening confidence-building measures on the seas and oceans remains open. Furthermore, naval forces have not been included in the overall disarmament process.

The conference participants addressed an urgent appeal to the USSR and U.S. presidents, parliamentarians, statesmen, public figures, politicians, and peacemaking organizations to take all possible measures to take the first steps toward beginning talks on these very complex problems.

Representatives of the Soviet public supported the movement to convene a world conference of "people's diplomacy" on problems of limiting the naval arms race and to create a combined UN naval force.

Economist Yavlinskiy Interviewed on G-7 Meeting

PM0205155991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, coauthor of the "500 days" program and leader of the Center for Economic and Political Studies, by I. Demchenko under the "Events and Commentary" rubric; place and date not given: "Will the G-7 Help Us?"]

[Text] A session of the Council of Experts of the world's seven most highly industrialized countries—the United States, Britain, France, Japan, the FRG, Italy, and Canada—was held in Washington 25-26 April. Soviet economist Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, one of the authors of the "500 days" program and leader of the Center for Economic and Political Studies, took part in and spoke at the conference, which was held at the U.S. State Department. On his return he agreed to answer a few questions.

[Demchenko] Who belongs to the G-7 group of advisers and what significance do the decisions drafted by them have?

[Yavlinskiy] As the official conference documents state, they number around 100 leading international experts in the sphere of economic policy and businessmen. Most council members are current or former officials of G-7 countries occupying the posts of finance ministers, directors of central banks, and so forth. Former Japanese Prime Minister N. Takeshita is the council's honorary chairman.

The Council of Experts sets out to hold the widest and most intense economic discussion on the professional plane aimed at elaborating political decisions in the economic sphere. As far as the acceptance and implementation of the recommendations are concerned, this is determined by the high standing enjoyed by the advisers.

[Demchenko] What was the aim of the conference?

[Yavlinskiy] It drew up recommendations for the conference of G-7 heads of state that is planned to be held in London this summer. Problems associated with those states' economic policy vis-a-vis other countries were discussed in this connection. For example, there was detailed discussion as to whether this policy should be administrative or indirect in nature and whether influence on the world economy should be expressed in the direct form of, say, the centralized setting of currency exchange rates or whether this influence should be exercised via economic and political levers.

Much attention was paid to questions of enhancing the population's propensity to save as a means of fighting inflation as a most important element of financial policy. Problems connected with the current crisis in the banking system in the United States, oil prices, and questions of free trade were also discussed. All the experts agreed that maintaining stable prices is the main objective and the basic principle of world financial policy. If the Seven agree on these questions, then success can be expected. Does this not remind you of something?

[Demchenko] Were questions connected with our country discussed at the conference?

[Yavlinskiy] One of the four sittings was devoted entirely to a range of problems connected with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

[Demchenko] What do you think is the reason for such a direct interest in our problems?

[Yavlinskiy] The point is that what happens in the Soviet Union is of great significance for the world economy. The whole of Eastern Europe, for example, depends on our energy sources, and if the Soviet Union's slump continues, the West will have to take charge of all our former brothers in the socialist camp. Moreover, the countries of Eastern Europe now lack markets to sell their output. The upsetting of all these proportions naturally has a great impact on all world financial and economic policy.

[Demchenko] How, in your opinion, do these countries regard the question of continuing aid to the Soviet Union—is it a question of goodwill or vital necessity?

[Yavlinskiy] There are varying standpoints on this score. Some experts felt, in this regard, that there is nothing surprising in what is happening in the Soviet Union—you simply have to wait until we straighten things out ourselves. Others said that it is in the interest of the whole world that the situation be stabilized as quickly as possible, and that positive processes must be helped. It seemed to me that those who hold to the second view are considerably more numerous.

[Demchenko] What form could G-7 help take?

[Yavlinskiy] If it is clear to them that we are carrying out effective reforms which are improving people's situation and indeed increasing political stability in the country and the world and if they are sure that the efforts invested will yield results, they are ready to participate in the reform not just financially but also in terms of equipment, know-how, organization, and so forth. So, as usual, everything depends on us.

IMF Cited on Need for Economic Reform

91UF0693A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Apr 91 Union Edition p 4

[Unattributed IZVESTIYA report: "West Is Not in a Hurry With Assistance"]

[Text] **A highly placed IMF representative, desiring to remain unnamed, told journalists that the West does not intend to provide assistance to the Soviet Union until a reform of the Soviet economy is implemented.**

"Not one country can invest money in a system that is collapsing. Reform is a necessity and, to achieve it, a political agreement must be reached on the Union treaty."

According to the assessment of the aforementioned representative, the situation in the USSR is "extremely dangerous." "At the present stage, we are not in a condition to give any kind of positive evaluation," he emphasized. "The scales of the Soviet economy are being curtailed, the trade of the Soviet Union with its partners in Eastern Europe is breaking down, and the volume of production of the chief export product, oil, is dropping. All of this could result in unpredictable consequences for the country and its East European neighbors."

The French TRIBUNE DE L'EXPANSION cites the opinion of IMF specialists that "the economic disintegration of the Soviet Union has begun, and it threatens an incalculable disaster both for the USSR and for the countries of Eastern Europe."

Referring to the possibility of the Soviet Union receiving foreign economic aid, the newspaper writes: "While in South Korea the USSR president was able to get an agreement on economic cooperation, in particular on the joint development of gas deposits on Sakhalin, he came away empty-handed from Japan, on whose visit a lot was staked. But under circumstances when the economic demands of the strikers are being replaced more and more rapidly by demands for the resignation of the president, the government, and the Supreme Soviet, who bear responsibility for the crisis, the Soviet leadership needs at least some kind of success in the international arena."

Foreign Ministry Lauds Ethiopian Peace Moves

PM0105121591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 91 Union Edition p 5

[Foreign Ministry statement, place and date not given: "Statement by USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman"]

[Text] As is well known, after examining the question of the military-political situation in the country recently, an emergency session of the Ethiopian National Assembly (Shengo) adopted a number of important decisions designed to settle the intra-Ethiopian conflict peacefully. The Shengo proposed "starting peace talks with all opposition groups and forces in favor of Ethiopian unity at a common table with a view to securing an agreement to establish a long-term peace in the country and create a transitional structure." The Ethiopian supreme legislative body said that legal guarantees of all opposition forces taking part in the country's political life would be provided. There was a proposal for a cease-fire to be called on the fronts and other steps to be taken to stop the civil war.

Thus, Addis Ababa called for a "peaceful forum" involving all combatant sides to secure national accord.

We greeted these suggestions with approval—suggestions that have been dictated, we realize, by recognition of supreme responsibility for Ethiopia's future. Over the last few years the Soviet side has made vigorous efforts to reach a political settlement to the conflicts rending Ethiopia. We believe that the initiative proclaimed by the Ethiopian legislature opens the way to a cessation of the bloodshed and the establishment of the long-awaited peace in this country.

Guided by its principled line of settling the intra-Ethiopian situation peacefully, the Soviet Union is prepared to make use of its opportunities to help establish broad and constructive dialogue in Ethiopia on the basis of the Ethiopian National Assembly's new peace initiative.

United States & Canada

Bush Says 'Possibility' of Granting Farm Credits

PM0205152191 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 2 May 91 p 3

["Verbatim" feature "received via TASS channels": "'Useful for Us, for Our Farmers...' From G. Bush's Speech to Editors of U.S. Farming Newspapers"]

[Text] Question: Have you decided to grant the Soviet Union new credits?

Answer: No, I have not. We are considering this at the moment. The bill—and I have talked about this with Ed (Ed Madigan, U.S. secretary of agriculture—SELSKAYA ZHIZN editorial note)—is fairly specific as regards creditworthiness. If I am mistaken then let Ed correct me, but I think that's right. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has not entered the stage of the market reforms which I think Gorbachev aspires to, and I am sure Republic President Yeltsin also. So for us to be able to provide credits, they must make steps to become creditworthy.

Maybe—and we are considering this—there is a possibility of providing credits, but I must say to you that another problem is that we want to be sure about how these resources will be distributed, sure that no region will be left out and everyone will enjoy the benefits of this credit. This matter is now being discussed. I don't mean that I will not continue to look into this. In my opinion, this would be very good in some spheres, very useful for us, for our grain growers. I mean I cannot help but react to the fact that these farmers are suffering, and so I would like to help them, but I must stick to the law.

Question: What is your reaction to the instability demonstrated last week, when Gorbachev wanted to resign but the Central Committee did not accept his resignation? What would his departure mean for U.S. agriculture?

Answer: I think it would mean uncertainty in the Soviet Union. A multitude of questions arise about what course the Soviet Union will choose to take if Gorbachev goes.

I would like to think that the changes demonstrated by the events in Eastern Europe and their much greater openness and by glasnost in the Soviet Union itself are irreversible.

But this is an internal matter for the Soviet Union. I prefer to maintain close contacts with Gorbachev, he is just the man who is needed now. From time to time we meet with leaders at various levels, including my meeting with the Baltic leaders. We have differences of opinion with them on the question of our relations with the republics just at this moment. But I think what happened last week is encouraging because people were saying that Gorbachev had difficulties even in relations with the party, and I think these events showed that this is not so.

But, of course, turbulent events are taking place in the Soviet Union today and he is coming up against great difficulties. And this in no way makes us happy.

We want to preserve our good relations, but they have colossal problems at the moment, simply colossal problems, and this in no way makes me... us happy. I would like to find the means to help them, but when it is a question of these credits, we can't... we have to comply with our laws.

U.S. Actions Said To Belie Free Trade Talk

PM0205142391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Apr 91 First Edition p2

[G. Kostenko article: "Not Allowed! Who Understands Freedom of International Trade and How"]

[Text] At all kinds of fora representatives of the U.S. Administration and those international financial organizations under its control speak out strongly in favor of a world market and free trade, which, they say, must not be restricted either by protectionism or by political conditions. But as soon as U.S. interests are affected, the administration's practical actions immediately begin to diverge from its expansive declarations.

What is the point, for example, of the Washington-sponsored Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] regulations based on criteria drawn up when the cold war was at its height, whereby no developed Western country may sell modern technology to the Soviet Union? Even now, for all its statements about how the cold war has receded into the past and the Soviet Union is considered to be an equal partner, the U.S. Administration stubbornly continues to insist on keeping the old restrictions on the export of advanced, high-technology products to our country. Europe and Japan are becoming increasingly aware that the aim of this policy is not so much to prevent the possibility of improving Soviet military technology as to force rivals from the international market.

To no less an extent, a similar policy is used to restrict the export of advanced technology from the Soviet Union. The situation is reaching the stage of outright blackmail and blatant deception. According to AFP, the U.S. Government, which enjoys a virtual monopoly on the right to space technology in the United States, does its utmost to oppose competition from other countries—the Soviet Union, in particular—in the launching of satellites into space.

For example, Brazil recently showed definite interest in the possibility of launching its own satellite from the Alcantara test site, using a Soviet carrier rocket to do so. Cries of outrage from Washington immediately rained down on the heads of the unfortunate Brazilians: What on earth do you think you are doing? If you embark on this cooperation, you will find yourself with serious political and economic difficulties in your relations with other countries! And when Australia decided to build a

space port with our help to launch the Soviet "Zenit" carrier rocket to take foreign satellites into space for commercial purposes, the United States (although what has it got to do with the United States?) began to demand that if this deal were to go ahead, the Soviet Union must cease all commercial space activity in its territory. No less!

The Soviet Union is now considerably ahead of other countries in a number of areas of space technology. These include achievements in the medical, biological, and technical support of long-term stays in outer space; space materials technology; the creation of carrier rockets and liquid-propellant engines for them; and so forth. It is no accident that foreign firms are showing great interest in cooperating with the Soviet Union in the creation of environment-friendly oxygen-kerosene engines for new carrier rockets. They recognize the leading role of Soviet industry in this respect. Indeed, how could it not be recognized, when the latest U.S. development in this field dates back to 1959, while we have modern engines of this type—used in the "Zenit" carrier rocket, incidentally. Their level is higher than what the United States and other countries intend to have by the end of the nineties.

One would have thought that mutually advantageous cooperation could have been achieved in precisely this sphere. However, some people are again seeking reasons for political opposition, completely discounting the fact that ignoring other countries' achievements and repeating stages of technical development that have long been passed can only set back those who scorn the experience of others and act in such a way as to prevent competition on the international market.

U.S. Seen Focusing on 'Economic Intelligence'

91UF0683A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Kireyevskiy: "A Double Yardstick"]

[Text] *The authoritative American magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS recently published a large article entitled "Intelligence in the Era of Glasnost." In essence its author D. Carver, a former career intelligence officer and a member of the consultative group for developing policy in the area of special operations of the U.S. Defense Department, outlined an extensive program for restructuring the operations of the U.S. intelligence community.*

At the same time another authoritative journal, FOREIGN POLICY, published an article "Meeting Moscow Halfway" by M. Brement, a leading member of the staff of the U.S. National Security Council. It was devoted to the issues of radical changes in U.S. foreign policy and the military system in the environment of the "cold war" coming to an end.

Dissimilar as these articles are, one gets the impression that the authors had discussed in advance the topic on which the articles touch, namely, economic intelligence, and had assigned roles in covering it. The former author actually calls for global economic espionage by the United States on its competitors, including allies, whereas the latter, Brement, demands categorically that other countries engage in no such activities against the United States. In particular, he offered 17 points of "appropriate behavior," "transforming" U.S.-Soviet relations. What are we supposed to do? In addition to abolishing the practice of keeping scientific and space information secret in the USSR on the basis of "far-fetched national security considerations," it is recommended "to resolutely put an end to espionage and the extensive program for stealing commercial and technical secrets."

How does the United States follow these theoretical postulates? As the newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE reported, a campaign to "reorient" operations is getting under way in the CIA. In the opinion of one of the leaders of this organization, changes under way in the world are providing "a golden opportunity" for U.S. intelligence which it should take advantage of.

A planning and coordination directorate has been set up at the CIA in order to implement the new course. Six special operation groups work within it. The issue of U.S. competitiveness in the area of economics and state-of-the-art technologies is a priority in their operations. In his public statements, CIA Director W. Webster persistently brings up the notion of the significance of economic intelligence and counterintelligence, stressing that economic frictions between countries will mount in the immediate future.

In light of this, reports by highly placed FBI representatives concerning economic intelligence operations allegedly conducted against the United States by "friendly countries" are not surprising. The FBI assistant director for counterintelligence directly accused French agents of attempting to obtain secret information from the U.S. computer companies IBM and Texas Instruments.

Striving to somehow neutralize the unfavorable impression made by the "new" intelligence initiatives, CIA officials maintain that their goal is not to spy on foreign companies but merely "to integrate and collate information on very broad aspects of the economy."

At the same time, the CIA acknowledges that through its agents and National Security Agency [NSA] spy satellites it receives information containing economic secrets of various countries, including the USSR, which it shares with private U.S. companies if needed. NSA Director Vice Admiral W. Studeman also gave to understand that his agency is even "asked" to procure "competitive" information. In the process he voiced the apprehension that countries friendly to the United States in various regions of the world may, acting in defense of their secrets, ban the siting of NSA technical information-gathering facilities on their territories. The concerns of

the vice admiral are easy to understand. Along with information on its allies, the United States may lose a substantial segment of USSR economic secrets because numerous U.S. listening posts are located in a number of countries bordering on our country.

The so-called "strategic program for environmental protection research" proposed in fall 1990 by the Senate Armed Services Committee of the Congress is also associated with the efforts to invigorate "economic competition" being made in the United States. Research of "broad issues" of the environment is the focus of the plan proposed by Senator Nunn. The Senate allocated $200 million for the initial stage of the program.

Broad circles of the public almost failed to notice this event. However, interesting details of this plan, which attracted the attention of other countries, soon began to appear in the U.S. press. Thus, the Washington magazine MILITARY SPACE noted that within the framework of the program heightened attention is being paid to surveillance technologies, in particular super-sensitive sensors, which may track global changes in the environment. It was also reported that miniature space-based sensors developed in the Los Alamos laboratory are so sensitive that from space they may even "smell" the chemical composition of the output of small underground enterprises manufacturing narcotics. A network of 1,000 such satellites carrying laser sensors and onboard equipment for information processing will be placed in space orbits surrounding the globe.

Individual details of this plan make it possible to state that the United States is creating a new extensive system of aerospace intelligence gathering whose technical potential may also be put to use for economic espionage on a global scale.

As is usually the case under such circumstances, the United States uses a double standard while embarking on "reorienting" the operations of its intelligence community and focusing its efforts on economic intelligence. While vigorously mounting economic espionage against other countries, the United States at the same time demands from them in the form of an ultimatum that similar actions not be allowed to occur with regard to itself.

China

Defense Minister Departs for PRC Visit

LD0205181991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1750 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 2 May (TASS)—Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, left today on a visit to China at the invitation of the PRC defense minister.

Dmitriy Yazov was seen off at the airport by Army General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces; Army General Konstantin Kochetov, first deputy USSR minister of defense; and Colonel General Nikolay Sylaga, first deputy USSR minister of defense and chief of the main military-political directorate of the USSR Armed Forces. Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR, was among those seeing him off.

Arrives for 5-Day Visit

LD0305085991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0735 GMT 3 May 91

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Kashirov and Sergey Sorokin]

[Text] Beijing, 3 May (TASS)—D.T. Yazov, marshal of the Soviet Union and USSR minister of defense, arrived here today on an official visit at the invitation of Colonel General Qin Jiwei, PRC minister of national defense.

We have arrived in friendly China, with whom we have the longest border, the USSR defense minister told TASS correspondents on his arrival. He stressed that following M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the PRC, relations between our two countries have changed substantially for the better, although the attitudes of the Soviet and Chinese peoples toward one another have never been bad regardless of the cold winds that have blown at times. We have arrived in the hope of getting to know China better. Of course, I am primarily interested in military friends and colleagues with whom we have been exchanging opinions on a number of issues that interest both sides. I think that this will be of benefit both to us and to the Chinese military leaders.

During his five-day stay in the PRC, the head of the Soviet military department will conduct talks with his Chinese counterpart, Qin Jiwei; will be received by Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission; and will be received by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council. Yazov will also tour the country.

The first official visit to the PRC by a USSR defense minister in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations has been made possible by the successful development over the past two years of bilateral ties and cooperation between the Soviet Union and China.

A qualitatively new stage in Soviet-Chinese relations, including cooperation in the military field, was initiated in May 1989, when, after a lengthy interruption, there was a meeting in Beijing between M.S. Gorbachev and the highest Chinese leaders. Complete normalization of relations between the two largest socialist states was declared.

Yazov's motorcade made its way form Shoudu, the capital's airport, to the square of the central military museum, where the official ceremony led by Col. Gen. Qin Jiwei took place to welcome D.T. Yazov.

The ceremony was attended by N.N. Solovyev, USSR ambassador to the PRC, and also by Major General N.S. Proskurnin, the USSR's military, naval, and air force attache in the PRC.

Defense Official on Relations

LD0205121391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1015 GMT 2 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 2 May (TASS)—Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Yazov, USSR defense minister, leaves today on an official visit to China. This is the first time in the history of Soviet-Chinese relations that a visit will be made by a military leader of such a rank. The minister's visit must be regarded in the general context of the development of mutual relations between the two countries. It is a qualitatively new stage, the ground for which was laid by the meeting between USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and the PRC leadership.

"Current Soviet-Chinese relations must be regarded as one of the key elements in the entire system of international relations in the Asian-Pacific Ocean region," Lieutenant General Valeriy Manilov, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, stated in an interview with a TASS correspondent. He added that "Our relations with China are undergoing a new fruitful stage—a stage of normalization of relations after the well-known period of exacerbation and tension."

In the general's opinion, the strengthening of confidence and the expansion of various types of ties between the USSR and China on a business-like and constructive basis "serve to open up the potentials of the two major powers more fully for the benefit of all mankind." As is noted in the interview, mutual ties between the USSR and the PRC are also developing in the military sphere, against a background of the positive changes in the world. Valeriy Manilov said that a beneficial role is being played here by the agreement signed in 1990 on strengthening of trust in the military sphere in the Soviet-Chinese border region, as well as on the revival of cooperation between the military departments of the Soviet Union and China on a wide range of issues.

"The parameters of our countries are such that they can and should build their mutual relations on the basis of friendship and good-neighborliness. The security of both the Asian-Pacific Ocean region and of the entire planet depend directly on this," the general said in conclusion.

Northeast Asia

Sakhalin Leader Cited on Islands Issue

OW0305011291 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Television in Russian 0815 GMT 16 Apr 91

[News conference by Anatoliy Petrovich Aksenov, chairman of the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet, on his tour of U.S. oil industry sites and talks with oil industry officials; to foreign and domestic correspondents in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, date not given; news conference chaired by Fedor Fedorovich Volk, Sakhalin Oblast Soviet press secretary—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] I would like to digress a bit from your trip, insofar as there are no more questions on this issue. The third session of the oblast soviet adopted a decision calling for inclusion of the oblast soviet chairman in the delegation that is presently visiting Japan. Did the session exceed its authority, did it interfere in the competence of the country's supreme authorities, or else, did these authorities simply disregard the decision of the oblast soviet?

[Aksenov] You know, I am a product of the system that we are criticizing. I worked in it for many years as a low-level rayon leader. So I have to say that unfortunately we did not manage to avoid many of the things we wanted to avoid. Maybe it is because many people who worked there previously have remained, maybe there are other reasons. But unfortunately—possibly due to the political situation that has taken shape in the country today—unfortunately many of our demands, letters, and appeals remain entirely unresolved. That is why only one official response has been received, from the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of Russia, to the decision of our session and our numerous letters, and I have been familiarized with it.

It is related to the fact that the Russian and Union MID's do not consider it expedient to include a Sakhalin representative in the delegation, any representative, be it the soviet chairman, the ispolkom [soviet executive committee] chairman, or anybody else. They explain this by noting that in world practice, such issues are solved by corresponding organs that exist in the state—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or state bodies that are entrusted by rank to deal with such issues.

That is why the inclusion of Valentin Petrovich Fedorov [Sakhalin Oblispolkom chairman]... [changes thought] When he returns he will talk about this in greater detail himself. According to the information that I have he was included in the accompanying group along with Kuznetsov, the Maritime Krayispolkom chairman. Now Danilyuk, Khabarovsk Kray Soviet chairman, and Nikolayev, chairman of the Yakut-Sakha Republic Supreme Soviet, were included in the delegation proper. It is difficult for me to say how this was determined but I can firmly say that right up to the last minute the answer was that our Sakhalin comrade would not take part.

[Correspondent] Excuse me, but yesterday many people on Sakhalin probably heard the Tikhiy Okean radio station program. In it, one of the Maritime Kray leaders—unfortunately I did not hear the beginning of the program—said with a lot of bitterness, that he was included in the delegation that was supposed to go to Japan and as a result of some behind-the-scenes intrigues he was scratched from the list at the last moment. He

said that he did not blame Gorbachev for this but regretted that such dishonorable people were so close to him.

[Aksenov] Unfortunately I did not hear this program, but I think that right up to the last minute some changes were apparently occurring in the makeup of the delegation, being put together for the Japan visit, taking into consideration the importance of this visit. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Where do the economic and political interests of Sakhalin, Russia, and the Union diverge or coincide as far as relations with Japan are concerned?

[Aksenov] In relation to Japan?

[Correspondent] And the current visit.

[Aksenov] Could you please broaden your question.

[Correspondent] To what extent do you feel in Sakhalin that the Russian MID or the Soviet MID reflect your interests?

[Aksenov] I think that in accordance with the information that I have at my disposal both the Russian and Soviet MIDs reflect the interests of Sakhalin Oblast. That would be a brief response to your question.

[Correspondent] And in more detail?

[Aksenov] In detail. Well, I must express my own point of view of course, but it must be understood that the problem that has existed for many years and decades cannot be resolved with one visit. Therefore, if either of the sides sets itself this task it will simply be unattainable. The visit, as I see it, will be positive if the first fact, the fact that a problem exists, is determined, because unfortunately we have not had a treaty with our nearest Far Eastern neighbor, an economically developed country, for many years. So there is a problem. It must be recognized and discussed.

Now in the longer term some method or basis must apparently be determined—right now I do not want to dwell on how I see this problem—to solve this problem since as long as it remains unsolved there can be no normal relations. Common points of contact must be found that would permit this problem to be solved. I can see nothing more, and with the information that I have—I had contacts with the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia and several ministry officials, as well as with Comrade Rogachev of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs—and this information—what we wanted and what they said—basically coincided.

[Volk] Any more questions? [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] I would like to put the gas development issue aside for a moment and in connection with Gorbachev's current visit to Japan to ask you, as a representative of the oblast in which the Northern Territories are located, what do you think about the Northern Territories?

[Aksenov] Not about the results of the talks, but how I see the question of solving the Northern Territories problem?

[Correspondent] About Gorbachev's visit, what do you think about this issue?

[Aksenov] About the results of the President's work? Or about the northern problem?

[Correspondent] What do you think about the problem.

[Aksenov] I think that to solve the issue today, if we want to cooperate, if we want to have mutual interests as neighbors there should not be an attitude as exists with some people in Japan, including party leaders and many Japanese government leaders. They state the issue as follows: We will cooperate with the Soviet Union if on your part you fulfill, as a minimum, the 1956 documents on handing over Shikotan and the so-called Habomai group, those small islands, and subsequently resolve the issue of Iturup and Kunashir. Because we really are neighbors. We can see one another over the straits.

More than one generation of our Soviet people have grown up on the Kuril Islands, even in the post-war period. So naturally—and the referendum on public opinions showed this—the absolute majority of Soviet people do not want to leave these islands. And I think that today in this situation insofar as the problem exists—insofar as our generation which lives in the Soviet Union is fundamentally, firmly convinced that this is Soviet land, while in Japan an enormous number of people are firmly convinced that this is Japanese land—we should as a minimum, determine a group of people, of professionals, who could trace everything stage by stage, beginning with the first discovery of these islands up to the present day. But this should not be done in our own corridors. As much information as possible should be presented to the population.

This way public opinion concerning the solution of this problem will be created, because today in my opinion any Soviet leader who would go and give them up simply could not do so because we have a corps of deputies which may not ratify this treaty. On the other hand, any Japanese leader today who would take the stand and say that we have no claims on these islands, he too could not work because, as I have said, we and you have been brought up on our precise positions. What we need is time, we need time and a precise analysis of the islands problem. But it must be solved and we should not base this on: Either the islands or no cooperation agreement. I am firmly convinced that Japan is just as interested in the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union is in Japan. We have very extensive natural resources, you have the most modern technology, the capital, and equipment. I think that by applying joint efforts the mutual interest would be obvious.

[Volk] If you permit, Anatoliy Petrovich, I would like to continue this topic. There is another attitude which lies in the fact that searching in the past will not yield any

positive practical results and that we should look to the future on the basis of current contemporary realities. What would you say to this?

[Aksenov] This is possible, you know, because historians have done a lot of work on this problem. It is quite possible that this group of people, the specialists delegated by both sides, may not arrive at a final conclusion. But I think that by going through this stage we, as a minimum, will be able to determine precisely all the historic aspects for our people so that there would be no questions.

Second, during this period we would have to spend a certain amount of time. Much would change, including our thinking. Let us look back, to the beginning of perestroyka at least, and compare it to what we have today. Could many of us have imagined what we would have today? Probably not. So I figure that another five to 10 years will pass, maybe a shorter or longer period, and much will change both in the world in general and in our country in particular. And it may be that this question will be much easier to solve at that time. But today the issue is deadlocked and it cannot be driven further into a dead end by simply making claims and demands from both sides. Some kind of compromise must be sought. I am firmly convinced of this. [passage omitted]

Near East & South Asia

Commentary Previews Bessmertnykh's Mideast Tour

LD0205152191 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 2 May 91

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Text] Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh will shortly make a tour around the Middle East. As it has already been reported, he will hold talks in the capitals of some Arab states. Besides, according to an Israeli official statement, Israel is expecting the arrival of the Soviet minister on 10 May. Here's a commentary by Aleksandr Pogodin:

There are all grounds to speak about the intensification of the Soviet Middle East policies. I should say that the contacts with the sides involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict are constantly intensive. Leaders of some Arab states have visited Moscow. There were talks with the Israelis and meetings between Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and the Palestinians. Special mention should be made of the recent Kislovodsk meeting between Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and American Secretary of State Mr. James Baker, where the sides reached understanding of the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States will become co-chair countries at the international Middle East conference.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the Middle East settlement may be reached gradually, stage by stage. The first stage is the holding of a regional conference, then there will be talks with the Palestinians, while the convocation of a broad peace international Middle East conference should be the logical outcome.

Now, according to Moscow, real chances have emerged to reach a comprehensive solution to the old conflict in all its aspects. Among them is the end of the Isreali occupation of the Arab lands, the realization of the national aspirations of the Palestinians, and the guarantees for a peaceful and safe existence of the state of Israel, as well as some other problems.

Understandably, such solutions are only possible if we take into account the interests and positions of all the interested sides who, as is known, differ dramatically in many respects. It is also natural that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can take the solution of all these complex problems upon themselves; but they can use their prestige, their relations with the conflicting countries, to help find common language necessary to elaborate compromise decisions.

As James Baker's recent visits to the Middle East have shown, this mission is very difficult, and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, too, is likely to encounter many difficulties; but I would like to hope that this trip will bring positive results.

Commentary Views Soviet Middle East Policy

LD0205123791 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 1 May 91

[Pavel Demchenko commentary: "USSR Policy in the Middle East"]

[Text] I have recently received a letter from my Syrian friend Muhammad 'Aziz in which he asks with some concern: Has the USSR not turned its back on the Middle East? This thought occurred to him in light of the repeated visits to the region by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and what my friend sees as the passiveness of Soviet policy.

In his letter, Muhammad goes on to say: Everyone here is talking about the Americans, their army, and their plans, but where are you? Where are our old friends?

I heard the same thing said during a meeting I had with a Palestinian delegation led by PLO Executive Committee member Abu-Mazin (Mahmud 'Abbas) which visited Moscow recently. One of the participants in the discussion said: We realize that the Soviet people are preoccupied with their internal problems and that they have political and economic difficulties. This seems the reason for the current interval in Soviet diplomatic activity. We are confident, however, that you will remain, as you have been, on our side.

I believe that the optimism manifested in the last sentence is fully justified. However, it is possible to understand this concentration on the imagined Soviet passiveness.

Baker has recently increased his visits to the Arabs and the Israelis: three tours within just one month. On every tour, he visited five or six capitals where he held dozens of meetings and discussions with heads of states and ministers and with a PLO delegation.

We will not, however, rush to assert that peace in the Middle East has been maturing along the American way, that Washington has become the master of the situation following the victory over Iraq, and that Moscow has washed its hands of the matter.

Let us remember, before anything else, that we are living in different international conditions from those that prevailed five or six years ago. It is a situation that is in contrary to the time when Washington used to reject everything Moscow agreed to. The situation has now changed very much. In other words, the positions of the two superpowers have now become more realistic, and, in place of all-out confrontation, there are now other concepts and other rules of behavior. Washington and Moscow admit, without fear, that a complex question such as the establishment of peace in the Middle East and the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be resolved by either of them alone.

Butrus Ghali, Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, believes that the change from rivalry to cooperation between the two superpowers was undoubtedly in the interest of the Arabs and will not harm them, as some allege.

I am aware that many Soviet citizens, and Arabs as well, find it difficult to get used to this new stage of affairs. Facts are facts, however, and there can be no escape from them.

Here is an interesting example. When Baker was flying from Riyadh to Cairo, he telephoned Moscow and offered to inform the Soviet leaders of the results of his consultations with leaders of the Middle Eastern countries. He did this in order to give the Kremlin time to make preparations prior to the arrival of Baker himself in the USSR.

It is evident that he felt he had to do this. In the course of his tour, the U.S. secretary of state realized that the United States cannot resolve the Middle East problem by itself, without Soviet participation.

Indeed, our country has many friends in the Middle East. It is bound to the Middle East by many ties. Furthermore, our country abuts directly on the Middle East.

In this regard, I wish to state that the Soviet political line in respect of the settlement of the Middle East conflict has not changed at all, as is sometimes alleged, and its basic elements remain intact. They are: the unconditional return of the Arab territories occupied by Israel in 1967 to the Arab countries; the grant to the Palestinian people of the right to political self-determination; and, finally, the guaranteeing of conditions of security [zuruf al-kiyan al-amin] for the Arab countries and Israel alike.

This is the strategy. As regards tactics, they naturally change according to changing conditions. In fact, the tactics are aimed at the adoption of the shortest route to the achievement of the strategic goals. Hence there is no reason whatsoever to be afraid or to describe the changes in Soviet-Israeli relations or the approval of the solution of the Middle East question by stages, as baker has proposed, as retreat or passiveness.

Pavel Demchenko said in conclusion that what is important is that the strategy—that is, the final objectives, which, as we can see, respond fully to the nationalist interests of the Arab peoples—remains unchanged. In this regard, Moscow will not retract one step from these objectives.

As regards tangible actions, I wish to recall here the visit that Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh will pay to the Middle East. I believe that his tour will confirm the traditional character of Soviet-Arab relations and, at the same time, help to settle the Middle East question.

East Europe

Kvitsinskiy Says NATO Must 'Transform'

AU0205191191 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 27 Apr 91 p 3

[Interview with Yuliy Kvitsinskiy, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs and head of the Soviet delegation at the Prague conference on "The Future of European Security," by Jiri Roskot; in Prague, date not specified]

[Text] [Roskot] What is your view of the possibility of NATO's transformation within the European process?

[Kvitsinskiy] The objective reality taking shape in Europe in the wake of the dissolution of the military component of the Warsaw Pact, the formation of a network of new contractual commitments throughout Europe, and the emergence of new all-European structures will compel NATO to transform itself and seek a new role for itself. NATO cannot stay as it is now.

[Roskot] Does this mean that the Soviet Union regards the Helsinki process as the main platform [on which to work toward European security]?

[Kvitsinskiy] If the Helsinki process does not become a priority for all European countries, it would be a step back, a return to the 1920's, to the time of putting stakes on various regional organizations and of intrigues of one against the other.

[Roskot] What inspiration do you find in [CSFR Foreign Affairs] Minister Dienstbier's recent memorandum on European security?

[Kvitsinskiy] There are a few interesting points in it. It is important to work on Mr. Dienstbier's proposal so as to

achieve consensus on questions that are acceptable to all sides. That will determine the chances of the ideas expressed in the proposal.

No Progress on Interstate Treaty With Hungary

PM0205192391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 91 Union Edition p4

[Correspondent F. Lukyanov report: "We Do Not Want To Be Neutral, Hungarian Premier Says"]

[Text] Budapest—The third round of talks in Budapest between the Soviet delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Kvitsinskiy and a Hungarian delegation on drawing up a new interstate treaty has ended without producing any results.

It seems that the crux of their differences is as follows. Since we are talking about a treaty of good neighborliness and cooperation, the Soviet Union would like to enshrine the obligation of each country not to join alliances directed against the other country. The Hungarian side—which has repeatedly said that Hungary's associate membership of the NATO Assembly is not directed against anyone, including the Soviet Union—has no intention of taking such an obligation upon itself.

Hungarian Premier J. Antall said this in an interview with the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES. "We do not want to be neutral," Antall stressed, "and we will not sign an agreement with the Soviet Union that would restrict Hungary's right to choose which alliance to join." At the same time, the Hungarian premier said that Hungary wants good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union and is prepared to guarantee that it will not allow its territory to be used for an attack on the Soviet Union.

According to the head of the Soviet delegation, there is no need to set any records for the speed with which such an important document is drafted. The treaty—80 percent of which is already agreed—must satisfy the security interests of both sides in full.

Gorbachev Sends Greetings on Polish National Day

LD0205133591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1120 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] Moscow, 2 May (TASS)—It has been officially reported here that USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev has sent President Lech Walesa of Poland a message congratulating him and all the Polish people on the occasion of Poland's national holiday, the 200th anniversary of the 3 May Constitution.

"I am sincerely devoted to having relations between the USSR and Poland, which are entering a new stage, develop on the basis of neighborliness, equality, and mutual respect, preserving everything valuable and positive that has, despite everything, built up in relations between our peoples in the course of centuries", says the greetings message from the head of the Soviet state. "Joint Soviet-Polish activity based on trust and mutually beneficial cooperation would be, I am convinced, in line with the interests of Eastern Europe as a whole. It would be a substantial factor in the pan-European process, and would serve international security and stable progress".

Yanayev, Laptev Attend Polish Embassy Reception

PM0205135191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "On the Occasion of the Holiday"]

[Text] On the occasion of the 3 May national holiday, Constitution Day, S. Ciosek, Polish Republic ambassador to the USSR, gave a reception 30 April.

The reception was attended by G.I. Yanayev, USSR vice president; I.D. Laptev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Union; and other officials.

Commentary on Asylum for Former East Bloc Leaders

PM0105152891 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 15, 14-21 Apr 91 p 4

[Nataliya Gevorkyan article: "USSR Foreign Ministry: Communists of the World Unite"]

[Text] Unless it's a joke, this country might soon be entered in the Red Data Book as the world's last communist preserve. According to the statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman published in PRAVDA on March 29, we are going to accommodate all destitute "have-beens" from Eastern Europe.

The statement has thrown some light on the obscure remark by the KGB Chairman Kryuchkov during the parliamentary debate on the KGB Law. He said that the last word in our relations with the socialist countries is yet to be said, and noted, quite rightly, that the now persecuted "have-beens" know no other blame except their honest service to the regime.

Their own people's lack of warm feelings towards "honest servants of the regime" will be compensated by this country's warm welcome to poor suffering unemployeed communists, apparatchiks and committee members. Having no other profession except "honest service to the regime", the future refugees will no doubt put their skills and expertise to good use here, in their adopted country. One can only hope that not all of them will be smuggled in as secretly as the former GDR intelligence boss Markus Wolf or the GDR leader Erich Honecker. Both managed to escape criminal investigation back home by fleeing to the safety of Soviet protection.

There was a time when socialist leaders did not care a straw about scientists, artists and writers evicted from their native countries, forced to earn a living doing menial jobs while their children and grandchildren were blacklisted back home.

Whoever is prepared to offer political asylum to exleaders forget the price our neighbours had to pay for

the "triumph of communist ideals". I lived ten years in Eastern Europe and saw with my own eyes the triumph of mediocrity, falsehood and stupidity. Whatever Kryuchkov might think about it all, the fall of the Berlin Wall is the final word for me. As is the Palach memorial in Prague, and the now empty Dmitrov mausoleum in Sofia. Our relations with our fellow camp inmates will never be what they were before.

Do we bear the responsibility for the destitute "party and state officials, party activists, servicemen, and law and order officers from neighbouring countries", as the Foreign Ministry spokesman put it? We certainly do, as an "elder brother". They were nurtured by the system imposed by us and eventually rejected by Eastern Europe.

But what has been rejected by Eastern Europe is not necessarily rejected by our own leadership whose policies have always been noted for their continuity and consistency. After all, the Hungarian leader Rakosi died peacefully on Soviet territory and the Afghan leader Babrak Karmal still treads it. Of course, our land can accommodate more "political immigrants" like them, but the Foreign Ministry statement alleges that political asylum is offered them because the Soviet public have expressed deep concern about their fate.

I don't know what information sources are used to justify such allegations, but the Soviet public has still got an opportunity to give out their opinion openly and freely. Thousands of people chant slogans against our own Polozkovs at mass rallies, so it is highly improbable that they view imported ones with greater favour.

I am not worried about our neighbours. It is not their best citizens they are losing. I am worried about ourselves, because each nation has the immigrants it deserves.

West Europe

Kohl Endorsement of Gorbachev Policies Cited

PM2604130191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report citing Germany's ARD television program under the "World and Politics" rubric and the general heading: "Different Reports"]

[Text]

ARD Television Program (Germany)

Speaking on television, FRG Chancellor H. Kohl urged Western states to back M.S. Gorbachev. He said that the West would be acting correctly in helping this politician. The USSR president, Kohl said, is a man of great courage, who is continuing the reform course despite tremendous difficulties. We trust him more than any of his possible successors. The FRG's possibilities are limited at present. However, we will do all we can to help him. We hope that in the foreseeable future new state structures based on principles of federalism will be established in the Soviet Union. And that the economic reforms being implemented will result in the creation of a market economy to replace the former economic structures. Patience and political good sense are needed for this in dealing with one another.

Commentary Considers European Security, NATO

LD0205173891 Moscow World Service in English 1510 GMT 2 May 91

[Anatoliy Potapov commentary]

[Text] It is indisputable that with the end of the Cold War NATO is changing. The Alliance's new tasks and structures will be evidently considered at the summit meeting of the Alliance members next autumn. Also characteristic is the orientation of the statements by the Secretary General Manfred Woerner who said: We are not going to isolate the Soviet Union—we are for cooperation and partnership, not confrontation.

Well, it's quite promising for the new Europe, but regrettably, everything is not that bright. I, for example have many questions on the score.

Mr. Woerner said that NATO today had no definite enemy, while in another interview we can hear the following: The Soviet Union is a strong military power in Europe, and the North Atlantic Alliance should counterbalance this strength. Does it mean that the enemy is still there? And the chief commander of the bloc's troops John Galvin says about the future reduction of NATO armed forces almost by 50 percent and at the same time emphasizes: We need mobile multinational units and the most up to date high precision weapons [sentence as heard]. Another question: against what enemy?

Manfred Woerner reasonably denies any intentions on the possibility of some countries of East Europe joining the bloc, because that would make NATO closer to the Soviet border, and suddenly the North Atlantic Assembly members, legislatures in NATO countries and the Alliance's core, have advanced an idea of creating the so-called association NATO members, who may become those very countries of eastern Europe.

I'm rather worried by the following fact: NATO now actively improves its military structures, not breaks them. The ideas of the last year's London declaration to attach to NATO a political role in a new situation are not unfortunately realized. Only statements on intentions are, of course, not enough.

But if, according to Manfred Woerner, he is going with the help of NATO to breathe life to the Vienna Center for the Elimination of Conflicts, this would be a concrete and positive step politically.

The security of the continent cannot be based on the only military bloc left in Europe. This would in no way strengthen confidence or cancel suspicions.

The general European security is a notion of [word indistinct] and blocs and the Paris Charter has other orientations.

USSR To Supply Gas to Greece via Pipeline

LD0205211391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1516 GMT 2 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Malyshev]

[Text] Athens, 2 May (TASS)—The Greek Government today approved a contract between the state gas corporation and the all-Union association "Mashinoimport" for the construction of a gas pipeline to supply Greece with Soviet natural gas.

The project, valued at $1.3 billion is the largest in the history of economic relations between the two countries. The length of the pipeline (a start will be made on building it this year from the Bulgarian border) will be 510 km. It will convey some 1,000 million cubic meters of gas a year initially, and later 2,400 million cubic meters.

Building work should be completed in 1993. It will be carried out by an international consortium headed by Soviet oganizations.

Finnish Railroads Stop Liquid Freight Transit

LD0205191291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0608 GMT 2 May 91

[Excerpts] Helsinki, 2 May (TASS)—Finland's state railroad administration has halted, as of May, the first transit transportation of liquid freight from the Soviet Union, since "Soyuzvneshtrans" has not paid off tens of millions of marks in debt for the services of the Finnish side. [passage omitted] All possibilities for talks with representatives of "Soyuzvneshtrans" have already been exhausted. [passage omitted]

The halt in such transportation will also hit Finnish railwaymen. Over the last year they transported about 6 million tonnes of Soviet turnover on the railways. Almost half of this freight came from orders from the insolvent "soyuzvneshtrans". [passage omitted]

Political & Social

Villages Evacuated After 1976 Nuclear Blast

AU0305094691 Paris AFP in English 0833 GMT 3 May 91

[Text] Perm, Soviet Union, May 3 (AFP)—A radioactive lake was created and several villages were evacuated when Soviet engineers exploded nuclear devices in a 1976 canal-building project in the central Ural mountains, Soviet environmentalists announced.

In a first meeting with western journalists, members of the Perm district council's ecological committee said the blasts were first revealed to locals in 1988. A few people were then authorized to visit the area, committee members said at a press conference here.

Radiation levels on the shore of the artificial lake that was created in the blast topped 1.5 rem an hour, but were as high as five rem on the bottom, according to the committee. (In France, nuclear technicians must not be exposed to more than five rem a year.)

Three nuclear devices totalling 15 kilotons were exploded at a depth of 200 metres (660 feet) in an unpopulated area, 20 kilometres (12 miles) from the village of Krasnovishersk and 300 kilometres (186 miles) northeast of this city with a population of 1.2 millions.

The blasts created the artificial lake, 240,000 square metres (2,580,000 square feet) in size and 12 metres (40 feet) deep, with crystal-clear, blue water, but [passage indistinct] authorities evacuated an undisclosed number of villages, a witness who did his military service in the region told the committee.

Blueprints for the canal project had been drawn up in Moscow. It was to link the northern Kara Sea to the Caspian Sea via the Pechora and Kama rivers. The Kama is a tributary of the Volga. The blast area continues to be monitored by the Energy Ministry but no data have been published since the project was abandoned without an official explanation.

Committee member Yevgeniy Yasterov said civilian engineers carried out 13 nuclear explosions in the Urals between 1960 and 1976.

Vladimir Gubaryev, chief editor of the Communist Party daily PRAVDA and head of the paper's scientific department, told Agence France-Presse in Paris: "Schemes to use nuclear devices for engineering purposes were abandoned three years ago."

Mr. Gubaryev, who contested various aspects of the ecologists' report, said he had monitored several such projects. "They were launched in the 1970s and were part of a series of controlled nuclear explosions that were to facilitate major construction works," Mr. Gubaryev said. "In the Perm region means were to be found to turn rivers in the Dvina basin to the Volga (which empties into the Caspian Sea). I have seen that swampy, scarcely populated area from the air and have seen no such large lake," he said, referring to the ecologists' report.

"The Perm experiment did not cause any radioactive fall-out. It was extremely important because it helped to better understand the geological structure of the northern Urals and Siberia."

Mr. Gubaryev said nuclear explosives had also been used to blow out a burning gas well in the southern Bukhara region after it sent large clouds of smoke into the atmosphere. Another blast in 1971 stopped a leak in an oil well, he added.

"That way we also created an underground gas tank at Orenburg in the Ural region, and gave a boost to oil drilling."

According to Mr. Gubaryev, the basin for Kazakhstan's Lake Shega which collects snow water was created by a nuclear explosion on January 15, 1965. Water from the lake was diverted for the irrigation of pastures, and carp from the lake weighed up to six kilograms (13 pounds), he said, adding that the water was constantly monitored.

"There are no problems," he said.

Cabinet Presidium Discusses Anticrisis Plan

LD0305105791 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 3 May 91

[Excerpt] A session of the Presidium of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers is taking place in Moscow right now. The preliminary results of talks with republican delegations on details of the anticrisis program are being considered. As expected, the issue of the government's actions in connection with the joint statement of the 10 [nine republics and the central government] will also be discussed. [passage omitted]

PRAVDA Reports on May Day Festivities

PM0205132191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 91 Second Edition pp 1-2

[Roundup of correspondents' reports prepared by V. Fedotov: "Working People Back the Union! PRAVDA Correspondents Describe the May Day Celebrations Around the Country"]

[Text] I admit that I was not only glad but also alarmed to be holding the fort at the editorial switchboard yesterday. Of course, there was no doubt that Solidarity Day—a holiday celebrating spring and peace—would take place in most republics to the accompaniment of slogans expressing unity between working people of all nationalities in the fight for their rights and the integrity of the Union. But you could not, after all, close your ears and not hear the rifle and submachine-gun fire in what we usually describe as "trouble spots" or fail to notice that May Day was banned altogether in some areas... Not out of, say, blind passion, but because of considerations of "principle."

A few days before this date the editorial office received a short and deliberately semiofficial—perhaps that's why it was painful—telex from one of our correspondents: "I report that in accordance with the instructions of local directive organs, there will be no celebrations." While some figures, seeming to view their own country from up in the international clouds, are protesting about what they see as possible dictatorship at the center, its sinister outlines are emerging in totally different places...

A mighty earthquake hit Georgia's cities and villages, causing loss of life and tremendous devastation. Of course, people there don't feel like taking part in ceremonial processions. All Soviet people are now showing solidarity with their brothers and sisters from the Transcaucasian republics, are expressing their sympathy and condolences to the families of the dead, and are ready to do all they can to help. There is still a glimmer of hope that peace and concord will soon prevail here once and for all and that May Day holidays will be celebrated without interference nationwide. As the words of the song go: "Link arms, friends, lest we vanish one at a time."

Certainly, today May Day has taken place—from Moscow to the very outlying regions of the country—with less pomp, and much of the formality and sham has been stripped away. But the essence of the holiday has remained and even perhaps appeared more clearly: unification for the sake of constitutional order in the country, for a better life for ordinary people. Here is what PRAVDA's correspondents reported yesterday.

Leningrad—This year's May Day in Leningrad is a special anniversary. A century ago St. Petersburg's proletarians held their first May Day celebrations on the site of what is now the "Severnaya Verf" plant. A memorial pillar has been erected there, our correspondent N. Volynskiy reports.

Some political movements and parties called their supporters to take part in rallies in various parts of the city. However, the main event took place on Palace Square.

Long before the rally began young people aged 14-18 years began to gather here. Some carried USSR state flags, others union republic, old Russian, or even foreign flags. Everyone got on peacefully together. Perhaps people's mood was affected by the fact that the day before some local newspapers, including radical democratic ones, appealed in concert for civic peace and concord regardless of political views?

The demonstrators came from various parts of the city to Palace Square with the slogans "The People's Property for the People and Not for Shadow Economy Operators," "No to Unemployment, Price Hikes, and Speculation," and "Yes to An Effective Program To Halt the Crisis." Incidentally, these slogans received full, complete backing from Leningrad's Communists—the CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] issued a special statement saying this the day before. But it did not apply to take part in the working people's holiday, giving one local newspaper grounds for malice: "Don't Bolsheviks like underground May Day celebrations again?" There were no underground celebrations, but there was an overt celebration outside the "Severnaya Verf" plant, attended by roughly 1,000 people in response to an appeal from Communists at the Narva Gate, trade union organizations, and rayon soviet deputies.

The rally began on Palace Square. A worker, a medic, and an actress spoke... They called for unity among the gathering in the common fight for their rights and against certain—in their opinion—mistaken steps by the government and, particularly, the Leningrad Soviet, which has set about privatizing housing at working people's expense. The word "No!" was frequently heard in slogans and speeches, but there was also the word "Yes": Yes to Gorbachev, to consolidation, and democracy. It is a shame that not a single representative of the Leningrad party organization took the floor at the rally. However, none of the Leningrad Soviet's democratic deputies approached the people either.

Kiev—Bathed in spring rain and clothed in picturesque attire, the republic's main city looks handsome and festive, PRAVDA correspondents M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov report. The celebrations began at the V.I. Lenin monument, where convoys of working people from various areas of the Ukraine's capital gathered.

The festive stream of people filled the Kreshchatik. The slogans proclaiming "Yes to the Union Treaty!" "We Favor Strengthening Constitutional Order," "Long Live Ukrainian Sovereignty!", "Prevent Economic Collapse!", and "We Demand Increased Compensation!" towered above the demonstrators' heads. The procession, headed by leaders of the republic, city, and Kiev Oblast and veterans of the party, labor, and the Great Patriotic War, halted on October Revolution Square. A mass rally took place there. Appeals for the urgent implementation of the agreed actions to stabilize the situation in the country and overcome the crisis that were outlined recently in the joint statement issued by leaders of the Union and nine republics won the approval of those present.

After the demonstration organized by the party gorkom [city committee] a demonstration organized by Rukh moved down the Kreshchatik. Its main slogans were: "No to the Union Treaty!"; "Freedom for the Ukraine!"; "Down with the Colonial Empire"; and "Down With the CPSU."

Minsk—For the first time in many years the Minsk Oblast Association of Sector Trade Unions Council organized the May Day demonstration in the Belorussian capital, our correspondents O. Stepanenko and A. Ulitenok report. Early in the morning republic and city leaders spoke to demonstrators and then walked with them down the main streets. Many people carried banners calling for "Reforms Without Poverty and Unemployment" and "The Same Stores for Ministers and Workers"...

Our correspondents met with A. Martysyuk, leader of the Minsk area trade unions, in the Partizanskiy Rayon column:

"My comrades and I are here with workers from the electrical equipment, tractor, and other plants which were the first to begin striking at the beginning of April. Although the strike committees suggested that we boycott the demonstration, people have still turned out."

Festive demonstrations were held in all the republic's oblast and rayon centers.

Tashkent—V. Artemenko, PRAVDA's correspondent for Uzbekistan, called. Numerous representatives of the working people gathered on Tashkent's main square, he dictated to the stenographer, as is always the case on holidays. We have the best people from all 11 rayons' labor collectives here. They are accompanied by republic, Tashkent Oblast, and city leaders. Only now they are no longer standing on elevated platforms but alongside the people. The choreographed sports display "Peace, Labor, May" was the prelude for a large people's celebration.

I visited the railroad workers' House of Culture, where people were having a great time. That is no coincidence since the day before May Day the USSR Ministry of Railways and the trade union central committee awarded the Central Asian Railroad collective a challenge Red Banner for the results of its work in the first quarter of the year. Some 700,000 tonnes of freight have been shipped in excess of the plan.

Alma-Ata—The question of whether or not to hold the festivities or, more precisely, demonstration did not arise for us, Party Gorkom Secretary M. Sarsenov told PRAVDA correspondents G. Dildyayev and T. Yesilbayev. We sense and know that this is a feeling shared by most of the townspeople. Just look at the sincere delight that people are taking in the holiday.

Well, there were indeed many smiling faces on Republic Square, which was adorned with a banner proclaiming "Peace, Solidarity, and Progress." Needless to say, it cannot be denied that there are not many reasons for carefree rejoicing now. However, the people of Kazakhstan have not lost hope of better things. We attest that people in the republic reacted with satisfaction to the well known "Statement of the Ten." What else? There were no "festive reports" yesterday, although the city's economy is more or less successful, despite all the complexities. At any rate most of Alma-Ata's industrial enterprises are coping with their deliveries. "Show Solidarity, Don't Let Us Down"—that is the appeal that the people of Kazakhstan make to the workers supplying the republic with timber, electrical equipment, combine harvesters, and machinery.

Baku—The May Day celebrations in Azerbaijan were modest and businesslike, without being overpompous, in the opinion of our correspondent Z. Kadymebekov. Times are hard and troubled now—people are not in the mood for loud festivities. The curfew in Baku has been repealed by order of the republic's president, but a state of emergency still persists, which has in itself precluded the holding of the traditional demonstration. However, there were meetings and gatherings at labor collectives in which USSR and republic Supreme Soviet people's deputies and members of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee took part. The traditional Baku May Day festivities have taken place these days. All enterprises with a continuous production process mounted a May Day labor vigil.

Vilnius—Thousands of people supporting the socialist idea and a Lithuania developing within a renewed USSR took part in the festive May Day events in the republic's cities and rayons, PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Stroganov reported. There was a rally at the V.I. Lenin monument in Vilnius in which M.M. Burokievicius, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, took part. By tradition people from Klaipeda also gathered at the monument to Ilich. A cultural and sporting festival that coincided with 1 May also took place in Shalchininkay [name as transliterated]. While a real spring May Day demonstration took place in Snieckus on the shore of the lake.

Kishinev—The day before 1 May the editorial office received a telephone call from Muscovite A. Lyubimov. A former resident of the republic, he was worried whether there would be a demonstration in Kishinev. PRAVDA correspondent A. Pasechnik answered this question in his report:

Regrettably, as last year, there was no demonstration. But a citywide rally took place on Central Square in which several thousand people took part. Moreover, the previous format was given new substance. A procession organized by the Moldova People's Front took place on the square in support of the striking miners. Obviously, the event's organizers were not bothered that most of the miners have already returned to the pits. What is more, plenty of completely different "visual agitation" was stored up for future use: slogans and banners against the Union treaty, against the treaty signed recently between the USSR and Romania, and, of course, blatantly anticommunist slogans...

Nonetheless, Moldova's working people celebrated the holiday extensively. The day before ceremonial meetings and gatherings took place at Kishinev Moldova Communist Party Gorkom and many labor collectives. Rallies of working people and people's celebrations in squares, parks, and public gardens took place on the holiday in areas of the city. There were large demonstrations in Tiraspol, Dubossary, Rybnitsa, and other cities and rayons."

Riga—The teleprinter, which had just fallen silent, came back to life. Riga was on the line. What would our Latvian correspondent O. Meshkov be writing about?

Officially 1 May in Latvia is considered a labor holiday. But those people for whom 1 May is still working people's Solidarity Day gathered on 13 January Embankment early in the morning.

P. Valters, secretary of Riga Party Gorkom, gave the floor to A. Rubiks, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and Latvian Communist Party Central Committee first secretary. People accorded the Latvian Communists' leader a cordial welcome. They hold dear and understand what he said about the need to rally more closely in the fight to preserve our socialist state's unity and to prevent the revival of a national bourgeoisie. The gathering reacted keenly to the speeches by A. Mishin, secretary of the recently revived Latvian Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] Central Committee, labor veteran A. Dremina, and M. Bormanis, worker at the VEF Production Association.

Bishkek—PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Razgulyayev reports: Thousands of city residents and workers at major enterprises that have retained their belief in our ideals, in working people's solidarity, and in the irreversibility of perestroyka despite the severe economic crisis and life that has become complex in the extreme gathered on the main square at the V.I. Lenin monument in the capital of Kyrgyzstan. They were addressed by A. Akayev, president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, Dzh. Amanbayev, first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee, and E. Abakirov, chairman of the republic's Trade Union Federation Council.

The rally on the square opened the extensive program of festivities scheduled for this day.

Dushanbe—L. Makhkamov called from Dushanbe. On the initiative of the city soviet of people's deputies, he said, May Day in the capital of Tajikistan was celebrated with a festive demonstration by working people.

The presidential decrees and government resolutions that "cushioned" the drastic retail price hike have helped in many respects to alleviate social tension in the republic over the last few weeks: Students, young pupils, and unemployed mothers of large families—the union resolution made no provision for compensation for these people—have been allocated state benefits, the sales tax on many essential commodities, including children's goods, has been repealed, and the former prices for flour and bread have been reinstated. Lastly, the statement issued by the USSR president and the leaders of the nine republics on urgent steps to stabilize the situation in the country and overcome the crisis came as a real source of hope for working people and the entire population of Tajikistan.

...The festive columns spent roughly an hour moving past the platform from which the demonstrators were greeted by K. Makhamov, president of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and other state and republic Communist Party leaders.

Yerevan—We received a telephone call from Yerevan. Ruben Satyan, a local journalist who regularly works for PRAVDA, is worried:

Henceforth 1 and 2 May in Armenia are working days. I can attest that this recent decision has by no means met with enthusiasm, which is understandable. Work days are work days, whether they be socialist or sovereign work days.

In what way was working people's Solidarity Day bad? To understand this question for myself, I went to the republic's parliament where I was told literally the following. Working people would be more than compensated for the cancellation of the 1 May festivities by the Christmas, Easter, and other holidays.

I will not dispute the parliament's decision. The people are to judge it. Especially since some of the people may quite possibly hold other viewpoints.

Ashkhabad—Working people in the Turkmen capital decided not to break good traditions, PRAVDA correspondent M. Volkov reported. A large demonstration took place to celebrate the holiday. Workers from Sovetskiy Rayon took the lead. They worked better than others in the first quarter of the year.

"The people of Ashkhabad as a whole worked well," B. Sardzhayev, chairman of the city soviet of people's deputies and gorkom first secretary, said in conversation with your correspondent. "See for yourselves: We have a 3.8-percent growth rate for industrial production in our republic. Substantial profits have been made and we are constructing housing at an accelerated rate. Add to this the fact that there is still a calm, businesslike atmosphere in Turkmenia thanks to the republic party organization's efforts."

War, party, and labor veterans and republic leaders stood on the festive platforms. The demonstrators were greeted by S. Niyazov, president of the Turkmen SSR.

Tallinn—PRAVDA special correspondents I. Teterin and V. Shirokov report:

May Day is one of the few holidays that has retained its state character even since new political forces came to power in the republic. That is no accident. After all, Estonia's residents have since time immemorial been able and loved to work assiduously. It is they—workers from countless enterprises, seamen, fishermen, and dockers—who came to Freedom Square early this morning.

Admittedly, this year working people have no particular reason to rejoice at successes. This was said with utter frankness at the rally. Production volumes at many of Estonia's enterprises have dropped. The result is a reduction in GNP, a real threat of unemployment, prices are rising, and inflation has increased. Under these conditions solidarity and unity among labor collectives, trade unions, and left-wing political parties assume particular significance.

But it has not as yet proved possible to secure this kind of unity within the republic. Here is a typical detail: Even on 1 May, because of the split in the Estonian Communist movement, which now has two rival communist parties in operation, each of the parties held a series of events exclusively for its own supporters.

Participants in the festivities in Tallinn laid flowers at the V.I. Lenin monument. Rallies and demonstrations were also held in other cities in Estonia 1 May.

Rally Termed 'Inexpressive'

PM0205134591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 91 Second Edition p 1

["Report From Moscow Rally" by A. Batygin and V. Khatuntsev: "May Day in Red Square"]

[Text] In the Alexander Garden, beneath the Kremlin walls, the well- tended horses of a militia troop were nibbling the young grass. A yellow van with the characteristic logo of the newspaper KOMMERSANT, spelled [in the prerevolutionary manner] with a now obsolete red hard sign at the end, stood on the rise of the passageway to Red Square. On the square people were selling sandwiches and coffee from trays and also pouring mulled wine—heated wine with tea—from vacuum bottles. There were few people in the stands for invited guests, and the square itself was not distinguished by the usual crowds and abundance of banners for such a day.

The morning turned out as if to order! Even at Easter it had not been as warm in Moscow as on the first day of May, and since it was nonetheless a festival, this time nature itself had prepared a good mood. For spring in the world, good grief—spring is the revelation of everything that lives and is! There was a rally, and there were stern speeches from the mausoleum rostrum, and at the end the announcer attempted to initiate mass chanting by exclaiming three times: unity, solidarity, and the working person's rights! Some sort of rhythm could be sensed in this, but the square remained indifferent, the people drifted away to the sound of marches played by a civilian brass band, and the foreign correspondents dispersed unhurriedly because they would have nothing in particular or sensational to report to their editorial offices. They had heard of a crisis, of no confidence, and of emergency measures; however, the rally had been conceived by Moscow's trade unions as an action to express the working people's socioeconomic demands. Outside it was spring....

Let us ponder this: Can politics supplant everything else in the life of society, the family, and the citizen? Maybe this happens with professional politicians, for that is why they are figures, leaders, and heads. The bulk of the people, however, need a respite from all kinds of political tension, the fueling of passions, and apocalyptic forecasts. A nation, in whatever historical difficulties it may find itself from time to time, has and must be sure to have holy days in the year.

Such dates live in the consciousness of each of us, however hard we may have tried in vain to remake our calendars and to reinterpret our historical path, the experience of past generations, 7 November, 9 May, 22 June.... We cannot rid ourselves of involvement with these dates or measure their magnitude and bitterness. So why has May Day in the capital of a tremendous state, which officially marks this festival with two days off, suddenly turned out so inexpressive, despite the sunny morning?

To serve up politics on a festival, can we not have democracy without speeches, appeals, and demands! The previous day the capital's "head" declared on television that he should not be expected on the rostrum: The upcoming event, he said, is represented by just one political trend. What did he intend: to divide the mausoleum rostrum up among the factions and give each one its own microphone? It is a festival, so why divide people on such a day and fuel the hostility of confrontation? The people who gathered in Red Square, however, were in a quite uplifted mood, despite the rather severe slogans.

"All benefits to working people" and "Gorbachev! We need socialism." There was also one with a catch: "The wages of a Moscow City Soviet deputy for every worker." People's faces were serious and concerned, but there was no hint of despondency or animosity.

The central rostrum of the mausoleum was approached at 1000 by those invited to the rally—USSR President M.S. Gorbachev, USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov, and Moscow trade union leaders and activists. It is probably a long time since we have seen such a short "lineup" on our chief rostrum or such a brief rally....

The speeches ended, and the rally participants adopted a resolution. It spoke of support for the Joint Statement of "the 10" and of readiness in the complex economic and political situation to firmly adhere to positions of defending the working people's interests and to try to get the legislative and executive power to take vigorous actions aimed at surmounting the economic crisis. May our firmness and solidarity in achieving sensible goals, the document states, bring the country's rebirth closer and give honest working people the opportunity to lead a worthy life!

Correspondents on May Day Mood

PM0205183591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 May 91 Single Edition pp 1-2

[Interview with correspondents covering May Day celebration by A. Yakovenko, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA first deputy chief editor in charge of this issue; place and date not given: "Unusual May Day; Duty Editor Talks With Reporters Returning from Moscow's Streets and Squares"]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 1 May—[Yakovenko] It is still very early, but you have already all returned from Red Square. This is the first item of news. How would you comment on it?

[Correspondent V. Kondakov] This is probably the first time that people came to Red Square not according to the quota system nor because they were obligated to. They came because they were worried about the fate of the country, their plant, their family, and their relatives. They protested at the unprecedented growth in prices, the insulting sales tax, unemployment, and speculation. In short, at the sharp worsening of life, which has brought many people to the verge of poverty.

[Yakovenko] This time the rally was held by the trade unions. Who was on the mausoleum rostrum?

[Kondakov] The main rostrum appeared different to usual. On it were M.S. Gorbachev, A.I. Lukyanov, and General Confederation of Trade Unions Chairman V.P. Shcherbakov. B.N. Yeltsin, head of the Russian legislature, who was invited there, has been far from Moscow during these days—in the Kuzbass. Moscow City Soviet Chairman G.Kh. Popov refrained from participating in the rally "for political reasons," as he put it.

[Yakovenko] Our readers saw on television what happened at the rally. What are your main impressions?

[Kondakov] All the speakers, and the workers in particular, seemed to come to the microphone to speak frankly about their misfortunes and their demands to the government and to defend themselves and their families against the unchecked growth in prices and the ill-considered managerial decisions which are pouring down on people like rain from the sky. The people's patience is running out. Only working people's solidarity can counter the attempts to encroach upon their vital rights.

[Yakovenko] What slogans were carried through the square?

[Kondakov] There were many protests at the price hike and the "president's" tax. Anxiety over the future, the country's fate, and the working person's rights was expressed: "Down with the disarray of prices!" "The wages of a Moscow City Soviet deputy for every worker," "You cannot fill your stomach with laws," "We are strong when we are together!" and "Instill order in the country!"

[Yakovenko] What is the conclusion?

[Kondakov] The workers' movement displayed organization and proved its right to take an active part in deciding the fate of a great country. This is probably the chief result of this May Day, which has once again, at last, found its original meaning as a festival of labor and of the struggle for economic and social rights.

[Yakovenko] The atmosphere that reigned not only at the rally but also in Moscow's streets is curious. Obviously, you managed to sense the people's mood, did you not?

[Correspondent N. Belan] I was struck by the empty streets while walking from the subway station to Red Square, and it was already 0900. I encountered only frequent militia and voluntary police cordons—I had to show my pass about 10 times. This is the first point.

Second, I did not see the festiveness to which I have grown accustomed in recent years, and the people with whom I spoke in Red Square also drew attention to this. Anatoliy Petrovich Zuyev, for example, said: "I fully support and approve perestroyka. I will never understand why we must restrain our feelings when celebrating May Day, which, despite some claims that it was imposed on us by Stalin's regime, came to us from Chicago a century ago." [passage omitted]

[Kondakov] I wrote an account of May Day last year, and so I can compare what it was like with what it has become. What is most striking this year? The passiveness of people, political tiredness, and apathy. Last May Day virtually the entire city center turned into Hyde Park. On literally every corner people were holding rallies, arguing themselves hoarse, and almost getting into fights with one another. This time—silence and calm.

I spoke with people whom I chanced to meet in the streets, and they repeated, in general, what had been said in Red Square. Only the passersby spoke in harsher and certainly not diplomatic terms: How long can they extort the "president's" tax from us, when prices have already gone through the roof? How can we live on wages alone, and by no means cooperative wages at that?... This coincidence of the sentiments of the speakers in Red Square and of people in the street is very characteristic.

Whereas the people in the streets kept silent on May Day, the dark, backstage forces were far from silent. As soon as the cordons were removed after the rally, people suddenly emerged from somewhere with tricolor flags and provocative placards. Fine guys in leather jackets lined up in Soviet Square opposite the Moscow City Soviet. A collection box emerged for donations to help the striking miners. There was a lady there to record who gave how much, but nobody put in anything.

[Yakovenko] Did you talk with them?

[Kondakov] A passerby tried to talk with those guys. He turned out to be a worker at the "Salyut" machine-building plant. He went up to them and said: "Enough of playing the fool. You would do better to go to work!" What that started! "You are a Communist. Get lost or we will string you up!" The worker said: "I am a nonparty person, and I have operated a machine tool in the plant all my life. What are you? Loafers!" Such a commotion erupted that the worker spat and went on his way.

This little scene is curious: A man suddenly appeared, dressed in the uniform of an officer in the tzar's army, with a portrait of Emperor Nicholas II. Then a handsome lady, dripping with gold, sailed out of the subway with a portrait of Yeltsin, and there they were alongside.

This is what struck me as alarming. When the people began pouring from Red Square, teenagers suddenly appeared and began distributing leaflets with anti-Soviet verses by a certain Vladimir Zharinov entitled "I Am on Strike." The leaflet ends with an appeal to Muscovites to declare a strike: This is supposedly the only salvation from hunger and adversity. This is a blatant provocation and incitement to riot.

[Correspondent A. Gamov] I would like to add the following in this connection. As is known, the "Democratic Russia" movement refused to participate in the rally. Nevertheless, it did have an invisible presence in the square, as it were. I mean the now hackneyed political slogans demanding the president's resignation, etc., which filtered through. It seems to me that this introduced a certain dissonance into the leitmotiv of the rally and somewhat spoiled the general impression. So, did "Democratic Russia's" leaders not keep their promise? I do not think this conduct improves their image.

[Belan] I have to say that I saw amid the procession of demonstrators people people bearing portraits of Stalin. Five or so people. This was a source of irritation to the people standing by me, but I particularly remember a woman with a portrait of Lenin. It was such a small, modest portrait she was carrying. I caught up with her as we came out of Red Square and we fell into conversation. Her name was Galina Ivanovna Cherkasova, from somewhere in Moscow Oblast. I asked her: Why did you come with a portrait of Lenin? "Why," she replied, "my whole life has been bound up with Lenin. My father was a Communist and Leninist. He was killed in the Great Patriotic War. Before the revolution my mother worked as a hired farm worker for a priest. I came here today to say on their behalf that we will not allow anyone to vilify Lenin's name and cause."

[Yakovenko] You saw only one portrait of Lenin?

[Belan] Just one, unfortunately.

[Kondakov] In Pushkin Square I met with some people who were demanding freedom for Nagorno-Karabakh. It turned out they were the same guys who had been there on May Day last year. I recognized them. They were not catching any passerby's attention, but they stuck at it. I approached them and asked them what they thought about the fact that Armenian gunmen had killed a totally innocent officer in Rostov. They became furious and started shouting at me: "How many of ours have been killed?.."

This kind of "pluralism" was bewildering to people who were coming from the rally in Red Square. I talked with two war veterans from Chertanov, Nikolay Vasilyevich Goryushkin and Fedor Ivanovich Vasiltsov. They were exasperated, understandably wondering: Where are the actual Communists, where are the party aktiv, agitators, and ideological workers? Why are they not visible, why are they not audible today? We have given over the streets and squares without a fight to agitators of a certain bent—anticommunists and anti-Soviets. Veterans believe it is time to take definite legislative steps. Would it be possible in any other country to openly call for the overthrow of existing power and the lawful government and call it a gang of crooks, robbers, and dirty dogs? It would be actionable in any country. Not here, though. That is one-sided pluralism for you.

[Gamov] In this connection, I personally was amazed that practically none of the slogans the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] has produced in its work was in evidence at the rally. As far as I know, there were party processions to the May Day demonstration in other Russian cities. Why did this not happen in Moscow? It is true that the leaders of the CPSU, the Russian Communist Party, and the Moscow CPSU City Committee [gorkom] were in the square on the day, but they could have headed party ranks.

At the news conference the day before, I put a question to the leaders of the Moscow trade unions federation: Will there be party organizations among the columns of demonstrators? They replied that the Communists did put in a request, but it was refused. If they want to, they said, let them appeal to the Moscow City Soviet and hold their own demonstration. It seems to me that our party leaders made something of a blunder here. I think that the absence of party processions and slogans lessened the overall impact of the May Day demonstration. [passage omitted]

[Yakovenko] Sasha, how did you manage to collar Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and get an interview? How does he look?

[Gamov] It was difficult. Frankly, he looks even better than when he was prime minister. Nikolay Ivanovich himself confirmed that he feels good, physically and mentally.

[Yakovenko] Did you not ask what he thought of the anticrisis program presented by the new Cabinet of Ministers?

[Gamov] That was the first question I asked. Nikolay Ivanovich said, in particular, that the anticrisis program is essential at the moment and life would be impossible without it in such a complex situation. According to N.I. Ryzhkov, the proposed program contains much that is new, but also many points that were elaborated by the previous government. They show a definite consistency in conducting socioeconomic policy.

At the same time, N.I. Ryzhkov noted that by no means did he agree on everything with the new government cabinet. In particular, the proposals relating to the accelerated liberalization of prices and hasty privatization of

housing. This requires some very serious consideration, in his view. It is necessary to work out where you need privatization and where you need destatization. What role labor collectives will play in these matters. If ownership passes to the labor collectives, that is one thing. If some individual buys it for big money—one has to be cautious about such a development.

I also put the following question to Nikolay Ivanovich: As a member of a trade union, does he support the slogans concerning protection of working people's interests, which were on display in the square? "The trade unions were set up to protect working people," Nikolay Ivanovich replied. "During the past 12-18 months of my work I have done a great deal of thinking about the role of the trade unions and I believe that they occupy a proper place in the country's political life."

[Yakovenko] Does Nikolay Ivanovich intend to get involved in active politics again—I am thinking about the upcoming Russian presidential election?

[Gamov] He confirmed that a great number of people—reopresentatives of labor collectives and public organizations—had already asked him about this. "I spent some days wondering whether or not I should join the fight for the Russian presidency. Morally I had every right to say "no," for obvious reasons. My former illness is no secret. In view of the complex situation, however, I believe, as a citizen of my country and as a citizen of Russia, that I cannot stand aloof from current political activity. So I have decided to join the election struggle. I believe that Russia requires special attention. I would like it to find its feet eventually. Whom the Russians choose as president, however, is a matter for the people." [passage omitted]

Further on Prokofyev CPSU Plenum Speech

PM0305105191 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 27 Apr 91 p 2

[Speech delivered by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU City Committee, at CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission Joint Plenum on 24 April]

[Text] Comrades, a Moscow CPSU City Committee [Gorkom] Plenum was held yesterday. It focused on the same current problems as we have been discussing today.

Without going into details, I will dwell on the main assessments and the most important proposals for getting the country out of the crisis.

First, we have no more time for endlessly arguing about the catastrophic situation in which our society finds itself. There are plenty of arguments to back up this assessment. Additional details will no longer make the picture any clearer. We need to act vigorously to get the country out of the crisis. The question is: How should we act?

It is now obvious that we will not be able to get by without tough measures—above all in the economic sphere. We should not view them as an attempt to reverse the reforms that have been begun. But we should pluck up courage and admit that the mistakes made when implementing the reforms have left the country in the gravest of situations. The essence of the transformations has been subverted [podmena]. The means has become the end. The destruction of the national economy has led to a sharp fall in the people's living standard. Urgent measures, up to and including emergency measures, are needed to stabilize all aspects of life in order to halt the slide into catastrophe and, having taken stock, continue the reforms. That is why we support, on the whole, the joint statement on urgent measures to stabilize the situation and overcome the crisis signed by the USSR president and the leaders of the top state organs in nine union republics and published today. It largely coincides with the proposals advanced at the Moscow City Party Committee [gorkom] Plenum.

But, nonetheless, the proposed measures are not, in our view, entirely adequate to cope with the prevailing situation. It seems to us that they should correspond to three main interrelated demands: comprehensiveness, the presence of a clear-cut mechanism for implementing them, and phased implementation. The absence of these requirements in the joint statement diminishes its constructiveness and the confidence that what has been planned will be carried out.

I will cite just one example: 28 March in Moscow. There was the president's viewpoint, there was a decision by the USSR Supreme Soviet, there was an order by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, but the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom [Executive Committee] and Moscow Soviet ignored them. I am referring to the holding of the demonstration. And what then? There was no reaction to this from the state authorities. If we continue to have a situation where lower executive organs ignore the decisions of higher executive organs, no program, not even the most wonderful program, can be implemented.

In this connection I would make the following specific points. It is not enough to speak of the need to comply with existing laws. We must stop the war of laws. And this cannot be done without suspending the operation of all laws adopted by republics and regions which run counter to the USSR Constitution and laws.

We should not hope for something to turn up to get us out of the crisis. In the new highly developed countries whose experience and living standard we invoke there have been five-, three-, and one-year development plans and targeted national programs.

We need to urgently restore a centralized system of material and technical supply, above all, for vitally important sectors. Without this, in our view, it will be impossible to block the crisis processes. The improvement of the tax system should be one of the priority

measures for stabilizing the economy. New forms of economic management should not be established at the expense of infringing the interests of state enterprises and the people working at them. We cannot allow the final disintegration of the state sector of the economy. That would lead to ruin.

The anticrisis measures should provide for an improvement in the financial health of the economy. A unified financial and credit policy based on a single monetary unit and on a powerful state banking system must be implemented in the state. At long last, in our view, we must also make up our minds to carry out a profound monetary reform. Broad strata of the population will not suffer as a result of this.

The comprehensiveness of the measures is also destroyed because of the lack of the necessary steps to normalize foreign economic activity and to establish control over the main export resources. We may lose practically all our strategic raw materials if they are used for barter deals.

Problems of science, culture, education, and health care, which must be urgently solved if we are to survive and think about the future, are not mentioned among the immediate measures.

Second, with regard to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers anticrisis program. Whatever viewpoints have been expressed here today, I still believe that the course of the discussion of the program clearly demonstrates the extent to which the party is isolated from the solutions of the most important questions of the state's present life. The Central Committee has again been confronted with a fait accompli. What is the point in discussing at the plenum today a document that was adopted as a basis by the Supreme Soviet yesterday? Although it must be recalled that the CPSU is the ruling party, and the country's president and prime minister are Central Committee members. You get the impression that our comrades would like to get the okay from the plenum according to the classic scenario of the past. We meet, we talk, we vote "in favor." Otherwise there is the possibility mentioned here by Comrade Prigarin, that the party Central Committee plenum will be pitted against the Supreme Soviet if it arrives at a different viewpoint.

I also have to express the party gorkom's viewpoint on the program as a whole. There is serious doubt about the social cost of the measures proposed by the government. We consider it extremely high. You know, esteemed comrades, I forget all about the considerable achievements of perestroyka in the sphere of democratization when I see old people down at the vegetable store in the morning picking up cabbage leaves out of garbage containers, or a young man in a commercial store calmly buying three bottles of spirits costing more than 1,000 rubles.

There is one more question in connection with the program. What did deputies vote for? For Comrade Pavlov's report or for the program? Even a quick glance shows the difference between the provisions of the report and the program that was submitted. What is going to be implemented? The provisions of the report or the program? That too is totally unclear.

Third, the most heated debates at the party gorkom plenum yesterday focused on the question of the current CPSU leadership. A direct call was made for the Central Committee general secretary to resign. The framing of the question in this way was justified by the difficult progress in the transformations, the burden of the errors of perestroyka which are increasing life's difficulties, the policy—incomprehensible to many—of conducting a balancing act between different political forces, and the increasing gap between primary party organizations and the party leadership.

This was by no means a machination by the party apparatus, as some people are now trying to make out. It is a feeling held by quite broad swathes of the party masses. Our gorkom alone has recently received over 300 letters and various resolutions expressing no confidence in the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the general secretary. And anyhow, members of the party gorkom, most of whom are representatives of labor collectives, are far from being apparatchiks.

Mikhail Sergeyevich! You should realize that people are expecting not only resolute statements. There have already been more than enough of them. They are expecting above all vigorous and consistent action in all spheres of life. That is the only way to win back Communists' confidence and the people's support.

The gorkom plenum discussed the need to take emergency measures as an instrument for implementing the anticrisis program. Comrade Pavlov's report, especially its first section, also suggests the same thought. No program, much less an anticrisis program, can be implemented without such emergency measures in the situation which has emerged in the country. And Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, as the president, needs to make up his mind to do this and to apply the emergency powers which have been granted to him.

If everything remains unchanged and drowns once again in a sea of words which are not backed up by action, it will be a tragedy for the country and the party. And then Communists will be entitled to ask: "Does the current political leadership have the right to lead the party?"

One more thing. I did not know of Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko's speech. I think it is an honest, courageous speech, and I am prepared to subscribe to every word of it.

Sverdlovsk Gorkom Meets Ahead of CPSU Plenum

PM2304154191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Correspondent V. Fomin report: "Position Stated"]

[Text] The enlarged plenum of Sverdlovsk CPSU Gorkom [city committee] was preceded by extensive discussion of the proposed draft documents in enterprise and institution party organizations.

The discussion was really long overdue, and as a result of the one-sided exchange of opinions the "Position of the Sverdlovsk City Party Organization on the Situation Prevailing in Society" was formulated. This document for the first time uses the term "collapse" to describe the situation: collapse of state power, the territory of the country, the economy, morality, and the law. In these conditions the USSR president and the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet are told to accelerate as much as possible the timetable for concluding the Union treaty, to achieve civil harmony, and to hold presidential elections by universal suffrage. The participants in the plenum also press for legislative guarantees of a minimum level of social protection for the whole population.

The CPSU Gorkom plenum adopted a political statement by a majority of votes. This statement says, in particular: "The power of the party masses in the party proclaimed at the 28th CPSU Congress has in practice turned into the alienation of Communists from the real political process. CPSU members have thereby become hostages to decisions adopted against their will." The Sverdlovsk Communists also propose that an extraordinary CPSU Central Committee Plenum be held as soon as possible to discuss the government's anticrisis program and the situation in the party, including the expediency of combining the posts of general secretary and president of the country in the prevailing political situation.

A separate point in the statement is a proposal to examine at the next plenum of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee the question of the resignation of Comrade Polozkov from the post of first secretary, since the leader of Russia's Communists does not enjoy prestige or trust among many party members in the city organization.

Shenin Urges 'Joint Action' With Other Parties

PM3004143791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Meeting Held"]

[Text] O.S. Shenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met at the Academy of Social Sciences 27 April with students from the Institute for Improving Qualifications and the teaching staff from the academy's Theory of Parties and Sociopolitical Movements Faculty. There was a thorough discussion of a wide range of issues connected with the results of the CPSU Central Committee's April Plenum and the party organization's tasks in implementing its decisions. Great attention was devoted to the need to mobilize party organizations' work, and to the questions of elaborating the theoretical foundations of the CPSU's political activity in a multiparty system, interaction between the party and society, the party renewal mechanism, research into fundamental problems of the theory of political parties, and the standing of political forces in society.

The importance of elaborating the theory and practice of political centralism and of the processes of renewing the CPSU itself, preserving its unity and integrity, strengthening its social base—particularly, the worker movement—and studying the experience of other parties and political forces in the country and abroad from the standpoint of seeking mutual understanding and joint action in deepening perestroyka, renewing the USSR, and protecting working people's social and political rights was stressed.

Potential Successors to Gorbachev Viewed

PM0105131191 Amsterdam DE VOLKSKRANT in Dutch 24 Apr 91 p 15

[Article by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA chief editor Vitaliy Tretyakov: "Gorbachev Is Ripe for Resignation"]

[Text] The most likely successor to Gorbachev as president seems to me to be Anatoliy Lukyanov, the current chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Lukyanov was long the number two in the state hierarchy but has been pushed into the background by figures such as Vice President Yanayev and Prime Minister Pavlov.

Gorbachev is "ripe" for resignation, because the policies pursued by him have been rendered out-of-date and at the present moment satisfy neither right nor left in the Soviet Union. His deserts as founder of the reform of this gigantic country are clear to all and require no comment. He is bound to find his way into the history books and he alone is able to destroy the positive assessment he currently enjoys.

As the "great destroyer" of the totalitarian and imperial Soviet system he has laid the foundation for future democracy in the country which even today is still called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics although it has not been a union for a long time, nor has it been Soviet or socialist.

In order to be able to hold onto his present position Gorbachev must in the short term do what he has not succeeded in doing throughout the past six years of perestroyka. That is: Giving the country enough to eat and creating growth in the economy—and Gorbachev has no program for this. He must also put an end to the development of bloody ethnic conflicts in the Soviet Union. And that is even more unlikely.

The right would perhaps still forgive Gorbachev his fiascos in these respects if he were able to hold together the Soviet empire within its current borders and on the

old basis. But that is completely impossible. The confidence that Gorbachev enjoyed in 1985 with both the right and the left has completely disappeared.

Can Gorbachev delay his resignation from the presidency? Yes, but he can do no more than delay it. His imminent resignation—if the signs do not deceive us—as leader of the Communist Party, his abandonment of the post of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee would a year ago perhaps have extended Gorbachev's political career to the end of the century. Today such a departure would be the subject of heated discussion for only two or three days, and after a week would be dismissed as something obvious and not at all a feat of Herculean proportions.

The second possibility for remaining in office is an alliance with Boris Yeltsin. However, psychologically Gorbachev and Yeltsin are almost irreconcilable. And even if one of them were to make the first move, such an alliance is probably now only possible on Yeltsin's terms—something that the ambitious Gorbachev is hardly likely to be able to swallow. Such an alliance could only hold temporarily at best—up to the summer recess, for example.

On the other hand, the number of factors which could lead to Gorbachev's immediate resignation as president, naturally in the form of a "voluntary" resignation, is much greater.

The first is the fact that both the right and the left—not intentionally, of course, but spontaneously—are simultaneously calling for his resignation. In the past few weeks the threat that this spontaneous call will be translated into a parliamentary action has been hanging over Gorbachev's head. Anatoliy Lukyanov, who has every opportunity to manipulate parliament behind the scenes and who has saved Gorbachev in this way more than once, could now use his power against the president—something that would be lamented by only a few and that would consequently not be viewed as immoral.

The second possibility is a new bloody conflict in the Soviet Union, particularly if it were to affect Russia or Moscow, the capital. Gorbachev has already succeeded several times in ducking his responsibility for clashes between population groups and for the clumsy behavior of the Army in "pacifying" such conflicts. This cannot go on for ever. Either Gorbachev must finally punish the guilty, who would then make his "involvement" in the aforementioned events known to the world, or he again protects them from the threat of a legal action and in doing so discredits himself.

The third possibility is the bankruptcy of the current clumsy and harsh economic reforms which are being implemented by Gorbachev's protege, Pavlov. It is possible that Gorbachev could avoid his own resignation by sacrificing the prime minister. Pavlov's reforms are after all implemented with the aid of presidential decrees.

The fourth possibility is the ever increasing pressure from the strike movement, which has made Gorbachev's resignation its foremost political demand.

The fifth possibility, finally, is a decision by the Communist Party itself. Thanks to the party Gorbachev is a delegate to the Supreme Soviet, and subsequently he became chairman of the Supreme Soviet and president of the country on their recommendation.

Strictly speaking, the Soviet Constitution offers very few possibilities for a legal dismissal of the president, but the legality is easily taken care of if you limit yourself to a transitional period. For example, a "voluntary" resignation of Gorbachev followed by a "voluntary" resignation of the vice president and a temporary transfer of power to the present chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who becomes acting president of the country.

Such a scenario introduces some calm into the political struggle, particularly among the "disaffected" miners and republic parliaments. Their activity will be "rechanneled" into the campaign to promote "their" candidate in the new presidential elections.

Gorbachev's greatest rival is Boris Yeltsin, but he himself has no interest in challenging Gorbachev for the post of president of the whole country because he is sure to get the post of president of the biggest republic on 12 June. As president of Russia, Yeltsin can exercise much greater influence on the outcome of the presidential elections for the entire Soviet Union and the future policy of the president, whoever it happens to be, than if he were to succeed Gorbachev now in this prestigious but unpopular post.

There are two other politicians who, by virtue of their posts, could succeed Gorbachev: Vice President Yanayev and Prime Minister Pavlov. But each man's chances are slight. In all probability, Yanayev will have to resign along with Gorbachev. He enjoys as little popularity with the people as he does with deputies. Furthermore, he is still tarnished by accusations of fraud during his election to the vice presidency, accusations which have never been refuted.

Prime Minister Pavlov has the advantage that he is not directly linked with the Communist elite, but on the other hand he is greatly hated by the electorate for his recent draconian money reforms and the enormous price rises in the country.

Anatoliy Lukyanov seems to me currently the best candidate as Gorbachev's successor. First, I think, he is capable of steering the reforms in a more radical and democratic direction even though he was raised in the Communist political school. Despite his upbringing in the party apparatus, he is first and foremost a child of perestroyka.

Since spring 1989 Lukyanov has borne a difficult and thankless task: to mold Gorbachev's ideas in an acceptable form, to carry those sometimes clearly dubious

ideas through a sometimes rebellious legislature, and achieve a difficult balance between the different forces in the USSR Supreme Soviet. He continually had to kick the ball into the goal that Gorbachev was aiming at but he missed the target more often than he hit it. Gradually Lukyanov learned increasingly to give the president's ball a certain direction of his own even though that ball had been kicked in a very different direction.

He reconciled the different republics' interests with one another as best he could. Before the whole people (parliamentary sittings are televised) he did not balk at presenting himself as a politician with a jesuitical sharp-wittedness who heard what he needed to hear, gave the floor to the right deputy at the right moment, and ensured rounds of voting which turned out favorably for the president. No one has performed more political services for Gorbachev than Lukyanov these past few years. But as thanks for this he is increasingly being pushed into the background by Pavlov and Yanayev.

Nowadays, when domestic policy is decided less and less in the USSR Supreme Soviet and more and more in the republic parliaments and via their difficult and often conflictual contacts with the Kremlin, Lukyanov remains at his post like a steadfast little tin soldier. Thus he is enormously popular as the butt of people's jokes but not as a figure in history.

You could say that it is Lukyanov alone through his professional discipline who fashions the president's dilapidated policy into a more or less presentable parliamentary form and who is actually the champion of a more marked and more democratic course.

Lukyanov is furthermore a politician with extensive contacts among leaders of the different political tendencies and parties in the country, leaders whom Gorbachev knows only from the reports of the secret service.

It is also said that Lukyanov is not particularly enamored of Gorbachev's new idee fixe—centrism—which in fact lies to the right of center. He seems more in favor of a roundtable with all the democratic forces and even a coalition government.

It seems to me completely out of the question that Gorbachev will be succeeded by one of the so popular democrats, not even by so popular a figure as the present mayor of Leningrad, the lawyer Anatoliy Sobchak. His chances in direct presidential elections are not bad, but for the moment I am concerned only with what will happen immediately after Gorbachev's resignation. And it will be at least three months between that resignation and direct elections.

It will be very difficult for Gorbachev's successor to win a place in history. Only through a great leap forward could someone match the Nobel Prize winner, let alone surpass him.

In any event, at this moment any successor to Gorbachev is preferable to Gorbachev himself. Whether real or potential. Recently Gorbachev has not even been able to produce any more foreign policy triumphs, the area where previously he achieved his greatest successes. The failure of his latest foreign trip, to Japan, is evidence of that.

The new president of the Soviet Union can—in no small measure—pin the faults of perestroyka on its initiator and embark on a policy which is fundamentally the same but more radical. To succeed he only needs to rid himself of two millstones: the striving for an early signing of the new Union treaty (that is, the maintenance of the old empire) and the desire of the Communist Party to maintain its influence. If he can overcome these two obstacles, good times await us.

Opposition Groups' Leaders View Statement

PM0105133491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 91 Union Edition p 1

[Interviews with Vladimir Lysenko, one of the leaders of the Republican Party of Russia; Aleksandr Kuzmin, member of the Interregional Deputies Group; and Nikolay Travkin, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Andreyev—place and date of interviews not stated; first two paragraphs are Andreyev introduction: "The Opposition: A Constructive Document"]

[Text] Political parties and social movements have expressed their attitudes to the document. The CPSU defined its position in the resolution of the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission "On the Situation in the Country and Ways of Extricating the Economy From the Crisis," which supports the joint statement by the USSR president and the leaders of nine union republics.

The position of political forces opposed to M. Gorbachev is interesting. Formerly it would not have been difficult to predict their reaction to any document signed by the USSR president. When it comes to the "Statement of the 10," such predictions cannot be unconditional, definite, or clear. And this is confirmed by the views expressed to IZVESTIYA's correspondent by certain representatives of democratic forces.

Vladimir Lysenko, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy and one of the leaders of the Republican Party of Russia:

The statement came as a surprise. And at first it prompted complex feelings. At the recent Congress of Russian Deputies I said that a "roundtable" of social and political forces is an opportunity to reach a compromise. The statement could also be regarded as an example of compromise. It is a constructive document. It makes provision for mechanisms which, it seems to me, will enable us to reach a consensus on many questions. These include general elections after the signing of the Union Treaty, and the adoption of a new Constitution. And the election of the USSR president.

The independence of those republics that so wished is recognized. For Gorbachev, that was the main compromise. As for Yeltsin, his main concession is the appeal to the miners to end the strike, which has caused mixed reactions both among the miners and in the "Democratic Russia" movement. Furthermore the statement contains unfortunate terms, such as "special situation." This could be interpreted in very different ways—from drastic, emergency measures to the granting of specially favored status.

Aleksandr Kuzmin, USSR people's deputy and member of the Interregional Deputies Group:

The statement by the leaders of nine republics and M. Gorbachev must be regarded as a document that was forced upon them. Forced in the sense that it constitutes an attempt to create an appearance of compromise prior to the launch of the anticrisis program. This document is to a great extent ambivalent. On the one hand, a union of sovereign states is declared, and on the other it is stressed that the results of the referendum must be taken into account. The statement is preemptive in nature. According to some reports, representatives of five republics are drawing up their own draft Union treaty in Kiev. The center obviously does not want to lose the initiative on this matter.

But in general, in some respects, the statement makes a strong impression. A concept for interaction with the republics not signing the Union Treaty is proclaimed, and they are regarded as foreign states. I met with a representative of one of the Baltic republics, and he said that they were given pause for thought by the principle of interaction with them on the basis of international settlements, which presupposes going over to convertible currency. This is a serious matter for them.

Another factor could complicate life. According to the "Statement of the 10," the present Union legislature is most likely to be disbanded. In that case Gorbachev will face the difficult task of how to explain to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet that the deputies are coming to the end of their powers. The election of M. Gorbachev himself to the post of president is by no means predetermined.

Nikolay Travkin, USSR and RSFSR people's deputy and chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia:

In my view the document signed is a reasonable one. It is evidence that everyone—both the center and the republics—has gotten tired of the tug-of-war.

I think we are seeing the approach of real political insight; people are coming to their senses. On the part of the republics: You cannot do anything in isolation. Sovereignty is a very fine word, you can, of course, struggle for independence, but when you have an impoverished, embittered people it turns to dust. There is also evidence that the center is opening its eyes, it is beginning to realize that it cannot hold on to power to the same extent as before, it is beginning to agree that the republics' demands for an increase in their power functions are justified. The center is making a mistake: It keeps everything to itself and takes the full force of the blows. By sharing power it will also share the responsibility. This seems to be an elementary point, but it has taken a long time getting through to some minds.

For the first time it has been said out loud: No one will keep anyone in the Union by force. For heaven's sake, you can secede, but remember: You are acquiring 100-percent autonomy, and therefore mutual relations will be structured in a good-neighborly way but, as with foreign states, on an appropriate political and—most important—economic basis. I think that is the right step to take. There is no need to intimidate anyone or try to persuade them. Experience will show, economics will show who is right and who is wrong here. I think, for instance, that of the six republics three will very quickly take steps toward the Union—Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova.

All the participants, in particular Boris Nikolayevich, found the courage to sign a text expressing this attitude to the miners' strikes: Think again, and stop it. I think Yeltsin was very well aware that some of the democrats would take a very critical view of this. And so it turned out. But in my view these are the democrats who do not really care about the Fatherland's affairs. Our party, after the signing of the statement, is all the more sympathetic toward Yeltsin. The man has taken a very serious step, and it is a necessary step, which shows Yeltsin to be a sober-minded politician.

Most likely it was just as difficult for Gorbachev to abandon his claims to anything and everything, as it was for Yeltsin to abandon the advantageous position of always being on the attack.

This document makes further actions essential. If it remains only on paper, or if one side tries to wriggle and avoid fulfilling the accords, then the final collapse is inevitable. This may be the last chance for us to begin moving toward consensus by a civilized path. [Travkin ends]

The opposition has expressed its view of the "Statement of the 10." As you can see, the opinions are, with some reservations, favorable. What next?

Speedy Signing of Union Treaty Urged

PM0205152991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 91 Second Edition p 2

[Yuriy Shabanov commentary: "The Bets Have Been Placed"]

[Text] To be honest, we have been waiting for this statement for a long time and, with it, the overcoming of personality factors and differences of opinion between two leaders—the Union leader and the Russian leader. I know that the ultraleftist camp has already hastened to label B. Yeltsin as "the Judas of democracy" and the

ultrarightists have started shouting about the shiftiness and "treacherous intentions" of M. Gorbachev. But sober-minded politicians and reasonable people have understood and assessed the main idea of the USSR president and the leaders of the nine republics who signed the Joint Statement: Mutual responsibility for the future of the peoples of our multinational fatherland.

In this connection I recall the pained words uttered at the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum by one of the authors of the statement, Kazakhstan President N. Nazarbayev: "To continue political confrontation in this situation means to turn the country into dust and ashes." You could not put it more succinctly. Millions of people have been drawn into the furious political intrigues of right-wing and left-wing radicals, and they are the hostages of uncontrolled passions. And this is already threatening to bring about a social catastrophe. That is why, it seems to me, the Joint Statement was particularly opportune. It can and should serve as a stabilizer for internal—and this includes interethnic—relations, and as a instrument guaranteeing protections for the consolidation of sober-minded forces in the country, who have realized that it is only by joint efforts that you can clamber out of the shambles and chaos.

It is no accident that the second of the "five points of agreement" as journalists have dubbed the statement, says: "The top-priority task in overcoming the crisis is to conclude a new treaty between sovereign states taking into account the results of the all-Union referendum that was held."

Note, top-priority task. Indeed what else could it be if, in their desire to become separate and sovereign, people have already started putting up barriers across the borders of republics, oblasts, and rayons, dividing everything up, right down to the last pond? If priorities of common human value are trampled for the sake of narrow national ones and things are already developing into a situation whereby any moment now people will start being divided according to the shape of their eyes, the color of their skin, and the shape of their nose. Isn't that where the extremist slogans of the type "Georgia—for the Georgians" and "The Ukraine—for the Ukrainians" are pushing us?

The price of such appeals is the pitiful wail of thousands and thousands of refugees, the inextricable thorn stuck in our souls, the fresh graves of those who died at the hands of people whom they called their friends and neighbors only yesterday. God, if you exist, save and preserve us from ourselves for our sake! But it would be more correct to say: Let God or universal justice settle in our hearts and minds so that we can save ourselves. Through concrete earthly deeds. That is why we need a treaty of sovereign states like we need air, to cement the new union on a voluntary and equal basis. Precisely on a voluntary basis. The six republics that did not sign the Joint Statement are acknowledged to have the right "to independently decide the question of accession to the Union treaty." The unconditional nature of this provision in the document will, I believe, open up new possibilities in the talks between the center and the "rebellious" republics.

At the same time it is ismpossible not to draw attention to the words in the statement about granting most-favored-"nation" status to the republics that do sign the Union treaty. Of course some people may perceive this as a threat and as coercion. It is not at all. This action is fully in line with the norms and provisions of interstate relations: for example, trade and all settlements between foreign states are carried out at world prices. And if in some places people want to picture self-determination as a cow that eats fodder from the union manger but which is milked on the territory of an individual republic, then it is best to get rid of such illusions straight away. In any case, the thesis of most favored "nation" status provides a serious reason to think deeply about the pluses and minuses of withdrawal from the Union: Decide for yourselves, as the saying goes.

The signing of the treaty on the union of sovereign states is an immediate step, but it is only the first one in establishing new relations between those who will accede to the treaty. It will be the legal foundation for the elaboration of a new union Constitution which the USSR Congress of People's Deputies must adopt no later than six months after the signing of the treaty. And then it will be possible to hold elections to the union's organs of power on the basis of the treaty and the Constitution.

At first sight, this provision fully corresponds with the strikers' political demands. A new parliament means a new government, and the nationwide election of a president. However, the essential difference is in that this process will not take place under the pressure of ochlocracy, but by legal constitutional means.

What will the new organs of power be like? I do not know what form they will take (this will be determined by representatives of states included in the union), but in essence they will be democratic, will meet the interests of all the republics and all the nations, and will possess clear rights and commitments, as is usual in a rule-of-law state.

Will the path to the new democratic elections on the basis of the new Constitution be a long one? It all depends on how soon the representatives of the union republics sign the Union treaty. That is, we again come up against the need to take the first step toward mutual accord as quickly as possible. And until then? Until then we have to respect the existing laws and the present Constitution. The statement clearly records that an indispensable condition for the stabilization of the situation in the country is to adopt decisive measures to restore constitutional order everywhere and strictly observe existing laws...

Today there is no shortage of commentaries in our country and abroad on the text of the Joint Statement. I add my voice to those who, while assessing its strategic

thrust as working for the deliverance of the Union from political and economic destruction, are concerned first and foremost with the actual translation of the statement into reality. I would not like this enormously important document to become mere small change in the political struggle or a tactical ruse for a specific period. I believe that people would not understand this or forgive it. The stakes are now too high.

Returned Agent Interviewed on Espionage Work

PM0205103791 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 May 91 p 2

[Interview with returned agent "Sergey Ivanovich" and Lieutenant General Leonid Shebarshin, chief of the USSR KGB First Main Administration, by correspondent I. Kadulin under the rubric "Station Chiefs' Lives"; place and date not given: "My Wife and I Were Illegals"]

[Text] The First Main Administration, which deals with foreign intelligence work, is one of the KGB's most secret subunits. Our correspondent met with one of its agents—a pupil of R. Abel and K. Molodyy, who has worked illegally abroad for more than 20 years. His name is still top secret, so he asked us to call him just Sergey Ivanovich. Lieutenant General Leonid Shebarshin, chief of the USSR KGB First Main Administration, also took part in the discussion.

[Kadulin] Tell me, Sergey Ivanovich, is there a difference between a "spy" and an "intelligence officer"?

[Sergey Ivanovich] "Spy" is more of a literary than a professional term. Two main terms are used in intelligence work: "cadre intelligence officer" and "agent"—that is, a noncadre specialist brought in to achieve intelligence goals.

[Kadulin] How do people usually get into intelligence work?

[Sergey Ivanovich] In different ways. Needless to say, just having an inclination to adventure and a romantic character are not enough. It is not easy to join us. Intelligence work requires specialists, and of the most varied kinds.

Most operatives either join as specialists in a certain region in their own right, or specialize after joining. When they return from abroad some of them become academics specializing in international affairs, others become language experts, and so forth.

[Kadulin] What selection criteria does intelligence work employ?

[Sergey Ivanovich] We have special methods that help us to assess people's analytical capabilities, psychological strength, observation, visual memory, and—last but not least—intelligence. By the very nature of their work intelligence officers are constantly moving among people with information. To avoid sticking out like a sore thumb, they have to understand various spheres of knowledge.

Our tests are many and varied. There is a test comprising 500 questions. There is another comprising 15 pages of closely printed text in which you have to cross out, say, all the letter "n's." A testee may be left in a dark room for several hours when suddenly, after a certain length of time determined by the program, a dazzling flash of light will go off.

Health is of enormous importance to an intelligence officer. Like servicemen, we undergo regular medical checks.

[Kadulin] What motivates people to go into intelligence work?

[Sergey Ivanovich] There is no one answer to that, but I can quite definitely say that it is not money, glory, or medals. Even if our intelligence officers are major entrepreneurs and earn millions of dollars—as was the case with Lonsdale (Footnote) (The famous Soviet intelligence officer K.T. Molodyy, who worked in Britain under the name G. Lonsdale) they give this money to the state. Our colleagues, as you can guess, do not get much glory either. After all, a good intelligence officer is one whose real profession is suspected by nobody.

The correlation between the pay earned by special service operatives and average earnings in that country is approximately the same all around the world. Their pay is slightly higher than the average. If we work abroad, we are paid our salary in foreign currency, the amount depending on many conditions and circumstances in each case. At any rate, we do not have to worry about where our next meal is coming from.

[Shebarshin] There are specific norms of behavior in intelligence work and a value system that is not understood by the uninitiated. A sense of camaraderie and even brotherhood is inherent in our line of work.

These days we never hesitate to get rid of those who cannot work conscientiously and in a disciplined and extremely honest way. Some of these people later start "exposing" us and besmirching their former colleagues, while overlooking all their own shortcomings and failings.

[Kadulin] Intelligence work is closely tied to politics and is at its service. Do intelligence officers' political convictions and professional duty always coincide? Or do they perhaps need to be fanatics to succeed?

[Sergey Ivanovich] Fanaticism is totally at odds with intelligence work. It would inevitably "color" officers' actions and prevent them from being objective.

And politics... You know, the oath we take does not include the words "politics" or "government," but it does include the words "country" and "people." You see, we do not work for any specific political leader, but

for the country. It is for the government to decide whether it uses the information we provide or not. Sometimes our information goes unheeded.... We have different attitudes to different politicians, but we have enough sense not to identify the country with the government at any given moment.

[Kadulin] What would an intelligence officer define as "failure"?

[Sergey Ivanovich] Failure would be the forced curtailment of an intelligence officer's activities caused by the most varied of circumstances. Arrest or exposure are very rarely seen as failure. As a rule, intelligence officers manage to escape, although this is always difficult. Such an escape does not constitute failure in the direct sense of the word; however, it essentially has the same result—the ending of intelligence activity.

Before sending intelligence officers to work as illegals, the center closely studies the environment in which they will be operating. It is important that intelligence officers should not find themselves in places where there are people who can correctly identify them. The following incident once happened to me. My plane once had to make a forced landing. I was flying first class—the most expensive of all—and our diplomatic couriers were nearby. After landing, a Soviet Embassy official came on board and I realized he was an old friend from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He recognized me too. Pleased to see me, came up with a shout of "Hi there!" (in Russian, naturally). I remembered that he knew Italian and English, and, to avoid an undesirable dialogue, answered him in French, stating that the gentleman had made a mistake. I followed the airline official into the VIP lounge for the most "important" passengers. You should have seen the poor guy's face. The next day a new plane was ready and we met again. Now my friend was even more amazed to see me traveling first class and being chauffeured to the plane by Rolls-Royce.

Failure is usually caused by some kind of betrayal. In such an event the center immediately recalls all operatives whom the traitor could know and, consequently, give away. That was the case with me too: I was betrayed by the renowned Oleg Gordiyevskiy, but that is another story...

[Kadulin] Could you say a few words about what intelligence operatives do?

[Sergey Ivanovich] First and foremost, we have to distinguish between intelligence officers who are Soviet citizens and those who are "illegals" working under cover and with a different name as the subjects of foreign states. Each of these forms of intelligence work—the legal and the illegal—has its pros and cons. As a rule, the other side's counterintelligence knows about intelligence officers working at official missions. To some extent things are easier for "illegals" because they are harder to detect but are also more vulnerable.

After all, there are some counterintelligence services that use extremely cruel methods...

I can state quite officially, however, that we do not use murder. I would even go further: Oleg Gordiyevskiy, who betrayed the motherland six years ago and was condemned to death in absentia, can now calmly return home.

[Kadulin] It is well known that any kind of intelligence effort involves the recruitment of foreign citizens to pass on to the station chief information containing state secrets. To all intents and purposes this is a question of persuading people to betray their countries, although it is not actually called that in every country. Clearly, this practice must give rise to some difficult moral choices?

[Sergey Ivanovich] That is a very hard question. Indeed, the other side of the coin is that, while being guided by the highest ideals and convictions, intelligence officers are forced to resort to very, shall we say unusual, methods....

It is important to bear in mind, however, that 90 percent of all the information we need—Graham Greene once said this—is collected overtly. We need our agents to collect the other 10 percent.

[Shebarshin] It is naive to imagine that most of the agents who cooperate with us do so because of any lofty convictions.

There are two main reasons why people cooperate: money and ambition. Ambitious people, even those who are very successful in their professional life, thirst for more and more glory. The less talented and successful are often pathologically sensitive about failure to recognize their merits, real or imagined. Such people readily cooperate with those who strike them as being able to discern their true worth.

Our operatives are sometimes employed by the security arms of large international corporations, all of which without exception engage in technological and economic espionage. The agents never even dream that the information they give us is passed on to our intelligence center. We do everything to ensure that they retain this happy delusion to the end of their days, thinking that they have just been doing good business.

[Kadulin] Sergey Ivanovich, you have spent more than 20 years abroad, virtually never visiting the USSR. Presumably this was very difficult.

[Sergey Ivanovich] When we left, Khrushchev was promising communism in 20 years, but the years have gone by and the situation in our country has not improved. My wife and I, of course, have naturally discussed this and been through it together, but we could not afford to do any more than that. As you will appreciate, intelligence officers have no time for sentiment....

[Kadulin] Nonetheless, were there times during your work over there that you felt disillusioned about our government's policy and about the ideals you were serving?

[Sergey Ivanovich] I did feel disillusioned about policies, but never about my ideals. Otherwise I could not have done my job.

It was often difficult. After all, we hardly ever got any information about what was happening in the country. Judge for yourselves: Our radio channels were open for probably just 15 minutes a week and were used solely for operational purposes. Consequently, we were unable to obtain any information of a general political nature. Nor could we listen to Russian-language radio, since this would erode our aptitude in the language in which we had to think as well as talk. Even when we got home, we initially found it hard to use our native language. When my wife and I have a row, or when we dream, it is in a foreign language.

Newspapers were our main source of information on the motherland.

Since my wife and I were "illegals" we could, understandably, never afford to come to the attention of the police or the special services under any circumstances. Wherever we went—be it to a restaurant or a movie theater—we immediately studied the situation and looked for possible escape routes.

Sometimes, when we were feeling homesick, my wife and I would make borscht and pelmeni, after having checked three times to see that all the doors were locked. Sometimes we would drink a glass of vodka. I remember that, when I was made a colonel, my wife heard about it on the First Program on the radio—since I was on the other side of the world. She later told me that she drank two glasses of vodka in our honor, then called me and, using words known to us alone, told me about the change in my personal life.

I would note in passing that titles and awards have never been devalued in our line of work, even in the stagnation years of medals aplenty. I know this from my own experience. Admittedly, I was once awarded two Orders of the Combat Red Banner in succession within a single year. Clearly, it was just a "bumper" year for major operations.

[Kadulin] How have you been adapting to our life since you got back?

[Sergey Ivanovich] With some difficulty, to put it mildly. For instance, I am still instantly on my guard if a stranger or slight acquaintance suddenly starts asking questions about my personal life. After all, as I have already said, we had to live "under cover" over there. There was always the fear that the cover story would not stand up to serious examination.

Moreover, the professional cautiousness and fear of being followed that is shown by some of my colleagues—many of whom were shadowed for many years quite openly and sometimes in a deliberately blatant manner—can turn into a persecution complex. That is one of our occupational hazards.

This is just one part of the problem. The other is that we have lived for 20-odd years in another society with a different standard of comfort. You get used to certain kinds of food, certain kinds of clothes, and a plentiful supply of goods. Of the two of us, I have adapted the more quickly to the new living conditions. In general, we have learned to get by. Our professional habits help. We have switched from a Mercedes to a Volga. I have learned, out of necessity, to be a car mechanic. During our many years of working over there my wife and I both had to learn to do dozens of jobs, and we speak at least three languages each. So I hope that we will manage even in today's very difficult situation.

One other point. Intelligence work has, regrettably, kept us apart from our friends for a long time. I am only now starting to pick up my old friendships, and some quite delicate problems are cropping up. For instance, I had a good relationship with several guys at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, where I studied. Since then many of them have achieved great success in their lives. My fellow-student Sasha Pumpyanskiy is currently chief editor of the magazine NOVOYE VREMYA. The current foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, was a year or two ahead of me.... One way or another, I can now freely meet up with the friends of my youth, although almost none of them could even imagine what I have been doing for so many years. After all, only 14 people in the whole world know what my wife and I have been doing for more than 20 years. You are the 15th.

[Kadulin] Which intelligence service is considered the best in the world?

[Sergey Ivanovich] "Best," "worst"—it is all relative. For instance, before the war German intelligence was thought to be the best, but after 1942 we started moving ahead of them. We give our current "opponents"—the Americans, Israelis, Germans, French, and British—their due. I know that we are not last in this list.

Followup Report on Pamyat Leader's Suicide

PM0205144191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 91 Union Edition p 7

[S. Mostovshchikov report: "Konstantin Ostashvili Has Committed Suicide"]

[Text] Konstantin Ostashvili, who was 55 years old and one of the leaders of Pamyat before his trial, hanged himself 26 April at 1030 hours in the Tver intensified regime colony.

K. Smirnov-Ostashvili was convicted 12 October 1990 by Moscow City Court under the quite rarely applied Article 74 of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated

Socialist Republic] Criminal Code (violation of equality of national and racial rights) for acts of violence at the Central House of Writers. When the sentence was read out—two years' imprisonment to be served in an intensified-regime colony—the accused was cheerful and promised sympathizers who had gathered in the courtroom that he would rapidly convert his future fellow inmates to his faith.

Andrey Muratov, the member of the Moscow City Court who heard Ostashvili's case, was alarmed at rumors that his former "ward" had committed suicide and on Monday 29 April called the Tver colony, where the fact of the death was confirmed, to him. According to Muratov, however, the administration gave no specific details.

In an interview with your IZVESTIYA correspondent, Vladimir Gulyayev, chief of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Main Administration for Correctional Affairs, ascribed for the paucity of information provided to the fact that an investigation into Ostashvili's suicide is currently under way and the interests of the investigation do not permit all the details to be made public. V. Gulyayev disclosed, however, that Ostashvili hanged himself in the chief engineer's department cloakroom and did not leave any notes concerning the reason for his suicide. It is already known that the prisoner had not turned to the administration and no instances of oppression against him have come to light.

Economic

Government Anticrisis Program Criticized

914A0673A Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by TRUD political observer V. Golovachev: "It Is Down to a Matter of Days; Does the Government Draft Anticrisis Program Promise a Way Out of the Crisis?"]

[Text] The situation in our country reminds one of a powder keg next to which people are starting a bonfire: Social tension is increasing, the strike movement is growing, and there is mass dissatisfaction everywhere... Confidence in the government is declining literally before our eyes. The "war of nerves" begun by the prime minister and his cabinet with the striking miners has led to a situation where the strikers have shifted from economic demands to political ones. The ineffective and unskillfully conducted exchange of money and the price reform, which was not thought through to the end and which they decided to conduct without preliminary financial improvement or antimonopoly or other necessary measures, undoubtedly contributed, along with other factors, to the growth of social tension in society.

Under these most difficult conditions the government developed a draft anticrisis program whose goal is to lead the country out of its impasse. At first glance there is much that is attractive here, and market instruments and unexpected solutions are suggested. For example, the commercial and procurement cooperatives are rehabilitated, private property is recognized, and there is even mention of concessions to foreign countries and companies... But upon closer reading one discovers that a significant part of it is not a real program but merely declarative assertions that are not filled with anything concrete. There is no mention of either time periods or sources of financing. Moreover, in my view, the rigid administrative command system shows through clearly here and there.

For example, the draft program demands: to immediately eliminate administrative and economic barriers that have been artificially created on the path of the movement of goods; to provide for deliveries of the most important resources; to organize work in all regions for starting up shops and productions that have been halted; to put new production capacities into operation... All that is good, but how are we to achieve these goals? What does it mean, for example to "establish a moratorium on political strikes"? Are troops to be sent into the mining towns?

If the center and the republics do not reach an agreement or if the government does not enjoy the necessary confidence, then no program will bring the country out of is impasse. But here is the question: Does the present government enjoy this confidence?

The draft of the government anticrisis program was considered yesterday by the committees and commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet. One of the questions USSR Deputy Prime Minister V. Shcherbakov dealt with in his speech was this: Why does the program contain so many general phrases and why is the concrete mechanism sometimes not revealed? In V. Shcherbakov's words, it was necessary to resort to this in cases when detailed coordination with the republics was required. Here general lines are mentioned instead of concrete measures.

A detailed mechanism is not revealed when unpopular measures are suggested either. The government would not want to shift responsibility to the Union legislature, as the deputy minister said.

These arguments convinced far from all the delegates. In fact, why not first conduct the necessary coordination with the republics and earmark real measures, and after that bring them up for the consideration of the Union legislature? In its present form the draft of the program, as is noted in the conclusions of one of the specialists, is not completely clear in terms of the goals that are set, its principles for implementation, or its deadlines. An analysis showed that more than 100 of the earmarked measures (there are 134 in all) have no mechanism for implementation, and some of them are merely prohibitive. This was discussed, in particular, by the work group leader, N. Bobritskiy.

Deputy A. Baranov severely criticized the proposals contained in the draft concerning making compulsory

payments "before paying wages." Is it clear what this means? If not, I will clarify. The calendar day for payments into the budget arrives and the bank takes the necessary sum from the enterprise's account. And it does not pay any attention to whether or not the plant has sufficient funds for wages. There might not be any money, and not by a fault of the collective—for instance, clients might not have paid their bills or something. And then comes payday and the workers are told: There is no money, esteemed comrades, the bank has taken it all for payments into the budget. It is easy to imagine the kinds of social explosions this might bring down upon the country. Or does this not bother V. Pavlov, who frequently conducts policy, as they say, from a position of force? Has the barrage of strikes that have befallen the country taught us nothing? If not, I do not think the government has much chance of surviving.

The proposal concerning the introduction of material and criminal liability for barter operations based on costly motor vehicles, complicated household equipment, and so forth also seriously violates the rights of the enterprises. Does the center want to take command of the plants, factories, and combines again? But where is the promised independence? As long as this kind of command system remains, the barriers on the path of the commodities are not likely to be removed.

Expert analytical materials also point out that the draft program does not envision the concrete measures necessary in a crisis situation to reduce all kinds of expenditures by the Cabinet of Ministers. There are pro-forma and inadequately developed sections pertaining to the system of social guarantees and priorities in structural rearrangement and scientific and technical progress.

It is also essential that with respect to many of its provisions, especially regarding privatization of state property and the price setting policy, the draft is not coordinated with the programs of the republics, including the RSFSR.

But perhaps what seems most surprising is the last section of the draft. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers declares its readiness to take responsibility for leading the country out of its crisis, but while observing the following conditions: stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in the country, a moratorium on strikes, a halting of the "war of laws," and so forth. But is the provision of normal functioning of the organs of power and the enterprises not the primary concern of the government itself? When the members of the Cabinet of Ministers were appointed neither V. Pavlov nor the ministers set any conditions. And now these conditions have appeared. Is this maneuver not an attempt by the government to escape responsibility beforehand? It is a convenient position, of course, but one would hardly think it would be acceptable for people at the helm.

In conclusion I would like to return once again to the statement by Deputy A. Baranov—the chairman of the trade union committee of the Izhorskiy Zavod Production Association (Leningrad). He said, in particular:

"Today's meeting is putting me to sleep. I do not sense here any concern for the events taking place outside the Kremlin walls. And what is happening there? The country is in the throes of creating strike committees—the Ukraine, Belorussia, the miners, Georgia, Moscow, Leningrad... The situation is critical, local conflicts could grow into mass conflicts. Tomorrow I have to return to a collective of 30,000. When I read the draft program I kept trying to find an answer to the questions: What will happen tomorrow, in a week, in two weeks? But I find no answer. This might be a program for the best possible situation, but where is the program for tomorrow?

"What is causing the situation to heat up?" continued the trade union committee chairman. "One of the factors is the several-fold increase in prices. They say to us: Find your own money. I have gotten this impression: Along with the administration we should go into the forest and find a sack of money and raise the collective's wages. Because there is practically no profit left in the enterprises.

"It is down to a matter of days," A. Baranov emphasized. "Either we keep the situation in check or we will be swept away in a battle of strikes..."

It was as though with this speech the living breath of the worker brigades burst into the Kremlin meeting hall. Will the Cabinet of Ministers hear it? We will see what the government brings to the session of the Union parliament next Monday...

Pavlov on Regulated Transition to Market

914A0671A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 17, Apr 91 p 5

[Unattributed article: "The Government Is Seeking a Way Out; Will It Find it?"]

[Text] Prime Minister V. Pavlov believes that, in the present situation, there can be a multitude of variants in the development of events. Of all of this diversity, three are most likely.

First. No special measures of an anticrisis nature are employed. The economic processes in the country are regulated by the methods in force, and the sociopolitical situation unfolds in accordance with trends that are taking shape on the basis of the current balance and distribution of forces and interests, and their practical actions.

—**In this variant, national income will decrease by approximately 20 percent on an annual basis.** It is perfectly obvious that with such an enormous drop, we will not be able to stabilize the situation even by the end of 1992.

—**Up to 18 million persons can end up without a livelihood.**

Second Variant. Complete repudiation of state interference in the economy, and it is based on an accelerated transition exclusively to market relations.

—In this variant, the volume of national income and industrial production will decrease by no less than 30 percent, but the total number of unemployed will be about 30 million persons.

Third. This is the path of decisive but consistent measures, and the government is choosing this.

This variant entails the least losses and social costs, and it gives the people an opportunity to adapt to changing conditions.

On what principles and under what conditions can this variant be implemented? The program combines economic and market instruments with administrative methods.

Already by the end of this year, approximately one-third of the small enterprises, but in 1992 not less than two-thirds, should be withdrawn from state property.

As for average and large enterprises, state enterprises should be reorganized into joint stock companies, associations, and formations of collective (people's) enterprises.

A campaign will be conducted on the conversion of state enterprises into joint stock companies. Simultaneously, there is provision for a quick transfer, a minimum of 10 percent in the course of a year and a half, of shares or value of the property of all state enterprises to the property of members of a labor collective and other citizens.

It is proposed to exempt from income taxes wages and other monetary income that are being directed at the acquisition of stock or the repayment of credits, which will be given for this purpose. The same kind of benefits will be granted to enterprises that use their own profits for the redemption of state property and investments.

A wage reform is being conducted. State guarantees have been established for minimum wages for various professional and skilled groups of workers. Restrictions have been lifted on the size of individual earnings. Enterprises have been granted the right to determine the forms and systems of wages independently.

Scientific

U.S., Soviet Space Program Aims Contrasted

PM0105122191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Apr 91 Union Edition p 8

[Interview with Colonel A. Radionov, leading specialist in USSR Defense Ministry Space Units, by V. Litovkin under "Details for IZVESTIYA" rubric; place and date not given: "What Discovery Is Carrying"]

[Text] The American reusable spacecraft Discovery was launched from Cape Canaveral at 1433 Moscow time 28 April. In the United States the flight program statement was brief—"carrying out scientific research work."

What in fact is Discovery carrying in its payload bay? Colonel A. Radionov, a leading specialist in the USSR Defense Ministry Space Units, tells us.

"The purpose of the flight is to carry out complex experiments and research into establishing satellite reconnaissance of space and orbital means of high-accuracy ballistic missile interception in space," Alexandr Ivanovich [Radionov] says. "The American astronauts—there are seven of them, working in two shifts, day and night—have to launch a number of spacecraft into orbit, some of which will then be returned to earth. These will carry out tasks of a reconnaissance nature and test methods of identifying warheads."

[Litovkin] What research apparatus is installed on board Discovery?

[Radionov] There are five systems. Their total payload is four and a half tonnes. The principal system is the "Cirris" [Cryogenic Infrared Radiance Instrumentation] infrared telescope, a kind of space night vision instrument. It has been developed specially for shuttle-type spacecraft and was first taken into space in 1982, where it was designed to record high-definition spectral characteristics of the earth's limb and the flame plumes of ballistic missiles in the upper layers of the atmosphere. That is to say a telescope capable of revealing warhead-carrying reentry vehicles against the luminous background of the planet, and consequently of helping to destroy them.

On board there is also a radiometer, a space radiolocator, and an ultraviolet telescope which operates in conjunction with the radiometer and "Cirris."

One interesting detail. The same instrument system is also located on the deployable unit. With the aid of the remote manipulator the unit will be injected into open space, and when the craft has made the appropriate maneuvers the unit will be located 10 km behind and 1,525 meters below it. This enables both the general configuration and the spectral characteristics of the plumes of the ship's operating engines to be observed, which is fundamentally important in setting up high-accuracy methods of hitting ballistic missiles.

Three small satellites will be launched into space in addition to this unit. Their payload is in the region of 85 kg, and their distance from the craft will be around 150 km. On a command from earth they are to eject various types of missile fuel components into space. In this way the possibility of camouflaging missile warheads and finding them in a gaseous cloud will be tested.

[Litovkin] So you mean they are testing components of the Strategic Defense Initiative?

[Radionov] It's not me saying this; it's what the Americans themselves are claiming.

[Litovkin] What other instruments will be launched into space?

[Radionov] There are two other satellites aboard Discovery. One of these is a small Lightsat weighing 60-70 kg. The U.S. military leadership plans to use spacecraft of this type as communications, reconnaissance, navigation and meteorological data provision tools for commanders in the tactical chain—tank, platoon, and company commanders...

The second spacecraft, weighing 1,926 kg, comprises five containers carrying a secret payload designed to test the advanced components, assemblies, and hardware of future military items in space.

[Litovkin] Is our Buran also capable of carrying out these tasks?

[Radionov] It's hard to answer this question. Nobody has ever required it to perform tasks of this sort. Its test flight planned for the end of 1991 or the start of 1992 envisages docking with the Mir orbital station, transmitting the results of on-board experiments from orbit, and testing the cosmonauts' rescue procedures.

As you can see, the tasks are exclusively economic and scientific in character. And they have no relation whatsoever with the military establishment.

Military

Moiseyev Briefs General Staff on CPSU Plenum

PM0105114591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 May 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Meeting With Plenum Participant"]

[Text] On 29 April secretaries of CPSU organizations and Communists from the USSR Armed Forces General Staff met with Army General M.A. Moiseyev, member of the party Central Committee, who participated in the April Joint Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. He shared his impressions about the plenum's work, described the basic trends of the discussion at it, noting in part that one of the main tasks today is the consolidation of all healthy forces in society around concrete and understandable aims such as ensuring the preservation and renewal of our Union state and overcoming our political, economic, and spiritual crisis.

Speaking about the conclusions that General Staff Communists should draw from the plenum's guidelines, Army General M.A. Moiseyev stressed the significance of everyone's enterprising and urgent work in their sphere of responsibility, bearing in mind today's realities and with a view to ensuring reliable security for the country. The chief of General Staff also noted that a very important condition for efficient activity on the part of military control organs is the preservation of an atmosphere of exactitude and comradeship in their collectives which would preclude the emergence of nervousness and loss of staying power, to which Communists are called upon to pay particular attention.

Western Group Commander on Withdrawal Problems

PM0205191191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 91 Second Edition p7

["Topical Interview" with M.P. Burlakov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces, by V. Izgarshev in Wuensdorf; date not given: "Troops Leaving by Sea"]

[Text] First I shall introduce my interlocutor to readers. He was born into a working-class family in the Transbaykal region in 1935. His father, Sergeant Prokopiy Ivanovich Burlakov, died in 1941, defending Leningrad against the fascists. Matvey graduated from Omsk Military School in 1958. He has worked his way up the service ladder from platoon commander to commander in chief. He is married. His wife, Viktoriya Nikolayevna, was at school with him. They have brought up two children: a son and a daughter.

[Izgarshev] Matvey Prokopyevich, we met last year, when you had just begun the withdrawal of units from the Southern Group of Forces to the Soviet Union. You are now having to resolve the very same problems as commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces. Are you a specialist in troop withdrawal?

[Burlakov] A commanding officer is what you might call obliged by service regulations to be a specialist in a very broad range of subjects. I just had a telephone call from Moscow asking me to receive some high-ranking guests from Bonn in the Group: the FRG president, chancellor, defense minister, and foreign minister and the chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany.... I was talking to some business people just before you arrived. Bankers often come to visit us here in Wuensdorf, incidentally. Well, they have the money and we have the material assets. They want to buy at a favorable price and we cannot sell without a profit.

[Izgarshev] I would like to ask, Matvey Prokopyevich, how your experience in Hungary has come in useful here, in the Western Group of Forces?

[Burlakov] As far as organization of the troop withdrawal is concerned, the same preparations have to be made as regards people, handing over premises, and so forth. If we are talking about differences, it seems to me that they amount to the following: We have a common border with Hungary. You would get on a train in Hungary, pass through Chop—and be home. But here there is a country in between, which has denied our

trains transit and caused us additional problems, incidentally. Considerable problems. So now we are pinning our main hopes on the sea. We are leaving Germany by sea.

[Izgarshev] I was in Rostock. I saw them loading military equipment onto Baltic Shipping Company vessels in the port. I realized that these sea trips are going to cost us quite a lot of money....

[Burlakov] Of course they are! Just think what it means to transport more than 300,000 military servicemen and 167,000 members of their families. Plus 26,000 civilians: our workers and employees. Plus 115,000 pieces of equipment and 2.5 million tonnes of materiel. All that has to be back in the Soviet Union by the end of 1994. It is an enormous task....

[Izgarshev] These days you hear people saying that we have made a mistake with the time-scale for the withdrawal. We should do some bargaining with the Germans. The deadline should be extended and more money obtained to provide facilities for the troops being withdrawn....

[Burlakov] Yes, I have heard that opinion expressed. But, first, you do not wave your fists after the fight is over and, second, there is no point in our remaining here longer than stipulated in the agreements. You do not have to be a diplomat to appreciate a simple fact: The situation in Europe and the rest of the world that has developed on the basis of new, realistic approaches—springing in part from our own initiative—does not allow us to change anything in our accords. They really are timely and reasonable.

No, we will go. We will calculate and recalculate which of the remaining facilities we can sell, how we can sell them, and what we can get for them. There is quite a lot of real estate that we have built here: 21,000 buildings; 1,280 residential buildings; 694 barracks; 370 canteens to seat 134,000 people; 401 stores; 56 schools; and 275 public baths. Plus military hospitals, clubs, officer centers, and 28 airfields.... Quite a lot, in short.

The real estate belonging to us is worth more than 10 billion marks. But how much will we get for it? We are greatly in need of money. The 7.8 billion marks allocated by the FRG Government to provide servicemen with housing is enough for 36,000 apartments. But, even by the most modest estimates, we will need another 19,000.... Incidentally, not a single apartment has been built with the German money so far. When will they be built? Have we become carried away with business again?

[Izgarshev] We certainly cannot get by without it. But, however important economic questions may be, they are not the main feature in the life of the Group. You and I, comrade commander in chief, visited a test site and attended tank firing practice three days ago. The results of the firing practice came as no surprise to me. Any idiot can hit the target from a modern tank. But I would like to ask you about something else. Germany is a densely populated country, and the sound of firing, exploding shells, and the rattle of machineguns can be heard all over the district. Now that the agreements have been signed, how do residents react to all the noise our army makes?

[Burlakov] That is a difficult question. Of course, we now feel far more restricted—I would even go so far as to say oppressed. Night flights are very limited. We can only drop bombs and launch missiles in our own territory. Combat training of ground forces is mainly conducted in single crews. Tactical exercises cannot extend beyond a battalion. And command-staff training is only on maps. Tracked vehicle movement is confined to the test site. In short, there are a mass of restrictions. But the agreements set out the conditions for combat training exercises, and the sides are adhering to them rigorously.

[Izgarshev] In March 1918, when the government moved from Petrograd to Moscow, V.I. Lenin wrote his famous article, "Our Main Task Today." He expressed the idea that we must learn from the Germans. How do you regard Ilich's words today?

[Burlakov] As very topical. We can learn something from the Germans. Industriousness, conscientiousness, and discipline. It is possible to do business with them: They know how to keep their word. But, in my opinion, we must learn from everyone—not just from the Germans.

[Izgarshev] I cannot help but ask you about deserters and black marketeers.

[Burlakov] Every family has its black sheep. But we do not have hundreds upon thousands of deserters, as some unscrupulous people would have you believe. We have 170 deserters, and about 10 rifles have gone missing. This is bad and disgraceful but there is no need to whip up passions.

[Izgarshev] The Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist. Our troops are leaving Eastern Europe and going home. But there is still NATO and there are still foreign troops in the FRG. How will all this affect our security?

[Burlakov] The accords we have entered into with our partners take all this into account. Our defensive doctrine fully safeguards the country's security. I think the internal factors destabilizing the situation in our country now have a greater impact on the state of our defense capability. The interests of our motherland and all its nations and ethnic groups require unity and a stronger union of republics. That is the opinion of servicemen throughout our group.

[Izgarshev] I think PRAVDA readers would be curious to learn about a military commander's daily routine and interests. What do you like to do when you are off duty? What do you read?

[Burlakov] My daily routine is extremely simple. I get up at 0500, 0430 on Mondays. I am on duty by 0630. I get home at 2100, often at 2200. Unfortunately there is no time for leisure. I realize that this is bad but that is how we live. I like to read historical works. They contain the experience of generations, which is always necessary to us. When I was younger I used to do a lot of sport. But now time is at a premium, so I can only play tennis. What else? I watch Vremya and always read PRAVDA, as well as other newspapers and journals.

The hour hand on the clock was on 10 and the minute hand was coming up to 12. The mist was getting thicker outside. Under his normal daily routine, the commander in chief should have been at home. Especially as he was planning to fly to the Baltic the next day, at 0730 hours: Two dry-cargo ships were being loaded in Rostock and the ferry was on its way....

Baltic Republics

Estonia Suspends Decision on Narva Economic Zone

LD3004132491 Moscow TASS in English 1317 GMT 30 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn April 30 TASS—The Estonian parliament has suspended for three weeks the final decision on creating a free economic zone in Narva. The proposal was submitted by the republican government.

The Estonian town of Narva in the republic's northeast, separated by a river from Leningrad region, has an enviable geographic position, considerable industrial potential, developed infrastructure and two steam power plants.

The authors of the project believe that these assets could attract foreign business people to invest capital and create enterprises in the zone.

At the same time, Narva is one of the three largest industrial centres in Estonia's northeast, where non-indigenous population prevails. Local authorities do not recognise legislative acts by the republican parliament aimed, they believe, at promoting Estonia's secession from the Soviet Union. They propose creating a Russian autonomy in the republic's northeast.

According to Narva Mayor Vladimir Chuikin, the priority of political motives has become manifest during preparations for the project. Chuikin is worried about statements that the Narva zone will begin functioning only after Estonia becomes independent.

He believes that such statements reveal the republican authorities' wish to subordinate economic demands to political ones and overcome the objective reality—during the March 17 referendum, most residents in Narva and Estonia's northeast favoured a sovereign Estonia in the Soviet Union.

Estonian Draft Proceeds Under Arrangements

PM3004140391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report: "Alternative Army"]

[Text] Tallinn—State and border protection departments are being set up by Estonian soviets. They have registered 70 percent of [the] draftees. Military commissariats find themselves facing strong competition.

The Union law on universal military service does not apply in the republic. Instead, the law "On Alternative Service in the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]"—the country's first such law—was adopted. Young men are given a choice: They can either serve as soldiers or work for two years as directed by the soviets, earning 100 rubles a month. Commissions dealt on a voluntary basis with questions of military service.

Faced with this initiative, many guys managed to neither serve nor work. The Supreme Soviet has made amendments to the Law on Alternative Service. Its organization has been given over to new departments under the soviets—state and border defense protection departments. They will start issuing instructions to the young men in May. The nature of alternative service is changing too. Draftees will be expected to serve with the police, customs organs, and economic border protection subunits.

Estonian Movement Receives Broadcasting License

LD3004143991 Tallinn International Service in English 2030 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] In consideration of various campaigns against Estonian independence, Interfront, a hardline Russian organization backed by Moscow, declared it will be made [word indistinct] in May. According to Interfront leader Yuriy Rudyak, in an interview with RAHVA HAAL this week, the organization received a license from the central Soviet Radio and Television Company to broadcast six hours every day.

Transmitters for the station are located on an Army base in Tallinn and, according to Rudyak, will be under permanent guard by the Soviet Army. Since last August the pro-Moscow Interfront, in conjunction with the Soviet Army, has been broadcasting radio programs calling on Estonian people to take action against [words indistinct] authorities. During the Soviet crackdown in the Baltics last month, the station even called on people to form battle units against the pro-independence Estonians.

Latvia Revokes Meat, Milk Price Hike Decision

LD0105163791 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1600 GMT 1 May 91

[Text] The Latvian Council of Ministers has revoked its decision on a new increase of retail prices for milk, meat, and their end products. A new increase averaging 15-20 percent was planned from 2 May. The abolition of this unpopular decision is linked to the fact that strikes were being prepared at a number of enterprises.

Latvian Premier Views Internal Affairs

LD0205162791 Riga Domestic Service in Russian 0832 GMT 27 Apr 91

[Remarks by Ivars Godmanis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers, at a session of the Dome of the Latvian People's Front in Riga—live]

[Excerpts] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has been fully reorganized. A three-department system has been created: one is a typical criminal militia; the second one is the militia connected with a protection of order and

patrolling; the third one is the one with all the functions that it was instructed with in connection with re-registration of documents and so on.

I cannot competently explain all this reorganization to you now, because I am not that competent—I must ask Vaznis to. Reorganization, however, is indeed connected with the money in the system. We have taken the Ministry of Internal Affairs under the republic's budget. This cost us 117 million rubles. We were reproached by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs for having done this because, in their opinion, we were not allowed to do this—we had to leave the Ministry of Internal Affairs partially financed by the USSR budget. We did not do this. I think that we took the right step. We took it under our budget. We raised the salaries. This should act as a material stimulus, because I fear that without a material stimulus nobody would come and work as militiaman or a policeman—let us not be naive. It is a fact that reorganization with the tendency of decentralization at the minitry has been already fully completed. In this event you must invite the minister of internal affairs, here to tell you, or to request him to (?give a specific) account in the press. This simply shows that there is a lack of clarity. [passage omitted] The government is thinking of establishing a defense department. At the moment we have established a department of security, a department of public security. We will promote this department to the end. Now let us think further. We are also thinking of developing the customs department.

I am going to try and answer [your questions] today. I have one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 questions. [passage omitted]

Let us turn to some of them.

First, sitting here is my first deputy, Mr. Bisers, I will later ask him to give a short account of the talks in Moscow. I do not want to talk about it, because he is the leader of the delegation at the talks, as I said; in any case you will hear the information much better first hand. That is the first point. Second, in relation to what was published in yesterday in ATMODA, I (?have my eye) on esteemed Mr. (?Veidemans). Let there be complete clarity.

We have had no agreements concluded with the Security Committee, neither in Moscow nor here. We did conduct talks with representatives of the Security Committee's leadership when they came here in the middle of the summer.

Item three: I have met the Security Committee's active in Latvia.

Item four: We are not interested for the Security Committee to change over into an (armed) forces' unit in Latvia, which would instantly happen at the moment should we organize an alternative security committee.

Item five: We would be interested in making use of almost what there is, on the condition that we are fully sovereign in the choice of the cadres and that we appoint all the leadership of the Security Committee under the competence of the government of the Republic of Latvia. That is, during this transitional period for this Security Committee to remain under agreement relations with the Security Committee on the Union [Scale], or even, should this Union Committee break up into separate committees in the republics—what do these functions, you see, remain like, that are, there are sufficiently specific functions—[to remain] on agreement relations. Agreement relations which (?do not restrict) entirely the committee's (?tasks).

Item six: I am very much interested. Should such a document come into the hands of the relevant correspondent, I would be very glad to [passage omitted including indistinct portion]

Latvian Social Democratic Workers Call Meeting

LD0105150991 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 1 May 91

[Text] Today, more than ever we need courage, solidarity, and readiness to fight for the democracy we have regained, because the danger is not yet past, believes the Central Committee of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Latvia. Today at 1200 on the Esplanade in Riga they called on all who hold dear the ideals of freedom, democracy, and peoples' self-determination and Latvia's independence to gather for a solidarity meeting to commemorate 71 years since the constituent assembly of the Republic of Latvia began its work.

Landsbergis on Baltic Struggle, New U.S. View

LD0205165191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1230 GMT 2 May 91

[Statement by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vitautas Landsbergis at the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] I must say that our strategy for peaceful political struggle is to conduct political work both in the East and the West. We are engaged in contacts and political cooperation, and we are preparing documents both in the Baltic Council in an attempt to maintain a joint political front as well as preparing bilateral agreements that are political in tone and content. These are documents that are being or have already been prepared with Russia, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova.

Our representatives are taking part in various political consultations. I am speaking here of the trend throughout the East, about the Interparliamentary Union and other organizations where we attempt to experience future state structures which will have to replace the former Soviet empire, as well as opportunities for cooperation between future state structures. This is where our attention and work are focused.

On the other hand, we already know about and have the practical experience of the so-called negotiations with the USSR leadership. We know these are not real negotiations in name nor in any other way because of the other side's intentions. It is acknowledged that people on the other side have no authorization to conduct negotiations. These contacts are not completely useless, however, and will perhaps lead to negotiations. As you know, in several important documents we have insistently asked President Gorbachev, both on behalf of Lithuania and of the Baltic Council, to grant authorization to his delegation to conduct negotiations and not just to talk.

Of course, if he does not do this after such insistent requests, it will be an acknowledgement that they do not want negotiations. The Latvians and Estonians are trying to do the same thing. Furthermore, not for the first time, we have reached the conclusion that it is hardly realistic to expect anything from bilateral relations with the USSR or, as we used to say, with Moscow. Some people say that this is a realistic policy. A truly realistic policy is when international forces are included on a wider scale. If they join, real progress and oportunities may emerge under the influence of these forces.

We are struggling now not just with a single document, but also in meetings with Western politicians, legislators, and state leaders to consolidate the necessary international solutions in multilateral forums that will discuss the Baltic problem. It seems that Western countries understand that to leave Lithuania to negotiations with the USSR would mean washing their hands of the problem for an unlimited period of time without Lithuania having a chance of reaching an agreement under any acceptable conditions. Of course, we could agree to the conditions set by the other side, accept ulitmatums and so on, but this would not be negotiation, sit would not be part of the struggle, but simply capitulation. [passage omitted]

We have noticed that the United States has changed its political dictionary regarding the Baltic states; it has changed its firm attitude. It is not avoiding demonstrations of direct support for the Baltic states as a separate entity or subject both from the viewpoint of political interest as well as international law. It is being very clearly stressed that the Baltic states are not just USSR republics and that the issue is completely separate and must be solved in accordance with the principles of international law. The seperation of the Baltic states into a separate regional problem in Europe—and not only in Europe—is an undisputable political [word indistinct] that Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia have survived throughout those years, and survived even an aggressive military attack.

Landsbergis 'Pessimistic' Over Talks With Moscow

LD0205213191 Moscow TASS in English 2116 GMT 2 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Uscila]

[Text] Vilnius May 2 TASS—Chairman of the Lithuanian parliament Vytautas Landsbergis made a report in parliament today about a political situation in the republic. He said that the tragic developments of last January continue to influence the situation in Lithuania.

The head of the republican parliament said that the situation could deteriorate soon because of the forthcoming call-up of youths "to the army of another state." In his opinion, "other economic blockades on the part of the Soviet Union are possible." In this connection he stressed the importance of a massive rally of Sajudis supporters, planned to be held by that organisation on May 4. According to the organisers of the rally, it is to outline the tactics of behaviour in the existing situation.

Touching upon prospects of the normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union, Landsbergis said he was pessimistic over the recently started Lithuanian-Soviet dialogue. He believes that the first meetings are not yet talks, because members of the Soviet delegation "do not have the authority to hold talks."

Landsbergis said that he planned to go to the United States next week. A programme of the visit includes a meeting with President Bush, scheduled for May 8.

Lithuania Approves Draft Constitution

LD0205221591 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] The Presidium of parliament discussed the draft concept of the new Lithuanian Constitution worked out by a specially set up working group. The Presidium approved the draft and it will now be published for nationwide discussion until 1 August. Another working group will be set up to draft the full text of the new constitution.

The Lithuanian Government discussed among other things the progress in drafting a law on the nationaliztion of farming enterprises. It was decided upon an experiment: the efficiency and correctness of the draft law is first to be tested in several rural regions.

The government also approved the rules of state property privatization auctions and the order of selling goods for hard currency.

Lithuanian Move on Military Benefits Rejected

LD0205011891 Vilnius International Service in English 2300 GMT 1 May 91

[Text] The chief of the Soviet Baltic military district, Fedor Kuzmin, has rejected the initiative by the government of the Lithuanian republic to pay social benefits to family members of the Soviet military stationed on the territory of Lithuania. The governmental decision was due to come in force after the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Maintenance had made an agreement with the leadership of Soviet military units in this republic. The money for the benefits would have been allotted from the

Lithuanian state budget. Now, the Lithuanian Government is forced to state that all complaints of the military as to their social guarantees are to be addressed to their chief, Fedor Kuzmin.

Prunskiene Views Lithuania's Move Toward Right

LD3004222491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1900 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The current political situation in Lithuania shows a tendency toward a deepening crisis, Kazimiera Prunskiene, former Lithuanian prime minister, has stated, the RIA agency reports. Interviewed by ATMODA, a Riga newspaper, she said she thinks Lithuania has moved sharply to the right. Despite the fact that Lithuania has adopted a politically more significant act, while the other two Baltic republics have opted for compromise solutions, I prefer the path of Latvia and Estonia after all, Prunskiene said. According to her, the Lithuanian right-wingers, while demanding the recognition of Lithuania, do not think about the concrete work that is required to achieve this recognition. Having touched upon Lithuania's relations with Moscow, too, Prunskiene stressed that too much weight is being placed on struggle with the center. If we regard Moscow as an enemy, she said, it will be practically impossible to reach an agreement.

RSFSR

Aspects of Yeltsin Visit to Kuzbass Discussed

LD0205175891 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] The trip by Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, to Kuzbass has evoked great interest among the Russians, especially as it has been covered very sparingly by the central press and television. Some people hope that the Russian leader's meetings and conversations with striking miners will help, at last, to solve the acute social conflict and to find a way out of the impasse. Others believe that this trip is nothing but an election stint by a candidate to the post of Russian president. Here is a commentary by Nikolay Agayants under the title of "Boris Yeltsin's Difficult Days," read by the author.

[Agayants] What one cannot deny Boris Nikolayevich is his stubborn effort to feel the pulse of contradictory and complex processes and events and his sincere desire to personally find out the situation in Kuzbass on the spot. On his arrival in Novokuznetsk on the evening of 29 April, he headed right from the airport for a meeting of an expanded council of strike committees, which was attended by representatives of labor collectives of all the towns in the oblast. I will recall that the meeting was convened in order to reply to a telegram from the striking miners in which they asked for clarification of the views which prevailed upon the chairman of the presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to sign the well-known statement by the Ten, and for an explanation of special mode of operation of basic industries, mentioned in the statement.

The conversation was complex, open, and very sharp. The strike cannot be stopped by order, Yeltsin said in his speech. Collectives themselves should decide about that. Those who think that I have come to appeal to the miners are profoundly mistaken. During the council's meeting, the issue of the mechanism of transferring the coal-mining Kuzbass to Russia's jurisdiction and the relevant cardinal changes in running the industry and in the area's economic structure were also discussed. Members of the council of strike committees adopted a decision on continuing the political strike until a joint decision by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers and the RSFSR Council of Ministers on transferring Union property on the federation's territory to RSFSR jurisdiction is signed; they decided to deal with the problem of suspending the strike of Kuzbass miners, which has been on for over a month and a half, only after such a document was published.

Boris Nikolayevich also visited Prokoyevsk and the West Siberian metallurgy combine in Novokuznetsk, saw the oblast's farmers, and spoke at a May Day rally.

Of course, it is too early to say that some cardinal change has been achieved in resolving a difficult labor and political conflict, but it is quite obvious that Yeltsin's trip has made it possible to set in motion a whole lot of problems. A light of hope for attaining important accords has clearly started dawning at the end of the tunnel. A truce which is, perhaps, forced and of compromise nature but is nonetheless, the only sensible thing in this situation has been concluded.

Boris Nikolayevich described as historic the decision that has been adopted on transferring the Kuzbass coal enterprises to Russian jurisdiction. He stressed that it contains a recognition of the miners' demands, our new mutual relations, norms for going over to Russian jurisdiction, and mutual obligations. A great step has been taken, and it was worthwhile coming to Novokuznetsk and to be here on May Day. This is a document of solidarity of the working people of Russia, the chairman of the presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet said.

Now, one supposes, a lot will depend on the Union Government, on whether Pavlov will refuse to comply with the fundamental agreement which has been attained between the prime minister and Silayev to mutual satisfaction, as the saying goes.

Deputy Prime Minister on Kuzbass Strikes' Role

LD0305141191 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 3 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Grigoriy Shalakin]

[Text] Kemerovo May 3 TASS—"An active miners' movement has in point of fact prompted the centre to make steps towards Russia," Yuriy Skokov, first deputy prime minister of Russia, who is currently in Kuzbass, told TASS.

He said that a document on the transfer of Vorkuta mines under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation had already been signed with the centre.

Kuzbass is the next priority, to be followed up by the metallurgial mills of Cherepovets (Russia's northwest), Lipetsk (central Russia), the engineering facilities of Uralmash (one of the Soviet Union's major machine-building complexes). "The process is evolving," Skokov emphasised.

The miners' movement makes it possible to stimulate transition to new forms of economic management and virtually hastens a radical economic reform, he said.

"I do not share the viewpoint of many who refer to the strike movement as destructive forces, sabotage and so on," Skokov said.

"Strike is the form of action accepted throughout the world. Simply we have been for years discouraged to use this form of industrial action. Therefore it proved unexpected to us and caused a certain discomfort.

"But it is necessary to reckon with the workers' movement. This is a real force which influences work collectives. These are embryos of new horizontal management structures in this difficult transitional period. One cannot do without a close contact with the workers' movement," Skokov said.

Ryzhkov Nominated for Russian Presidency

LD0205165891 Moscow World Service in English 1600 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] The former Soviet prime minister Nikolay Ryzhkov has been nominated a candidate to the post of president of the Russian Federation by the staff of a state farm in the southwest of Siberia. Earlier he said in a press interview that representatives of several big labor staffs asked for his consent to nomination. If such great confidence in me is being expressed, he said, I'm ready to enter the election campaign. I cannot remain outside active political life, he said.

Russian Election Commission Adopts Decisions

LD3004101991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1610 GMT 29 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 29 Apr (TASS)—The Central Election Commission for electing the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic president has adopted decisions on how to open a current bank account for presidential elections and to approve dates for various procedures. The elections will take place on 12 June this year. The decision "On the Time Limits for Collecting Citizens' Signatures in Support of a Nominee to RSFSR President" was adopted. The decision stresses that signature collection should be conducted in accordance with the RSFSR law "On RSFSR Referendum."

It was decided that the initiative group for collecting signatures should be elected simultaneously with the nomination of a candidate to RSFSR president. The commission's decision states that a registered initiative group can collect signatures on signature lists until 18 May.

The commission approved a calendar plan for the main measures for preparing and holding the elections of RSFSR president. Polling stations and polling commissions should be formed before 10 May. The nomination of candidates for RSFSR president should be completed by 18 May. The registration of candidates for RSFSR president and their agents should be carried out within three days after their documents are submitted to the Central Election Commission but no later than 22 days before the elections.

Reports on the registration of candidates for RSFSR president should start to be published in the press no later than the fourth day after the registration and will continue until 26 May. The commission's decision on opening a current account at the RSFSR Central Bank for concentrating money in the fund for electing the RSFSR president was adopted. The money coming to the fund, which is voluntarily donated by citizens, labor collectives, public organizations, and mass movements for preparing and holding the election of the RSFSR president, will be evenly distributed by the Central Election Commission among the registered candidates.

Russian Trade Union Head Justifies Protest

914F0201A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by I. Klochkov, chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia: "The Spring Offensive" subtitled "All-Russian Protest Demonstration—Why the FNPR Is Calling for It"]

[Text] **Today, in response to the appeal of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia [FNPR], many labor collectives of the republic are participating in a protest. To be sure, in many of the mass media recently people have expressed the opinion that there is no point to the protest earmarked by the FNPR—since the Russian legislature has just adopted a number of "social" laws and they have published the declaration of the USSR president and the leaders of nine Union republics. So, is an all-Russian protest demonstration necessary today? This question is answered by FNPR Chairman I. Klochkov.**

"Today the people are demanding not agreements and not discussions of intentions but concrete measures and actions. Is it possible to live under the conditions in which the working people have found themselves since 2 April?

"According to the conclusion of independent experts, the difference between the growth of prices and wages is almost eight-fold. It is this social tension and sense of having been deceived that made it necessary for the FNPR to conduct an organized demonstration, which should be a signal and a warning to Union and Russian power structures.

"Yesterday we discussed the situation in the northern regions with a group of emissaries from Siberia—fishermen, communications workers, and metallurgists. The growth of prices has in general raised the question of the possibility of living in the northern territories. People have begun to flee. They are packing their bags and leaving. This is a passive form of protest. The more active ones are the random strikes and work stoppages.

"To prevent this protest from developing in hundreds of places, when demands are made under the influence of emotions and the leadership is taken over by random people driven by their own ambitions and goals, the trade unions must be the coordinators of protest demonstrations.

"As for the joint declaration of immediate measures for stabilizing the situation in the country and overcoming the crisis, signed by the USSR president and nine republic leaders, we support it since it recognizes that when conducting the retail price reform they did not take all factors into account and that it is necessary to return to this question in earnest and revise a number of points. This joint declaration confirmed the correctness of the demands made by the FNPR, but it is far from meeting them.

"Therefore on 26 April the workers will hold a warning demonstration. The FNPR trade union center does not intend to urge the people to take such actions or to provoke demonstrations. The labor collectives will determine for themselves the forms their protest will take. But we have announced that there can be no question of halting work in agriculture, where spring field work is in progress. This pertains also to those enterprises that assist agriculture. We must not shut down blast furnaces, marten furnaces, or gas or oil wells. But in places where the shutdown is not prohibited by law, this can take place by a decision of the labor collective. The all-Russian demonstration will take place, and we are sure that the efforts of the Russian trade unions directed toward highly organized demonstrations and not random protests are the most reasonable position in the present situation. Incidentally, this demonstration is one of the elements of the spring Days of Unity of Actions of Russian Trade Unions, which will end in May."

Khasbulatov Discusses RSFSR Legislative Session

LD3004221591

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1630 GMT on 30 April in its "Russian Legislative Herald" program carries a 14-minute interview with Ruslan Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, by RSFSR Deputy Sergey Nosovets on the the work of the recent RSFSR Supreme Soviet session.

Khasbulatov talks about some of the most important legislation which was discussed at this session and gives recognition to the Communists of Russia bloc for cooperation which facilitated the adoption of these bills. He comments on the implications of some of the new laws, in particular the law on the rehabilitation of nationalities which were forcibly displaced during the Stalinist era and appeals to the population of the territories of the northern Caucasus affected by interethnic conflicts to exercise patience and restraint.

Talking about the ongoing trend of transfering industrial enterprises and even whole branches of industry to Russian jurisdiction, Khasbulatov says that this process will continue, and the events in the coal mining industry have demonstrated that the miners are totally disillusioned with the central government and Pavlov's policies and are now pinning their hopes on the Russian Government. On this point understanding between the central and Russian Government has been reached, he says.

Khasbulatov then goes on to discuss the division of powers between the republican and central government and says that before signing the Union treaty such divisions should be clearly established. He criticizes the suggestion made by Gorbachev at the recent Federation Council meeting that they sign the Union treaty first and then discuss the division of powers. He says this is not acceptable.

Khasbulatov expressed his good wishes to all the peoples of the Russian Federation in connection with the forthcoming national holiday and warns that the present situation, calm as it may appear, is fraught with tension and conflict. He calls for restraint and sensibility and once again points out that the RSFSR Government cannot be blamed for many of the controversies brought about by the "war of laws" and other problems brought about by central government which are being forced upon Russia. "They impose them on us and then blame us for the consequences," he says. He insists that not a single action taken by the Russian Government is aimed at causing conflicts and controversies. He says that the RSFSR Government and Boris Yeltsin personally have convincingly demonstrated their readiness for reconciliation and cooperation with the central government and have every intention of continuing such a policy. "but," he says, "please, do not provoke us, do not adopt decrees or laws which go against RSFSR interests. We will not allow this anyway," he concludes.

Shilov Interviewed on Moscow Militia Status

PM0105102991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 May 91 Union Edition p 8

[Interview with I. Shilov, USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs and head of the Moscow militia, by A. Illesh and V. Rudnev; date and place not given; first three paragraphs are introduction: "Moscow Militia—From Its Chief's Viewpoint"]

[Text] Our newspaper has described in detail the tense legal and political situation, deputies' hunger strikes, debates at the extraordinary Russian congress, and other rowdy and not always secure events linked with the struggle for the post of the capital's top militiaman. Lawyers, deputies, and officials (including the candidates for this lofty post) have shared their views of the presidential decree on setting up a new structure—the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Main Administration for Moscow and Moscow Oblast....

But the matter did not end there: It still troubles people. What is more, the Moscow Soviet leadership and many lawyers are still casting doubts on the absolute juridical legality of the new formation. But how are we to fight crime and restore order when such a delicate question arises? We met with Colonel General Ivan Shilov, USSR first deputy minister of internal affairs and leader of the Moscow and Moscow Oblast militia, in order to answer this question and ascertain his position. But before we do that here is a brief biography of our interviewee.

He began his service as a private in the Kuzbass. After graduating from the USSR MVD military college in 1953 he worked as a criminal investigation officer, an investigator, and senior investigator in Khabarovsk Kray. He then received some training and worked once again (for more than 17 years) in Kemerovo Oblast internal affairs organs. He later served for four years once again in the Far East in the post of chief of the Maritime Krayispolkom [Kray Soviet Executive Committee] Internal Affairs Administration. I. Shilov has been in Moscow since 1983. He has worked as chief of the USSR MVD Main Criminal Investigation Administration and directed the Moscow Oblispolkom [Oblast Soviet Executive Committee] Main Internal Affairs Administration for four years. So the militia in his charge have firsthand knowledge of the general....

[IZVESTIYA] First, why and for what purpose was it decided to set up the new main administration?

[Shilov] It has long been the case that internal affairs organs in the capital and oblast have occupied a special niche within the MVD system. Since 1988 the chief of the Moscow Internal Affairs Main Administration has been a Union deputy minister at the same time. This situation also persisted after the Russian MVD was set up. (I would note that Moscow internal affairs organs have not been removed from USSR MVD jurisdiction at all.) There is another specific "detail:" It is not only city and oblast militia that operate within the region of the capital, but also two internal affairs administrations for railroad and air transport and two special educational establishments, along with militia at special regime installations. All their activity was coordinated by a single leader in the person of the USSR deputy minister of internal affairs and chief of the Moscow Main Internal Affairs Administration. In my view, this practice has paid off.

[IZVESTIYA] This is history, albeit recent history. Tell us about recent times, about the presidential decree that provoked such a serious reaction....

[Shilov] The USSR presidential decree of 26 March "On Setting Up the USSR MVD Main Administration for Moscow City and Moscow Oblast" regulating in normative form the special features that have taken shape regarding managing the militia here. The new administration is tasked with coordinating actions taken by all organs and subunits within the region and tapping, where necessary, the potential of the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] MVD's, along with the internal troops.... Major efforts are needed to safeguard public order, when holding important international and all-Union functions, for instance.... That is not all. Statistics attest that foreigners commit up to 30 percent of Moscow's dangerous crime. The situation is equally complex in the oblast. There are also plenty of crimes that originated or continued on Union republic territory. Needless to say, clearing up these crimes requires specialists from many regions of the country to pool their efforts The new USSR MVD main administration has also been set up to incorporate our forces into a unified crime fighting mechanism. The intention is to form one administration within it—for coordination....

[IZVESTIYA] You have big plans. But you obviously have first to provide a cogent answer to the question of the legality of setting up a Main Internal Affairs Administration for Moscow and Moscow Oblast and demonstrate the legal justification for this decision....

[Shilov] I hope that the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee will produce its findings on this matter. Without going into details, I will say that the decree is lawful. However, some people may not like USSR laws, but that is another matter.

[IZVESTIYA] Does the creation of the USSR MVD Main Administration for Moscow and Moscow Oblast mean that the city and oblast militia no longer come under the control of the Moscow City Soviet and Oblast Soviet?

[Shilov] Not at all. Questions of safeguarding public order and crime fighting in the city and the oblast are settled in cooperation with and under the control of soviets of people's deputies, as prescribed by the USSR Law "On the Soviet Militia." However, there is one special feature. While giving the soviets the right to monitor the militia's work, the above law stipulated that interference from anyone whatsoever in the militia's

procedural, operational investigation, and administrative jurisdiction activity is not allowed!

[IZVESTIYA] How do you regard the Moscow Soviet Presidium's decision to set up a municipal militia in the city?

[Shilov] The fact that the Moscow Soviet presidium raised the question of forming a local militia with the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is by and large lawful. But a local militia should be set up in addition and not as an alternative to the Union militia. Practice shows that a local militia's tasks are confined to safeguarding public order, providing the population with social and legal aid, and certain other functions which legislation does not regard as within the jurisdiction of the Union and republic militia. It cannot therefore include criminal investigation and Struggle Against Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation subunits and other services whose leadership needs to be centralized. I am sure that consideration of the question of a local militia should be preceded by in-depth study of all aspects involved in setting it up, including financial aspects. (We will discuss the Moscow Soviet's view of this question—IZVESTIYA.)

It is extremely important to eschew division and demarcation in the militia's ranks. The desire to have your "own" militia chief may prove fatal, some people may then want their "own" investigator, prosecutor, and judge. That is the right way to lawlessness. The Moscow militia has not ceased defending Muscovites against offenders. Why sacrifice tranquillity and order in the city to political interests and "marginalize" thousands of conscientious militia staffers?

[IZVESTIYA] Now let us say a few words about money and everyday issues. What will happen about provision of housing and the promised pay raise for Moscow militia personnel?

[Shilov] First: Our city has a higher density of details, more staff in leading services, better provisioning regarding transport, special eq..ipment, and other resources, and more trained cadres. Now an order has been signed approving new salaries for our people serving in Moscow. Disparities in labor remuneration for our personnel in the city and oblast have now been eliminated. Regrettably, there have been difficulties in settling many issues. They must be surmounted, of course, in conjunction with soviet organs.

'Communists for Democracy' Leader Views Party

91UN1401 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 17, Apr 91 p 2

[Report on interview with A. Rutskoy, an RSFSR people's deputy and one of the leaders of the "Communists for Democracy" movement, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent A. Uglanov; place and date not given: "It Is Not Necessary To Be a Dog in a Manger"]

[Text] **The idea of building communism in the USSR has somehow moved inconspicuously to the second plane. Along with this, the political structure of the country, which is based on the monopoly of one party, has started to crumble and generate new directions within itself. The latest example is the emergence of the "Communists for Democracy" movement. Our correspondent, A. Uglanov, met with one of its leaders, A. Rutskoy, a participant of the war in Afghanistan, a Hero of the Soviet Union, and a people's deputy of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].**

[Uglanov] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, when, in your opinion, will communism be built?

[Rutskoy] The communist choice itself and the socialist outlook... this is excellent. The main thing here—in theory at least—is the individual. But let us take today's realities. Having this choice, what did we come to? To nothing. Lenin, and even Marx, imagined everything differently. Having gotten into the rut of dogmas, we tried to get away from the development of civilization. The attempt to deceive the laws of its development is what led to failure.

Therefore, we cannot idealize some one teaching. The very best has to be taken from all of them. In this case, we will move along the communist path.

[Uglanov] An edict has just been passed in Armenia on nationalizing CPSU property.

[Rutskoy] This has to be approached in a differentiated way. The party has colossal resources, and it makes one ashamed to see veterans of the CPSU, who devoted 30, 50 years to it, eking out a miserable existence. The party is simply obligated to render them assistance.

It goes without saying that in an extremely difficult time the party must share with the people. There are many rest homes and sanatoriums. How can the fact be explained that a joint enterprise was established on the base of the Chayka sanatorium of the Moscow City CPSU Committee. But there were requests to set up a children's hospital there.

In Sovetskiy Rayon in Kursk Oblast the party rayon committee stands in marble, and granite, with carpeted walkways inside. But across the road, there is a maternity home that is propped up by poles... so that everything has to be compared. But for me, as a member of the CPSU, what is incomprehensible is the proximity of a marble palace to scandalous poverty and squalor.

It is not necessary to be a dog in a manger.

[Uglanov] How do you assess the readiness of rank-and-file communists to stand under your banner?

[Rutskoy] This is not my banner. It is ours. At present, we are proposing that communists consider eight questions in their party organizations:

—for party organizations to consider the present situation in the country and the effectiveness of the political policy being carried out by the RSFSR Communist Party;

—to raise the question of a report by the leaders of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party at all levels to the party masses about their activity and, most of all, about their implementation of the decisions of the 14th CPSU All-Union Conference and the 28th congress on the fulfillment of the preelection platform of the CPSU;

—to hold a public dialogue in cities, rayons, oblasts, and republics within the framework of a "roundtable" of all democratic forces, political and social movements, and mass organizations and parties for the purpose of relaxing the social, political, and interethnic situation in the country, seeking ways of getting out of the crisis;

—to aggressively put into practice the principal decisions of the Third Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies ("On the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in the RSFSR and Measures for Getting Out of the Crisis." "On the Redistribution of Authorities Between Higher State Organs of the RSFSR on Implementing Anticrisis Measures and Fulfilling Decisions of the RSFSR Congresses of People's Deputies");

—to develop broad mass actions in support of the higher organs of authority and administrations of Russia;

—to apply all efforts in order not to permit the establishment of a new dictatorship in our country, organizing a broad movement of popular consent;

—to create "Communists for Democracy" deputy groups in the soviets of people's deputies at all levels and organize, according to place of residence and work, groups, clubs, and cells of "Communists for Democracy," supporting an alliance of democratically thinking communists with all progressive popular forces;

—to prepare and conduct local conferences of communists who are for democratic and popular positions, creating the necessary preconditions for the organization of a general national "Communists for Democracy" movement.

[Uglanov] Do you think that the documents of the 19th party conference and the 28th CPSU Congress are forgotten by the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, I. Polozkov, A. Sokolov, and I. Antonovich?

[Rutskoy] They are not forgotten. They departed from them a long way. Take the "Democratic Russia" program and the preelection platform of the CPSU Central Committee—they are about 85 percent one and the same. Then, the question arises: On what basis is dirt being thrown in the direction of "Democratic Russia" with respect to its vision for getting out of the crisis and building a democratic society?

[Uglanov] In what do you see the idea of conducting a "roundtable" of various political currents?

[Rutskoy] In the study of that reality which developed in the country from 1985 to 1991. It is necessary to take all of the program documents adopted by the political parties and movements and to study them carefully. I am confident that we will see a coincidence in a large number of problems which will have to be implemented immediately.

Society is already moving along a democratic path, and this movement cannot be stopped. In such a situation, the party cannot "take a back seat," having progressive program documents and being the initiator of perestroyka.

But look at what kind of an absurdity results. There is an RSFSR Supreme Soviet which publishes laws, and there is the RSFSR Council of Ministers which puts them into practice. But now look into the RSFSR Communist Party program. All of its undertakings are constructed on the laws and the Constitution of the USSR. The laws of Russia are not mentioned. What kind of a republic party is it which exists outside the sphere of legislation of its own republic?

[Uglanov] Do you see a renewal not only of the ideas but of the leadership of your party, as well?

[Rutskoy] At first, as I have already said, all problems must be discussed in party organizations and the results of the discussions should be sent to us. On this basis, a model of future actions will be put together, and a party conference or a congress will be convened for the elaboration of a program.

[Uglanov] Is a split possible at this congress?

[Rutskoy] No.

[Uglanov] But judging by the party press, a split has already occurred. We are written about with poorly concealed malice.

[Rutskoy] This once again shows the dishonorableness of these people.

But what is antipopular in those questions which we proposed be discussed in party organizations? It is necessary to be honest people. What kind of conscience is it when A. Sokolov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, and an RSFSR deputy, says that he is for a "roundtable" and consolidation, but who in voting presses the "against" button?

Why on all questions that give the public some promise do the secretaries of the obkoms [oblast party committee] and raykoms [rayon party committee] vote against? On the restructuring of society—"against," on land—"against," and on enterprise—"against." But at the 28th CPSU Congress, we passed a resolution on the transition to market relations. So the time has come to determine who is a member of the CPSU and who is a communist. But this is a big difference.

Organizational committee of the "Communists for Democracy" movement: 103274, Moscow, Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya, Building 2, RSFSR House of Soviets. Telephone 205-66—04. Facsimile 205-48-06.

Leadership Changes in Kaliningrad Cited

LD0105174891 Kaliningrad Maritime Press Service in Russian 1500 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The first sitting of the fourth session of the Kaliningrad City Soviet was held yesterday. It examined organizational issues. V.V. Shipov was elected chairman of the city soviet. Previously he occupied the post of deputy chairman. G.N. Isayev, chairman of the city executive committee, announced his resignation at the session. He explained the reason for his decision by the fact that he sees no possibility of carrying out his program. The resignation was accepted. G.N. Isayev will leave his post on 20 May. The deputies elected V.K. Nalivayko to the office of deputy chairman of the city soviet.

Paper Counters Polozkov's Bias Charge

91UN1396A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 1

[Article by Anatoliy Yurkov: "Hold Your Horses, Ivan Kuzmich"]

[Text] When opening the discussions at the combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission yesterday, Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party, among other extremely serious accusations against the president and general secretary, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, the prime minister, and all the mass media (with the exception of one newspaper and one magazine—he did not mention which), named RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA as the newspaper which, in his opinion, is conducting a policy against the RSFSR Communist Party and providing grist for the mill creating the schism. And it refuses to print articles by leaders of the RSFSR Communist Party.

We cannot fail to pay attention to this statement by Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, especially the accusations leveled against RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

In the first place, they are not true. During the less than a year of existence of the RSFSR Communist Party, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has carried articles by secretaries and Central Committee Politburo members Comrades G. Zyuganov and N. Silkova, and it is preparing to publish an article by Comrade V. Kashin, secretary and a member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, which was submitted to the editorial office on the day of the opening of the present plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

In the second place, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, as a newspaper for social protection of the workers, regularly publishes articles devoted to the pressing and crucial problems that are vitally important to the workers of Russia and its Communists and nonparty members. Regarding these problems, as with problems concerning the life of party organizations of Russia, the newspaper publishes articles by secretaries of obkoms [oblast committees], kraykoms [kray committees], gorkoms [city committees], and party committees of enterprises, members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party, and rank-and-file Communists. Sometimes RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA devotes entire pages to these subjects. There was only one case in which a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party sent his article to RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, a very long one, and the newspaper did not publish it. While they were negotiating, abridging, and editing it, the author sent it to another newspaper, which published the article. It is true that there is an absolute rule in journalistic practice: You must warn the editors to whom you have sent your article that you have sent it to another publication as well. In this case the author ignored this rule.

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has invited and does invite everyone to discuss on the pages of the newspaper crucial new problems related to the turbulent and contradictory development of the workers movement and its sometimes anticommunist mood. The leaders of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee are in no hurry to say anything about these earth-shaking problems, to discuss the practice of building bridges between the RSFSR Communist Party and the workers movement, or to use the pages of the party press for the consolidation of active perestroyka forces. These problems are vitally important for the fate of the party.

Russian problems that disturb workers and peasants, engineers and teachers, and all workers who are Communists, nonparty members, or members of other political and social formations, as before, will be considered on the pages of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA unhypocritically and without beating around the bush. Including in the context of the personal responsibility of the leaders of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee for their solution. For ultimately they must be responsible for something in our disturbing and very critical times. They must do more than provide their own interpretation of the steps of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the USSR president, the USSR prime minister, and the legislature and executive organs of Russia.

Remaining open to each Communist in the country, in turn, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has been and still is a newspaper that defends the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and pluralism of opinions; we will continue in the future to give priority to general human values and defend the interests of the working people over the apparatus games.

Goryacheva Speaks on RSFSR Issues

PM0205141191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 1 May 91 First Edition p 2

["Monologue" by RSFSR People's Deputy Svetlana Goryacheva recorded by correspondent A. Ryabov: "Live According to your Conscience—A Spring Evening Monologue at Home with Svetlana Petrovna Goryacheva"]

[Excerpt] Vladivostok—[passage omitted] I have always had my own opinions and have not been afraid to express them and defend them. Some people liked that, some did not. Maybe that is why I am so categorical. Incidentally, for the whole five years I studied at the university I was group leader, and the group was not among the worst.... It is possible, too, that my work in the prosecutor's office made its mark on my character. In short, I am a direct person. I don't know if this is good or bad, but one way or another life itself led me to the choice, to the step I have taken on behalf of six of the Supreme Soviet leaders.

Of course, understanding current events takes time. Our people's characteristic way of thinking in terms of personality cults is doing them no favors now. We always believed in somebody. Be it the intelligent and benevolent tsar, or Stalin.... Even now we want somebody to believe in. We almost always link our future to the latest personality. History shows that this road goes nowhere. Nevertheless, we have to develop a collective intelligence and not be afraid of deviating promptly from a particular path so as not to go too far or into an impasse.

Our statement was also aimed at breaking these eternal chains. How could I look people in the eye in years to come when they say: You were right by, you saw all of this, and... said nothing. We reckoned it was far more moral to speak out even if we continued to be misunderstood. The best judge of all is time. Time will show who was right and who is guilty.... We saw our task as warning people in time about the approaching threat of a new cult. When I told the congress about the persecution of my family I knew that I would immediately be accused of feminine weakness and of being too emotional. But I could not refrain from telling this to all of Russia and the Union because the issue here is not about personal grievance. I wanted people to see for themselves the methods employed nowadays in the battle with dissidents.

By the way, nobody has refuted our political statement. Not one of its theses, not one of its arguments was disputed by the congress participants. The whole blaze has flared up around individuals. Mine is not the only family under siege today. Vladimir Borisovich Isakov's wife and three young children were forced to leave Sverdlovsk and now they live together in a Moscow hotel, and one child has even stopped going to school. Can you tell me this is normal? Can you say that these are the shoots of the new democracy? All this is unadulterated extremism. The worst thing is that these unacceptable, immoral methods are being used by the forces which call themselves democratic.

In my opinion, extremism and lawlessness cannot be called democracy. Those who support genuine democracy must nonetheless rebuff those who merely don the masks of democrats and thereby compromise genuine democracy.

And another thing. Many people now accuse me of having responded very sharply when Boris Nikolayevich requested emergency powers for himself. But in the political statement and in that speech I just tried frankly and openly, looking him and indeed the whole auditorium in the eye, to say what I believe in. Our congress speeches, I think, served to counter claims by several deputies that we are supposedly afraid of Yeltsin's mere presence and could only speak behind his back. But if there is anything to reproach us for, then surely it is only that we do not know how to use snares and cunning....

The Congress of People's Deputies elected us and we must steer the line defined by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitution and the congress decisions. We can amend something but only within the confines of the program drawn up by the congresses. Boris Nikolayevich considers it possible to deviate from the decisions on the Union treaty and other questions.

Take a look at this. At the first congress we adopted a resolution on the demarcation of powers between the republic and center. That is the basis of the Union treaty. Approximately nine powers were delegated to the Union. Speaking later, however, Boris Nikolayevich says: "We decided it was necessary to delegate three functions to the Union." Who are "we?" After all, the congress decided to hand over nine functions! So how can he speak in public about just three functions? Yeltsin must defend his position in the congress, and only the congress can decide which functions we will leave to the Union and which we will not. Is such arbitrariness conceivable for a figure of his rank?

After the trip to the Baltic region he announced: "If it continues like this we will set up our own armed forces." What does he mean—if it continues like this? I don't understand—what is it exactly that threatens Russia? Local soviet representatives ask me questions from their seats: Svetlana Petrovna, how do you evaluate this? Why are things happening like this? And I cannot answer.

I do not even mention economic policy. I was quite shaken when, having only just signed the agreement with Gorbachev, Yeltsin then started rejecting everything enshrined in the agreement. Is this really consistency in policy? How then can we, his deputies, look people in the eye if a blatant political game is going on which has nothing in common with the activity of such a high-ranking state politician?

Or take the introduction of a presidency in Russia. Then read over the stenographic record of the first congress. Speaking at that time, Boris Nikolayevich said that first it is necessary to adopt a new RSFSR Constitution, and discuss it and the presidency issue on a nationwide level. That would indeed be democratic. Then after that adopt a Law on the Presidency and organize nationwide presidential elections on a contested basis. But what would happen in practice? There is no new Constitution. The Law on the Presidency is adopted....

Why are we forgetting that in certain regions of Russia people are rationed to around 200 grams of macaroni each? We have to work now, as in war time, not strike or incite strikes, but instead the idea of electing mayors in the localities is being foisted upon us.... Obviously all these campaigns will require huge financial resources and time. And is there any guarantee that these mayors will prove completely competent and capable of finding ways out of the impasse? Is it not more likely that the entire political hullabaloo will not only fail to lead us out of crisis but will actually aggravate the situation further? It is no longer acceptable to throw people beautiful, possibly even very alluring, but empty appeals and slogans. I am convinced that we must be constantly weighing up what is more expedient for us to do today and what is more useful for us to engage in.

After all, at the extraordinary congress our "democrats," endlessly whipping up the question of the president, totally forgot the economic problems which are the foremost concern of our electorate. Who had the most to say about the economic situation? Leaders of enterprises, agrarian specialists, representatives from the "Communists of Russia" and "Russia" deputies' groups.... Everybody except the "democrats." They chanted in one voice—we need a president, that is the people's will, we need a president.... What is behind this? The failure to understand that economic problems are nonetheless the main thing, or is it a purposeful power struggle? At any price and by any method?

Presidential elections.... When talking about the nationwide election of a president on a contested basis it is hardly possible to seriously argue that on 21 May we will begin the next congress at which we will confirm the relevant amendments to the RSFSR Constitution and the Law on the Presidency and that after that nationwide presidential elections will be held 12 June. On what terms will the candidates, the opponents of Boris Nikolayevich be put forward? The most unjust terms! On whose behalf is all of this being done? Why are words at odd with deeds?

We are realists. So let's face the truth. Only a year ago, befor our election, people lived better. There was butter in the stores, and sausage, too, although not always. But at least we were not rationed when purchasing macaroni and groats. Of course, we could always start seeking out enemies. The enemy could be declared to be the center, the Communists, the local organs of power, specific individuals. But then you still have to think: But perhaps it is nothing to do with enemeies, but with who is leading Russia's entire national economic complex and how, of who is elaborating the republic's policy?

We have been through the story of the enemies of the people, and we know after all that that we have had to strew our heads with ashes. It turned out that the guilty were not in fact enemies of the people.

The same can be said of today's attitude toward kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms]. It is clear that we will not move to private farming immediately or rapidly. So for today we should also consolidate collective forms of economic management, because whether people like it or not we cannot manage without them.

Now about land. In my view, it should be given to those who know how to work the land and want to do it, and can improve the soil's yield. Otherwise landowners will seek to transform it into an object of buying and selling. At the moment, in my view, the distribution of land to those who want it has turned into just another slogan, designed to impart without particular outlay the required political weight to the Russian Government, especially among city dwellers—after all, the overwhelming majority of them will gladly extend their allotments to the permitted limits. But will local authorities be able to find such huge areas near the cities? Will the city dwellers be able to work this land without the necessary supplementary resources? These are all tricky questions.... The main thing is that the land is nonetheless handed to those who will cherish it and be able to increase its natural yield potential. We need private farming, but we also need the competitiotn between large and small farms—the whole world follows this path.

We should not approach these difficult problems in a hurried or impulsive manner. Our main task is to create conditions for the birth of new structures and to refrain from destroying the old structures too hastily. We should not be quick to punish if somebody does not receive the allotted land by the stated deadline. It could be that right now there is simply no free land to take and allocate. In the coreport at the congress, V.B. Isakov said rightly that before promising everybody land by 15 April we should create a "bank" of land which is actually available and tell people exactly what land we have. And specifically where the land is and how much of it there is. For example, such and such a piece of land can be allocated today, but such and such cannot. In short, approach the matter with zeal and care.

You see, our talk turned out to be a far from festive one. But then we are talking about a painful issue.... All of these problems have been raised on more than one occasion by Russia's people's deputies. Of the range of proposals and ideas I incline more toward centrist positions devoid of extremism. But in my opinion the trouble now is that in our legislature these centrist

tendencies are still very feeble and they do not unite particular forces, but rather fluctuate between the right and left.

I myself have been a member of the CPSU for four years: I am not leaving the party and do not intend to. I consider it immoral that some people alter their political positions too frequently and too swiftly. I know many outstanding and interesting people among the democrats, too. But unfortunately it is not they who are calling the shots now but those capable merely of destroying and not creating. That is our greatest tragedy right now.

With all these matters and discussions we have forgotten the holiday. I also want to say one thing: In these days and weeks I have understood and felt the full measure of human solidarity. Thanks to all who supported us and continue to support us. But then May Day always was a day of solidarity among working people. We will no doubt remember this.

Happy May Day, dear friends!

Western Republics

Minsk Committee Urges Republic Strike Conference

LD3004103691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Belorussian 1920 GMT 27 Apr 91

[Text] The Minsk strike committee cochairman, in the hope of promoting a confederation of Belorussian strikes, spoke yesterday about the necessity of immediately convening a republican conference of representatives of the strike committees to work out further strategies and tactics in the struggle against the Communist government. Open debates took place yesterday on Belorussian television among representatives of the local strike committee and Communist leaders of Belorussia.

The city strike committee of students held a meeting in Minsk yesterday. According to its chairman, a student at the Minsk institute of foreign languages, the students were a bit late in joining the movement of workers, but everything will be different on 21 May.

Belorussian Deputies Visit Canada

LD0205013691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Belorussian 1920 GMT 1 May 91

[Text] As we announced earlier, three Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic people's deputies and activists of the Belorussian Popular Front—Zenon Pozdnyak, Mikhail Zabiotskiy, and Levon Borshchevskiy—are now in Canada on an unofficial visit. Speaking in Ontario, Zenon Pozdnyak said that the main purpose of their visit to Canada is to remove the information blockade which still exists in the West in relation to Belorussia; to make all the truth about the Chernobyl catastrophe available to the inhabitants of the new world; and to discuss with the senate governments [as heard] the possibility of leasing a zone which could be used for settlement of the people who suffered from Chernobyl, in case of mass emigration from Belorussia.

Ukraine Rejects Soyuz Call for Emergency

LD2604151991 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 25 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Serhiy Hubin]

[Text] The attention of deputies of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet was glued to the text of its statement concerning the call of the Soyuz group to introduce a state of emergency on the territory of the country.

The Ukrainian legislature adopted a statement which notes that calls like this are viewed by the Supreme Soviet as an encroachment upon the state sovereignty of the Ukraine. It stresses that our national legislature is fully responsible for the situation prevailing in the republic. It can be improved not by tightening the screws, which in the present-day unstable conditions may produce negative results, but along the path of further democratization of social and political life in the Ukraine and transferring its economy to the market track.

Gurenko on Political, Economic Situation

91UN1383A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 5 Apr 91 p 1

[Report by V. Fomenko on speech by Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, to workers of the Kiev production association imeni Artem; date not given: "Without Softening His Words"]

[Text] Sullen faces and angry glances.... Yes, a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo must have a great deal of courage after such a sharp increase in prices to go to a factory to meet with the workers and talk with them "about life." It is much easier, of course, to sit in an armchair in front of a television camera and develop one's thoughts to its indifferent hum.

But, apparently, there was good sense in meeting the workers eye to eye. To strike while the iron is hot.... As they say, a stitch in time saves nine (especially when there are not nine to go around).

Before his speech, as usual, S.I. Gurenko walked around the workshops, acquainted himself with production, and chatted with people. About what? I do not know. This time the secretary of the Central Committee did not take either his assistants or us, the newspapermen, along. He said he did not need that "train." He was probably correct. Those kinds of official tours have begun to smell strongly of mothballs.

But the examination left the Central Committee secretary satisfied.

"I believe that the workers' mood is normal," he began his speech before the workers of the Artem production association workers who had gathered in the spacious hall. "I myself worked 18 years at the factory, and for me each visit is like returning to my youth. After such meetings, my optimism and strength are renewed.

"And Communists especially need to recharge their 'batteries' of optimism these days," continued the Central Committee secretary. "The governing party here and three-fourths of the deputies at all levels are communists, and much depends on their mood and their persistence."

S.I. Gurenko immediately warned that he was speaking as a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo who feels his own responsibility for the state of affairs in the entire country. For now the main thing is to sign a Union treaty, but in relation to deadlines he does not share the opinion of the president: One should not be hasty in this instance. How is it possible to speak of signing in April or May if the subject of the treaty has not even been broached at a special congress in Russia?

In general, according to Stanislav Ivanovich, if Yeltsin becomes president we will not have a Union treaty: There will be a Russian Federation, and the rest of the republics will be outlying districts.

"Even today our economic relations with Russia," stressed the speaker, "are far from normal. Last year poor delivery of fuel hurt us, and today there is also trouble with timber. Only 55-57 of the Ukraine's 250 mines are on strike, but the rest are also threatened with stoppages because of lack of lumber."

In his speech the secretary of the Central Committee examined the most difficult and heated problems and did not make even the slightest attempt to soften the situation or try prove that after the 28th CPSU Congress things began to improve and the economy began to stabilize. Over the last year production of consumer goods in the republic did in fact increase by 3 billion rubles [R] (in Russia, incidentally, it decreased by R15 billion), but that is only a drop in the bucket. There is still a long way to go for prosperity.

"Today we are struggling merely for survival!" emphasized S.I. Gurenko.

"The most alarming thing is that a 'domino' effect always builds in the present situation: An interruption in one place immediately and automatically has an effect in other areas. For example, the miners are complaining of a shortage of food. There is no denying that they are in the right. But to obtain food it will be necessary to bring in the harvest on time, combines will be needed, and Rostselmash is producing unfinished combines because of a lack of metal. We go to the metallurgists, and they say, 'Give us coke and there will be metal.' And coke comes from coal. And so the circle is closed. How many such circles are being broken today in the republic and throughout the entire country before our very eyes!

"This means that we should not be separated by ethnic divisions but restore broken ties and enforce contract discipline.

"Everyone talks about sovereignty all the time. But if you think about it, the process of sovereignty is a process of destruction. Today the Crimea, tomorrow Galicia, then a sovereign Kiev, a sovereign Podolia, etc. Whom does this benefit? Of course the Ukraine will be able to endure independently and without ties with the Union republics. But that will put it many years behind. And I do not believe in the loud statements of people who say that they wish to be hungry, barefoot, and free. No, we should achieve not merely sovereignty but also prosperity for all people so that all will be children and not step-children. We have already seen what happened when Yaroslav divided Rus between his five sons....

"What should tie us together? How should the party function under these conditions? Yes, at present it does not command, but it can and should analyze the economy and strengthen it with the aid of communist leaders. But unfortunately, many forms of labor which at one time were somewhat effective have now been forgotten. As much as our opponents attack the party from the outside, it is still more undermined from the inside by people who, although they carry party membership cards, **are indifferent to what is happening and indulge outdated moods.**

"It is time to take a close look at those who are connected with the party only by a party card. Communists are judged by their deeds. It is no accident that the movement 'For each primary party organization a specific socially significant matter' was begun. We need to take every measure to promote a healing of the moral and psychological situation in the collectives, increase the number of supporters, and neutralize the activities of our political opponents."

Then S.I. Gurenko responded to some written questions. Here are a few of them:

[Question] At one time many people talked about the victories of socialism. Now everything has been discarded once and for all. Did they occur at all or not?

[Gurenko] They occurred in part. Internationalism, the friendship of peoples, enthusiasm, mutual assistance.... And the great brotherhood during the time of the Patriotic War. All this cannot be erased from the accounts.

[Question] Is the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee building itself residential buildings?

[Gurenko] No. We are not building anything at present. We are refitting one house to make a hotel.

[Question] Does the Ukraine have any programs similar to the 500 days program?

[Gurenko] There is no such program, and Yeltsin has also deliberately repudiated it: It is impossible to achieve a prosperous life in one republic without ties to the others.

[Question] Why is the party not accepting members?

[Gurenko] The party is accepting them, but fewer people are joining than before. But these people are all the more valuable for that.

There were more prepared questions, but at that time calls were heard from the audience that it would be better to respond to questions of "daily life"! The speaker agreed. And it was as though the meeting gained a new spirit. A young female worker approached the microphone with tears in her eyes:

"Today the teacher did not take the students to the cafeteria because the meals there are so expensive. Why did my child go hungry?"

S.I. Gurenko grew gloomy:

"Compensation probably has not been completely thought out. We need to correct the situation."

Engineer Milyukov rose:

"The engineering and technical personnel are the most vulnerable part of the collective. Especially at enterprises where conversion is underway. Is the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee thinking of protecting us in some fashion?"

"It is thinking of it," responded S.I. Gurenko. He emphasized that is really is a very important issue and shared his thoughts on how it would be possible to elevate the role not only of the technical personnel but of the entire intelligentsia in general.

Other workers at the production association got up and hammered home new problems like nails. How is the course of implementation of the agreement between Russia and the Ukraine being monitored? Why are our ideological workers abandoning their positions? How can we strengthen ties between the Central Committee and the primary party organizations? Why have the party raykoms [rayon party committees] withdrawn from society?

...Outside it had begun to get dark and the meeting continued. After it was over I approached the Central Committee secretary:

"In my account of this meeting can I say that 'Gurenko spoke at a political information meeting'?"

"Yes, write that. In general, this is the very time for political information meetings. We must not let this institution become outdated."

Ukraine Trade Union-Government Agreement Cited

LD0105161591 Kiev International Service in English 0000 GMT 1 May 91

[Text] Victory of Ukrainian Trade Unions crowned their lengthy talks with the government of the republic. [sentence as heard] An agreement was signed between them in Kiev today on the social protection of workers. The document consists of eight sections. Priority is given to providing people with state, legal, economic, and social guarantees during the transition to market relations. The sides believe that the realization of this agreement will become a certain guarantee for the relaxation of social tensions in society.

Ukraine Instructions on Spring Draft Reported

LD2904173491 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2200 GMT 26 Apr 91

[Text] With the aim of the fulfilling the Ukraine state sovereignity declaration and of legislative acts of the Supreme Soviet, the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Council of Ministers has issued instructions concerning the spring draft in all oblasts, the Crimea, and Sevastopol.

According to the instructions, only those conscripts can be sent to serve outside the Ukraine who themselves agree to do so in writing.

The republic's government exempts from military service those persons whose families have already lost members or whose members became invalids while fulfilling military duty. Postponement has been granted for those conscripts who have children aged up to three years.

According to the same instructions, privileged conditions of service are to be granted to conscripts who were affected by consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophy. This category of conscripts will only serve in ecologically safe conditions.

Moldova To Host Ribbentrop Pact Review

LD0105090291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1832 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] Kishinev, 30 Apr (TASS)—The Moldovan Supreme Soviet Presidium has decided to hold an international conference in Kishinev on 26-28 June 1991 to discuss the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was signed on the eve of World War II, and its consequences for Bessarabia.

Deputies from several European countries, including Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Finland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, the U.S., and Canada, and representatives from several international institutes have been invited to the conference. Delegations from the supreme soviets of the Baltic republics, Georgia, and Armenia will also participate.

In the words of Valeriy Matey, member of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet Presidium, the signing of the pact "signified the crude cutting off of certain territories from the mother homeland Romania." In a conversation with journalists, he reported that this problem will be considered in light of new data and previously unknown documents.

Matey stressed that "this conference is intended not to lay down foundations for discussion on changes to the borders of the republic of Moldova by force, but to concentrate universal attention on the problems which exist, against our will."

Caucasus

Further Reportage on Armenia-Azerbaijan Problem

Armenian Legislature Issues Statement

NC0305095791 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 2 May 91

[Statement issued by the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers Presidiums]

[Text] The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, and Getashen subrayon has become extremely exacerbated lately. The leadership of Azerbaijan, moved by its intention to organize a new deportation of the Armenian population similar to that carried out in Azat and Kamo, and having the support of the center and USSR Internal Troops, has imposed a siege on Shaumyanovskiy Rayon and Getashen subrayon for more than a month now.

Seeing the determination of the population of Getashen and Martunashen not to abandon their villages, the armed forces of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] and the Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia Detachment resorted to oppression, and in recent days they have initiated outright military operations.

Though under a long siege and deprived of any link with the outside world, the people of Getashen and Martunashen, sacrificing the blood of the innocent victims and the injured, gallantly resisted the terroristic operations of the regular units.

The Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers Presidium, while paying their respects to the heroic population of Getashen and Martunashen, also share the deep grief of the victims' families and kin.

In condemning the aggressive and misanthropic operations conducted against the Armenian Republic and the Armenian population by the center and Azerbaijan, the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and the Council of Ministers Presidium assure that they will do everything possible to protect the rights of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent areas.

Armenian Interior Issues Statement

NC0305095191 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 2 May 91

[Statement issued by the Armenian Republic Internal Affairs Ministry]

[Text] The situation has recently become extremely tense in Getashen, Shaumyanovskiy, and Nagorno-Karabakh. In order to divert Armenia's attention, brigand attacks are also being organized on the republic's border settlements. Fully armed Soviet soldiers have been engaged in the brigand operations with the knowledge and patronage of the Kremlin. This is manifested by the uninterrupted tank and artillery shelling and bombardment by Soviet Army units.

One peaceful citizen died and three others were injured in Armenia's border regions as a result of the aggressive operations conducted by the neighboring republic and the Soviet Army. Two people were taken hostage from Gorisskiy Rayon and later killed.

Scores of houses and other buildings were destroyed. A missile was fired from a helicopter on Voskepar village in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon.

The republic's population is already aware of the tragic, yet heroic, developments that unfolded in Getashen and Martunashen. The republic's law enforcement bodies, the special regiment operating under the jurisdiction of the Armenian MVD [Internal Affairs Ministry] Special Purpose Detachment, and the other military subunits are supervising the situation in cooperation with MVD departments and with personnel from the border-guard detachments. These groups are taking all possible measures to defend the republic's borders, ensure the security of life and property of the people, and to reply appropriately to any sort of (?crime).

Hasty steps and uncoordinated operations are very dangerous in the prevailing situation, for they might lead to even more tragic consequences. Such isolated behavior has already been observed at the republic's borders. The Armenian MVD hereby appeals to such persons to refrain from individualistic actions, hasty [word indistinct] and adventurism at this crucial moment. All those who are willing to assist in the defense of the fatherland should apply to the republic's Supreme Soviet Defense Committee which is organizing and coordinating such work. At the same time the republic's MVD warns that those persons and organizations which by their individualistic and unconsidered actions disrupt the measures taken by the MVD for the stabilization of the situation will be severely punished.

Armenian Emergency Council on Situation

NC0305093491 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] The Republican Temporary Council on the Emergency Situation continued its closed session on 2 May.

Supreme Soviet Chairman Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Gevorg Vardanyan, Council of Ministers' first deputy chairman, briefed the council on the situation. It was pointed out that in accordance with an agreement, two helicopters were sent to Getashen in the morning. The aircraft, however, were forced to land in Shaumyanovskiy Rayon due to bad weather.

Meruzhan Ter-Gulanyan, chairman of the Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Press Affairs, presented the results of the media operations aimed at shaping international public opinion.

The Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers Presidium then adopted a joint declaration.

Armenia Urges Gorbachev Intervention

LD0205172191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1701 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] Yerevan, 2 May (TASS)—Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, has insistently appealed to the USSR president to take under his own control the settlement of the issue connected with events in the Armenian villages of Getashen and Martunashen in Azerbaijan. Speaking on Armenian television today, the head of the republic's legislature stressed that President Mikhail Gorbachev remains the only person who is in a position to control the situation. He announced that he spoke to the head of the Soviet state by telephone on 1 May.

"We have repeatedly warned that a change in the status quo in the region will lead to the most tragic consequences," the head of the legislature noted. In his opinion, "Moscow has been tardy in acting this time, too."

Armenian Mission on 'War Situation'

LD0205180791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1715 GMT 2 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Ruben Shirinyan]

[Text] Moscow, 2 May (TASS)—A war situation has developed in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian villages of Azerbaijan near it. Two villages—Getashen and Martunashen—which have approximately 3,000 inhabitants, are under the threat of destruction. A news conference held at the permanent mission of the Republic of Armenia in Moscow this afternoon was devoted to this critical situation. People's deputies from the Union and Armenian legislatures took part in it.

David Vardanyan, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia, told journalists that "both villages are surrounded by tanks. Contact is being maintained with the residents by portable radio transmitter." "The Azerbaijani side's claims that armed Armenian militants are in the villages are not true. The residents have only hunting rifles," the deputy said. In his opinion, the most important thing now is to stop the escalation of combat operations, to lift the siege of the villages, to provide an opportunity to help the wounded, and then to start negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The appearance of Fuad Iskenderov, cochairman of the Committee of Azerbaijanis in Moscow, in the hall where the news conference was held was noteworthy because in recent years virtually no Azerbaijani people have appeared in the permanent mission of Armenia. "The Azerbaijani people are not the enemy of the Armenian people. It is necessary to stop the bloodshed immediately and to start negotiations," Iskenderov stated.

Armenian Villages 'Completely Surrounded'

LD0205172491 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] According to information received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, yesterday evening Azerbaijani OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] members and troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs again completely surrounded the Armenian villages of Getashen and Martunashen. Several attempts by the Armenian side to bring the injured out of the besieged villages failed. The Azerbaijan OMON members are frustrating all attempts at communication between these villages and the outside world. Telephone and radio communications are still not working in Getashen. Representatives of the Moscow Memorial could not get into Getashen either. They were sent back by an Azerbaijan OMON member from Stepanakert airport to Yerevan on the same flight by which they had arrived.

Situation 'Extremely Tense'

LD0205154491 Moscow TASS in English 1453 GMT 2 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert May 2 TASS—The past several days proved to be far from festive in Nagorno-Karabakh. A bus was fired at from a pistol on Wednesday night between the Armenian village of Martuni and the Azerbaijani village of Khodzhavend. An Armenian was wounded. Later a car struck a mine in the Gadrut District. Two Azerbaijanians were killed and a young girl was wounded.

An Azerbaijanian was killed by watchmen this morning in the Mardakert District of Nagorno-Karabakh during an armed attack on a farm of the Armenian village of Shal-Uran, aimed at driving away the cattle. Criminal proceedings were instituted on all those cases.

According to the information supplied by the commander's office of the state of emergency region, which includes the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region and the adjacent regions of Azerbaijan, situation was "tense on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border last night.

Fire exchanges occasionally took place there. According to preliminary reports, nobody was killed or injured.

The situation near the Armenian villages of Getashen and Martusheni [name spelling as received], in the Khanlar region of Azerbaijan, continues to be extremely tense. Fighting is continuing there. There is no exact information about casualties.

Units Attack Armenian Villages

LD0205200791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1745 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] Stepanakert, 2 May (TASS)—The situation continues to be extremely tense in the area of the Armenian villages of Getashen and Martunashen in Khanlar Rayon of Azerbaijan. Fighting is continuing there. A TASS correspondent managed to contact the nearby village of Shaumyanovsk by telephone. According to one of the village leaders, S. Megryan, OMON [special purpose militia detachment] units belonging to the Azerbaijan Interior Ministry began an attack on these two Armenian villages on 30 April. The Armenians put up resistance. According to information received at Shaumyanovsk, there are dead and wounded at Getashen and Martunashen. Homes have been destroyed.

Martunashen was attacked again today. The village was burned down and some of the villagers fled to Getashen. The fate of the rest is unknown. Attempts to evacuate seriously injured people from the villages were not successful.

At the Stepanakert office of the commander in charge of the state of emergency area, a TASS correspondent was told that two armored vehicles used by USSR Interior Ministry troops stationed in Shaumyanovsk were sent to Getashen to bring out the wounded. One of them managed to break through to the village. Five dead Armenians and seven wounded were brought out.

Official on Armenian Guerrilla Activities

LD0205132491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] Tofik Guseynov, cochairman of the organization for the Azerbaijani public under the Azerbaijani permanent mission in Moscow, told us by telephone that the presidential decree of 9 October last year has not been fulfilled. During registration formalities that took place in Azerbaijan on 25 April, Guseynov said, a large number of Armenian guerrillas without residence permits for Azerbaijan were identified. On 30 April Armenian guerrillas took 14 Soviet Army servicemen hostage, including 13 Russians and one Azeri, near Chaykend village. According to Guseynov, the Azeri was killed on the spot but the fate of the others is not known. A large quantity of equipment, including mortars, dozens of mortar shells, several powerful radio transmitters, military vehicles, and armored personnel carriers, was seized during the operations against Armenian guerrillas conducted by the Soviet Army and USSR Internal Affairs Ministry troops. Referring to a report by the military commandant of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, Guseynov said that Armenian guerrillas have already killed 90 people and injured 57 so far this year.

The head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of Shushanskiy Rayon reported that an attack was mounted against the town of Shusha yesterday. Hostilities are expected to continue today, too. A mosque was destroyed by an explosion in Nakhichevanskiy Rayon.

Official Describes Getashen Incident

NC0205111291 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 1 May 91

[Excerpts] The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, Shaumyanovskiy Rayon, and Getashen subrayon, as well as along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, has recently worsened. Disturbing reports are coming in, especially from Getashen, which has been under siege for the last month and is subjected to intense firing.

The Armenian Supreme Soviet met in a closed session on 30 April to analyze the situation and adopt relevant measures. [passage omitted] Babken Ararktsyan, first deputy chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, who had just returned that day from Getashen, noted that the main developments unfolded there that morning [30 April] when subunits of the Internal Troops positioned in the nearby hills opened massive artillery fire and then overran the village. They intended to terrorize and disarm the people of Getashen who were defending their homes. They burned down 10 houses. Realizing that the disarming process will be followed by the deportation of the peaceful population, as was the case in Azat and Kamo, the people of Getashen resisted fiercely and took 12 soldiers hostages. Talks started that afternoon for the exchange of hostages. [passage omitted]

[Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian at 1300 GMT on 1 May reports that during the morning of 30 April the USSR Security Council was in session under President Gorbachev. On the same day "the subunits of the Baku regiment of the Internal Troops of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry" took positions in hills overlooking Getashen and started to fire on the village. The Armenian authorities "tried in vain to contact the USSR leadership and the president." "At 1800 the subunits of the Internal Troops and Azerbaijani Special Purpose Militia began the assault on the village." Yerevan Domestic also reports that the village "radio transmitter went dead at 2200" after reporting "continuing massacres."]

Armenian Envoy Reminded of Nuclear Plant Control

NC0305060391 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 2 May 91

[Text] General Shatalin, USSR deputy minister of internal affairs, telephoned Feliks Mamikonyan, the Armenian Republic's permanent representative in Moscow, on 2 May and ominously demanded that the

Armenians end their protests and not forget that the Armenian nuclear power plant is under the control of the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry.

Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan Interviewed

NC2904185991 Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 24 Apr 91 p 10

["Exclusive" interview with Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet, by CUMHURIYET correspondent Fatih M. Yilmaz, in Yerevan; date not given]

[Text] Yerevan—[Yilmaz] Mr. Ter-Petrosyan, can you please assess the future relations between Ankara and Yerevan in light of Ambassador Volkan Vural's visit to Armenia?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Predicting future relations between Turkey and Armenia is very difficult. However, we wish to establish friendly relations with Turkey. Armenia, which is taking quick steps in separating from the Soviet Union with an aim to becoming independent, wishes to improve its relations with Turkey in the economic field, in particular.

The development of relations between the two countries will definitely depend on the two governments' approaches. We have observed that Turkey also wants to develop its relations with Armenia. The next important step is to establish mutual confidence. The Turkish and the Armenian peoples should be kept up-to-date on the progress in that arena. What I really should say on this matter is that both sides are willing to improve their relations. Ambassador Volkan Vural's visit has confirmed this state of affairs.

[Yilmaz] The anxiety that Armenia will demand land from Turkey seems to have been removed due to Vural's visit, particularly after you disclosed that Armenia will not make such a demand....

[Ter-Petrosyan] We wish to give priority to the development of our economic relations at the present time. We wish to establish mutual confidence. Political matters were not discussed during our talks with Vural. A move may be made to examine political matters after we establish economic cooperation and mutual confidence. This is a bilateral issue.

Furthermore, the matter is also related to the question of Armenia gaining its independence from the Soviet Union. The question of land is a sensitive matter. The Armenian legislature's resolution, which describes the incidents in 1915 as an act of genocide, does not contain a provision which can be regarded as a claim for land from Turkey. In short, my reply to your question is as follows: We do not wish to have political matters on the agenda at the present time. Neither of the two sides stands to gain from such an approach. The feelings which stem from past incidents may not conform with the present realities. Consequently, what should be done is to suppress these matters and prevent them from coming into the light.

[Yilmaz] Are you saying that they may be brought back into the light when the time comes?

[Ter-Petrosyan] Giving a quick reply to this question is difficult. We wish to maintain good relations. We maintain goodwill in that regard. A lack of confidence currently pervades the feelings of the Armenian and Turkish peoples. This must be overcome. This is why keeping these matters alive will be useless at this time.

[Yilmaz] Mr. Ter-Petrosyan, what will the scope of your economic relations with Turkey be? What kind of an economic policy will you adopt?

[Ter-Petrosyan] A significant similarity exists between the economic steps Turkey has taken in the past few years and the objectives we wish to achieve. We, too, are trying to adopt the free-market system. This is why we have moved to take liberal steps in the industrial and agricultural fields. We are trying to establish a modern and civilian Armenia and we will succeed in doing so. We will establish cooperation with Turkey for that purpose. Furthermore, we will initiate a new era in our relations with all of Armenia's neighbors. The scope of the relations we will establish with Turkey will be determined through negotiations between the two sides. We can cooperate in tourism, make joint investments, and open a border gate between the two countries.

[Yilmaz] Do you believe that the problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan will affect the relations Armenia wishes to establish with Turkey?

[Ter-Petrosyan] The problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan only concern those two countries. Each and every interference from the outside will worsen this problem. I believe that we will be able to resolve our problems with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, most Armenians believe that Turkey supports Azerbaijan. The matter is related to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. If this matter is resolved, no problems will not exist between Yerevan and Baku.

[Yilmaz] What is the level of your relations with Armenians who live in foreign countries?

[Ter-Petrosyan] We regard the Armenians diaspora as a potential source of strength. Regardless of the existing problems, Armenia wishes to maintain its relations with the Armenians in foreign countries. However, this must definitely not be taken as evidence that we support all of their policies.

[Yilmaz] Do you see your relations with Turkey as a way for you to become a modern country and to establish relations with Europe?

[Ter-Petrosyan] No, definitely not. Turkey is not the only chance we have. In light of the developments that

are taking place worldwide, we wish to place our relations with Turkey on a sound basis. We also wish to do the same with the other countries. This is what is required at the present time. We believe that the establishment of these relations will be auspicious for the two sides. I believe that Ankara and Yerevan will open a border gate between the two countries within a short period of time and move to take the necessary steps to establish economic cooperation.

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Meets 30 Apr

NC0205132091 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1700 GMT 30 Apr 91

[Text] The Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium held its regular meeting today. The presidium discussed the results of the meeting that the USSR president held with the leaders of nine Union republics and the joint declaration issued on the question of ending the crisis in the country.

The presidium members observed a minute of silence at the beginning of their meeting to remember one of their colleagues, Aydin Mamedov.

Tel'man Orudzhev, first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet, opened the meeting. He said that as in the case of the other republics, Azerbaijan was also greatly interested in the meeting held between the USSR president and the leaders of the nine republics. The meeting noted that a joint effort aimed at strengthening the situation in the Soviet Union is essential.

The presidium members approved the work carried out by President Ayaz Mutalibov. They also approved the position he took regarding the protection of the Azerbaijani people's interests.

The presidium also noted that it appreciated the meeting held between the USSR president and the leaders of the nine Union republics and assessed it as a very essential initiative aimed at removing the crisis situations in the country.

A joint effort at the present time is more essential than in the past. The joint declaration confirmed the need to approach the deepening crisis situations in the country seriously and with a sense of responsibility in order to find ways to end them.

The presidium fully approved the implementation of resolute measures to restore constitutional order and complete adherence to the law. This matter is in full harmony with the Azerbaijani people's interests. However, for four years now plots are being hatched against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Attacks are being launched against the republic's territorial integrity and sovereignty by armed groups which have been illegally established in Armenia.

The union of states in which our republic, which has taken part in the referendum (?in the country), wishes to maintain its sovereignty should be one in which the other subjects of the federation neither resort to the use of force nor are inclined to do so.

We fully support the implementation of joint measures to restore the normal functioning of the economy. This is due to the fact that each republic and its people suffers from the deterioration of the social and economic situation. Additional measures must be put into effect to improve the social security benefits for the citizens in particularly the low income bracket. Certain steps have been taken in the republic in that regard.

We are convinced that the leaders of the Union and the republics are working to end the [word indistinct] under the guise of economic and political [word indistinct]. The struggle of various political trends and movements must be based on the principles of democracy and civilization. During this responsible era in the history of the country, everthing must be subject to the lofty interests of the people. In view of this, the joint declaration needs our strong support.

The Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium regarded President Ayaz Mutalibov's work as productive and fully approved the position he maintained in complete harmony with the Azerbaijani people's interests.

Georgia Denies AFP Report on Declining Aid

LD0305112691 Moscow TASS in English 1055 GMT 3 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi May 3 TASS—The press centre of the Georgian parliament today denied a report by the [AGENCE] FRANCE-PRESSE news agency that Georgia had ostensibly declined aid offered by the Soviet central authorities for the elimination of the aftermath of the strong earthquake which had occurred on April 29.

"Only a madman can decline aid when 100,000 people in the republic have remained homeless, without clothing and food because of the earthquake," press centre staff member Maguliy Gagnidze told TASS.

She reaffirmed that all Soviet republics, by a decision of the central government in Moscow, are sending food, medicines, clothing and tents to Georgia for quake victims.

Cabinet Approves Aid to Georgia

LD0305120391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0900 GMT 3 May 91

[Text] In connection with the earthquake in Georgia, the USSR Cabinet of Ministers has allocated from reserves 20,000 liters of blood and blood substitues, tents, canned goods, milk, and sugar for regions that are stricken. This

is reported by the state commission on emergency situations. Rescue formations are being sent to the Transcaucasus by Union republics and a number of ministries. Army units of the military okrug and subunits of the country's internal troops are at work. A day of mourning was held in Georgia yesterday in connection with the earthquake. Today is a day of mourning in North Ossetia.

Georgian President on Blockade of Relief Goods

LD0205212391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 May 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] A report from the disaster area [Georgia after the earthquake] has been sent in by Nana Gongadze.

[Begin recording] [Gongadze] [passage omitted] What steps are being taken by the republic's government to solve the problems?

[Z. Gamsakhurdia, president of Georgia] You see, despite Georgia being struck by such misfortune—and everyone is expressing sympathy with us, and helping in any way they can—the Vremya program, for example, stated yesterday that despite the earthquake and these tragic consequences, we are supposedly continuing the blockade of South Ossetia. This is real disinformation. We sent a telegram to the USSR president and Pugo, the minister of internal affairs, requesting that urgent measures be taken to supply goods and specialists to the areas affected in the former South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.

[Gongadze] What is necessary now?

[Gamsakhurdia] Roads must be cleared immediately and the pickets of fighters who are stopping truck columns from transporting goods and personnel to these areas must be removed. [end recording]

[Announcer] In connection with the reproach of Vremya which this report contained, we want to explain that all reports from this region are given by us only with reference to official sources. In this case, concerning the continuing economic and energy blockade of South Ossetia, our presenter read out a statement, given in a TASS account, by the Tskhinvali Committee for Normalization in South Ossetia.

Georgian Officer Corps Protests OMON Presence

AU0205142791 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 19 Apr p 1

[Address to USSR President Mr. M.S. Gorbachev and the USSR Supreme Soviet by the Council of the Georgian Officer Corps; date not given]

[Text] The Republic of Georgia Officer Corps protests against crude interference by the center in the internal affairs of sovereign, independent Georgia, which has been restored with the support of the overwhelming majority of the republican population regardless of nationality or religious faith.

The sending in of an additional contingent of OMON [special-purpose militia detachment] units without the agreement of the legitimate government of the republic was caused by excesses on the part of the unbridled punitive forces [USSR Internal Troops]. Lawlessness has been provoked, too, by the bandit activities of the Ossetian extremists. People are being kidnapped and killed, houses ravaged and burned, and churches that withstood the Tatar invasion and the bolshevik terror are being blown up and put to the torch.

We regard this as open aggression against the Georgian people.

We demand the following:

1. That the OMON troops be immediately withdrawn from the city of Tskhinvali and the Goriyskiy and Karelskiy Rayons of Georgia;

2. That talks be started with the Republic of Georgia Government on a settlement of interstate relations.

In the event that our demands are not met, the Georgian Officer Corps reserves the right to ask servicemen who consider Georgia their homeland to leave the USSR military service.

[Signed] **Council of the Georgian Officers Corps.**

Georgian Trade Unions Protest Soviet Actions

AU0205145191 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 17 Apr 91 p 3

[Appeal to the world's trade union organizations from the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia, as reported by SAKINFORM]

[Text] The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia expresses its protest to the Soviet Government in connection with the occupation of a part of Georgia—Samachablo [South Ossetia] and the punitive operations carried out there.

On 9 April 1991, the legislature of Georgia declared the restoration of an independent Georgia. Throughout this period, the destruction of Georgia as a country and the assimilation of its nation according to the Soviet model have been under way.

The referendum held on 31 March 1991 confirmed, once again, the firm desire of the residents of Georgia, irrespective of their nationalities, to live in a free and independent country.

On the initiative of the working people of Georgia, protest actions—manifestations, meetings, and strikes—started against the punitive policy that is being pursued by the Soviet Government.

In this difficult time, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Georgia appeals to the peoples and trade union organizations of all countries with a request to show solidarity with Georgia and put a certain pressure on the ruling circles of the Soviet Union in order to put an end to the aggression and genocide that were started against Georgia and the Georgian nation.

Georgian Resolution on Election of Gamsakhurdia

AU0205092891 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 16 Apr 91 p 1

["Resolution by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet on the election of Zviad Konstantinovich Gamsakhurdia as President of the Republic of Georgia" dated 14 April 1991, together with biography of Gamsakhurdia]

[Text] The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet **resolves:** to elect Zviad Konstantinovich **Gamsakhurdia** as President of the Republic of Georgia.

First Deputy Chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet A. ASATIANI

Tbilisi, 14 April 1991

Zviad Gamsakhurdia

Zviad Konstantinovich Gamsakhurdia was born in 1939, son of the Georgian classical writer Konstantine Gamsakhurdia. He graduated from the Tbilisi State University faculty of West European languages and literature. He worked as a senior scientific associate at the Shota Rustaveli Institute of Georgian Literature. Among his learned interests are Georgian culture, Rustavelology [studies of Georgian classical poet Shota Rustaveli], theology, anthropology, foreign literature, and mythology. He is a candidate of philological sciences and the author of many monographs and scientific works.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia is well known as a poet and fiction writer, and has had collections of poetry and fables published. He has written literary research works on a variety of subjects and has made highly artistic translations of the works of American, English, and French writers. He has a command of English, German, French, and Russian.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia's public and political activities began in the 1950's, and led to his arrest while still a young man of 17. Despite this, he intensively continued his political activities in the 1960's, 1970's, and 1980's. He was editor and publisher of the first samizdat newspapers and journals to appear in Georgia. The publications "Okros satsmisi," "Sakartvelos moambe," "Sakartvelo," "Matiane" and others, which came out in the 1970's, played a highly important part in the rebirth of the national liberation movement in Georgia.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia is the founder and permanent chairman of the Georgian Helsinki Union. In 1989 he was elected chairman of the Society of St. Ilya the Righteous. He has been one of the organizers and active leaders of all acts and demonstrations of protest.

In 1977-79 Zviad Gamsakhurdia was repressed. He served sentence for his political activities in jail in Tbilisi, Moscow, and the Caspian region.

In November 1990 Zviad Gamsakhurdia was elected chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet.

He is married with three sons.

Georgian Referendum Statistics Published

AU0205100791 Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian 6 Apr 91 p 2

[From the Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Georgia]

[Excerpts] On 4 April 1991, a meeting of the commission was held at which the results of the referendum of 31 March in the Republic of Georgia were summarized.

The folowing question was asked in the referendum:

"Do you agree to the restoration of Georgia's state independence on the basis of the act of independence of 6 May 1918?"

The Central Referendum Commission has established that:

1. The total number of electors in the Republic of Georgia was 3,672,403.

2. The number of participants in the referendum [as published] was 3,334,286; this amounts to 90.79 percent of the total number of electors.

3. The number of participants in the voting [as published] was 3,326,100; this amounts to 90.57 percent of the total number of electors.

4. The number of voters who gave a positive response to the referendum question was 3,295,493; this amounts to 99.08 percent.

5. The number of voters who gave a negative response to the referendum question was 16,917; this amounts to 0.51 percent of the total number of participants in the voting.

6. The number of ballots recognized as invalid was 13,690; this amounts to 0.41 percent of the total number of participants in the voting.

In accordance with Article 26 of the Republic of Georgia Law on the Referendum, it was recognized that a positive answer had been given to the question in the referendum.

The total number of voters in the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was 347,175 of which 61.27 percent participated in the referendum and 61.23 percent in the voting. A positive response to the question in

the referendum was given by 97.73 percent of the number of participants in the voting (59.84 percent of the total number of electors); a negative response was given by 1.42 percent (0.87 percent of the total number of electors).

In the Adzhar Autonomous Republic, the total number of voters was 224,778 of which 96.64 percent participated in the referendum and the voting; 97.67 percent (94.39 percent of the total number of electors) gave a positive response to the question in the referendum; 1.42 percent (1.37 percent of the total number of electors) gave a negative response. [passage omitted]

[Signed] Bazgaradze, chairman of the Electoral Commission.

Central Asia

Kazakh Deputies Deplore Retail Price Reform

PM2604081191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Eduard Matskevich report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Statement by Group of Deputies"]

[Text] A group of Kazakh SSR people's deputies who are members of legislative committees have sent a statement entitled "On the Reform of Retail Prices" to the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The deputies consider that after announcing the transition to the market economy and proclaiming it as official policy, the USSR Supreme Soviet, the country's president, and the Cabinet of Ministers have by the 2 April 1991 retail price reform virtually discredited the idea of the market and undermined the people's confidence once and for all.

"We people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR," the statement says, "expressing solidarity with the legitimate demands of working people and all our electors, condemn the actions of the country's leadership which are causing a sharp decline in the living standard."

The deputies believe that in the prevailing situation it is necessary to rapidly rescind the 5 percent tax on the sale of all types of goods and services; to draw up a list of consumer goods and restore prices for those goods at the level of 2 April 1991; to carry out an extensive reform of the system of labor remuneration and the taxation of enterprises and citizens in the near future; to accelerate the adoption of legislative acts ensuring genuine autonomy for enterprises; and to ensure a real and not merely imaginary reduction in the apparatus of state and local management.

Kyrgyz Ministerial Appointments Reported

LD0205183291 Bishkek SLOVO KYRGYZSTANA in Russian 24 Apr 91 p1

[Summary] Today's paper carries a Kyrgyz presidential decree appointing Anarbek Kuramayevich Bakayev as Kyrgyz minister of public education. The decree is signed by Akayev and dated Bishkek, 20 April 1991. It is accompanied by a Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet decision confirming the appointment. The paper also carries a Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet decision confirming K.O. Osmonaliyev as chairman of the republic's state committee for physical culture and sport. Both decisions are signed by Sherimkulov and dated Bishkek, 20 April 1991.

Uzbek President Karimov on Union Treaty

PM0205113591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov by correspondent A. Orlov in Tashkent; date not given: "Islam Karimov, president of Uzbekistan: "'We Have Achieved the Union Through Suffering'"]

[Text] Tashkent—[Orlov] The joint statement of the USSR president and the leaders of nine republics is distinguished by its resolve and firmness of tone and in that respect was already a surprise to many people. It has also been received in various ways. Islam Abduganiyevich, how timely is this document? Is it not belated?

[Karimov] Some people now are arguing: Are we on the verge of an abyss or are we falling into it? I would put it like this: We have reached the limit, and to avoid collapse urgent measures are needed. Our joint statement could not have appeared earlier, however—it had to be achieved through suffering, we had to experience everything we have experienced, to realize the urgency of coordinated actions, and, with a consideration for new experience, essentially to lay the foundation for a union of sovereign states.

[Orlov] Just two months ago you personally asserted that you were not ready to sign the Union treaty. Why has your opinion changed?

[Karimov] Even then, and all the more so now, I considered it essential to build this treaty from below, that is on the basis of the Union republics' proposals. We quarreled, argued, and... diverged in our interests, so to speak. At those meetings I often thought: Why are we meeting, if it is all restricted to disputes over words? I also had the following thought: Do we have to conduct futile arguments with the supporters of the unitarian state and with those who are anxious to secede, to leave the Union?

Believe me, these were agonizing thoughts, since even in a republic with an obvious preponderance of centrifugal

forces there are many people living who cannot conceive of themselves outside the Union. What to do?

In the present situation in my opinion there are only two ways out. The first is to rely on the union republics, to find the common ground that unites us, and to resolve all questions promptly. The second is a dictatorship that might possibly glue together the former economic relations—but only for a while. Incidentally, at the CPSU Central Committee plenum someone suggested introducing an emergency situation. Surely today we cannot agree to return from 1991 to 1985, to obedient compromise, to the old forms of planning from above? Perestroyka has changed the main thing: the people's self-awareness. It is true that so far we cannot act on this. The main delaying factor lies in the fact that mutual relations between the center and the republics have not yet been determined. We do not even know whether the USSR Supreme Soviet recognizes the republics' declarations of sovereignty or not, or what its attitude is toward republican legislatures. What can we say of the "war of laws" if we do not know whether the center rejects the republics' laws or agrees with them?

I can see that there are forces seeking to "keep hold of the reins," to safeguard all the center's functions, and to retain the unitary state. There is no doubt that there will be attempts to oppose our joint statement and emasculate it. Here I predict a struggle.

[Orlov] In your view what is the most important thing in this statement—for the center and for the republics—which you have had to defend?

[Karimov] The main thing is that the union-federation that we intend to join, for the sake of which we intend to sign the Union treaty, should be based on the republics' genuine independence, that it should be a Union of sovereign states with equal rights. This principle is the key one for us. Proceeding from it, the powers of the union structure should be determined from below and not imposed from above. A very great deal stands behind this but I do not doubt that, having obtained specific power functions from strong republics, the center will also become strong. After all, it will not occur to anyone to object to its decisions if we ourselves delegate powers to it and clearly demarcate its competence. There was a lot of talk about this principle; frankly, we did not reach a unanimous opinion immediately.

It is also very important, while the renewed federation is being created, to maintain strict constitutional order and to fulfill an economic agreement determining our country's life for 1991.

As for the future Union treaty, I am familiar with many republican versions. We met recently in Kiev—representatives of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. We discussed all the versions. We have the same approaches toward the rights and duties of the Union and the republics. The leaders of the other Central Asian republics have no objections—I have talked with them. As far as I know, the president of Azerbaijan is not opposed either. With these agreements it is already possible to embark directly on signing a union document.

[Orlov] The republics which sign the Union treaty will establish a most favored nation status for themselves. What will that mean for the republics, in particular for Uzbekistan?

[Karimov] The tragedy of our position is that vertical executive ties have been broken, that the laws of the country's Supreme Soviet and the president's decrees are not being fulfilled in the republics. Today that is perhaps the main contradiction. But as soon as we voluntarily join the federation and determine a harmonious system of vertical relations, we shall thereby also determine a system of mutual responsibility. Sensible, rational relations will finally be formed whereby a gain for each individual republic will be a gain for the Union as a whole.

I believe the treaty should outline the spheres which we will hand over to the Union's management: questions of mutual relations between republics, major targeted programs, of course, rail and air transport, the defense complex, and so forth.

Well, the republics, on joining the Union, should feel not only responsibility but also the advantages of a federation—a voluntary community where there will be the division of labor, shared production, and, where necessary, the pooling of efforts and potential to resolve the most important common tasks. For instance, take Uzbekistan. We clearly realize that we would be many times weaker outside the Union. When we sign documents that are binding in terms of their execution and any laxity becomes intolerable and impossible in economic relations, then neither in our republic nor in the other republics will anyone have to agitate for the Union. The priority of horizontal ties will enable each enterprise to operate and develop relying on the aid of the union republics, and labor collectives will succeed in avoiding losses, the halting of production, and the reduction of wages.

[Orlov] What will be the position of the republics that do not sign the treaty?

[Karimov] I shall say immediately that we have not talked of any discrimination against the remaining six republics. The joint statement spoke of their full right to decide independently the question of acceding to the Union treaty. You know I am surprised that in these republics all political statements and declarations are not backed up by economic calculations. I am not convinced that their leaders know whether they will be able to feed people and provide clothing and shoes for them, whether they will be able to ensure a normal life within the limits of their potential if they withdraw from the Union. In the future it may be that the nine republics build mutually advantageous relations and resolve problems of taxation, trade, and budget formation and then in the six republics the people will finally start wondering which is more

important—economic ties or politicians' ambitions? Believe me, I am not trying to frighten anyone, but that question will arise.

[Orlov] The joint statement mentions the implementation of joint anti-crisis measures. What is meant by this?

[Karimov] Primarily the formation of the union and union republic budgets. Today, in implementing the price reform, we are running the risk of losing the people's confidence for ever, unless we are able to provide compensation at the promised level to the population. That is absolutely essential.

In the first quarter 31 billion rubles [R] were not paid into the union budget because the system of payments and taxation policy as a whole have not been properly thought out. Most important of all, however, are food supplies to people. The main purpose of the anti-crisis measures is to ensure that people in all the republics are supplied with essential food products.

Naturally, we must all take part in the implementation of the priority union-wide programs, above all the ecological program where problems are becoming more acute with every passing year, and an unfavorable situation in one region spreads to another. Today the problems of Chernobyl and the Aral Sea have assumed a global scale and cannot be resolved without pooling efforts. We are also interested in the speediest possible solution of questions pertaining to conversion—this is also a common problem. Nor can the fuel and energy program be a matter of indifference to us. In my opinion, it cannot be tackled at individual republic level. The miners' strikes have shown what impact they have on hundreds of other enterprises located thousands of kilometers away from the coal basins. Naturally, we want normal conditions to be created for the miners, and we are prepared to take part in this and other anti-crisis measures. Some republics will provide backing with money, others with resources, and yet others in some other way. Only by acting jointly and deliberately will we be able to overcome the existing difficulties and achieve a breakthrough. It is for this purpose that it is necessary to form the budget and extrabudgetary funds.

[Orlov] Republican sovereignty has become a reality, a division of power also already exists, even though it has not yet been underpinned by a treaty. It appears that an anti-crisis program will have to comprise a union and republican sections?

[Karimov] What specifically each republic will be doing will become clear when the division of functions between the Union and the republics is defined on the basis of the final version of the treaty. For the time being the anti-crisis program has only been sketched in outline, it has no specific content or mechanism of implementation, nor is it tied to territories. It will become effective when its implementation mechanism comes into play, and this mechanism is inconceivable without the involvement of the republics' executive bodies.

[Orlov] How relevant to Uzbekistan is the warning against incitement to civil disobedience and strikes, how do you assess the sociopolitical situation in the republic, and what is your forecast?

[Karimov] Uzbekistan is not partitioned off from the rest of the country, nor is it possible to guard against social instability by means of borders or bans, but only by means of a sensible, farsighted policy. It is important that miners' strikes and other forms of the populations' protests are on the wane. In my opinion this is already a result of the joint statement. After all, it is addressed not just to governments and power structures, but also to political parties, movements, and the public. We have turned literally to everyone, not with a hollow request to discard differences and political ambitions, but with a specific program of priority measures. Unless they are treated sensibly and with understanding, there will simply be no one tomorrow to sort out who is on the left and who is on the right, given the general disintegration. Common sense is more important today than ever.

Now all the measures of the center and the republics aimed at improving the situation make it possible to maintain the narrow band of stability, to enter into dialogue with the working people, and to establish mutual understanding. I would say that in our tense situation (and Uzbekistan is no exception) the republic's labor collectives and leaders of the individual movements are, nonetheless, beginning to subordinate their plans to the sensible views which, in my opinion, are beginning to prevail among the country's public. Only consolidation on the basis of a positive program can help us out of the crisis.

It is extremely difficult to make predictions at the moment; however, I am convinced that provided we succeed in the next few days in filling our joint statement with specific content, the Union will prevail. This depends on each one of us, and primarily on the USSR president, who must steer a straight course here, without vacillation. This is not just my opinion but also the opinion of the leaders of other union republics.

If the two leaders M. Gorbachev and B. Yeltsin stick firmly to the positions of the document that they have signed together with us, I am confident that the signing of the Union treaty is near. In my opinion, everything that is necessary at this stage has been done, there is no need for other statements or speeches. The long-awaited treaty cannot be postponed any longer. We have achieved the union through suffering.